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Abstract 
 
A SEU or soft error is defined as a temporary error on digital electronics due 
to the effect of radiation. Such an error can cause system failure, e.g. a 
deadlock in an asynchronous system or production of incorrect outputs due to 
data corruption.  
The first part of this thesis studies the impact of process variation, 
temperature, voltage and size scaling within the same process on the 
vulnerability of the nodes of C-element circuits. The objectives are to identify 
vulnerable to SEU nodes inside a C-element and to find the critical charge 
needed to flip the output from low to high (0-1) and high to low (1-0) on 
different implementations of C-elements. 
In the second part, a framework to compute the SEU error rates is developed. 
The error rates of circuits are a trade-off between the size of the transistors and 
the total area of vulnerability. Comparisons of the vulnerability of different 
configurations of a C-element are made, and error rates are calculated. 
The third part focuses on soft error mitigation for single and dual rail latches. 
The latches are able to detect and correct errors due to SEU. The 
functionalities of the solutions have been validated by simulation. A 
comprehensive analysis of the performance of the latches under 
variations of the process and temperature are presented. 
The fourth part focuses on testing of the new latches. The objective is to 
design complex systems and incorporate both single rail and dual rail latches 
in the systems. Errors are injected in the latches and the functionality of the 
error correcting latches towards the SEU errors are observed at their outputs. 
The framework to compute error rates and soft error mitigation developed in 
this thesis can be used by designers in predicting the occurrence of soft error 
and mitigating soft error in systems. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 presents the motivation behind the research, the objectives, a thesis 
overview, the thesis’ contributions and publications. 
1.1 Motivation 
The demand for higher integration density and lower power consumption has 
lead to the scaling of transistor and voltage supply. Technology continues to 
improve in modern VLSI design with the number of transistors doubled every 
18 months; this observation is known as Moore’s law [1]. According to Figure 
1 [2], assuming half of the die area of 300 𝑚𝑚2 is allocated for logic and the 
other half for cache memory, the number of transistors in logic and cache 
memory will reach 1.5 billion and 100 billion respectively by 2015. In 2001, 
the number of transistors in logic and cache memory were 50 million and 1 
billion respectively. As transistors continue to shrink, their number per unit 
area is increased. This has led to an exponential increase in the number of 
logic cells per chip. It becomes increasingly important to deal with reliability 
issues of such complex systems, which is the main focus of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1: The evolution of transistors with respect to year 
 
An important factor affecting reliability of systems is the phenomenon of a 
single event upset (SEU) in state holder components such as a memory cell, 
flip-flop or latch. NASA defines SEU as “Radiation-induced errors in 
microelectronic circuits caused when charged particles (usually from the 
radiation belts or from cosmic rays) lose energy by ionizing the medium 
through which they pass, leaving behind a wake of electron-hole pairs” [3]. 
SEU has been identified as a possible cause of data corruption. The term ‘soft 
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error’ refers to a temporary error that occurs as a result of particles (alpha 
particles from packaging or neutrons from the atmosphere) striking the silicon 
structures and causing the state to change from high to low or from low to 
high. This electrical effect happens due to the generated electron-hole pairs in 
the reverse-biased junction of the victim device.  
Nowadays, the dimensions of transistors are very small, as the technology 
nodes of 90nm and below (down to 22nm at the time of completion of this 
thesis in 2013) became feasible. The drain current and the threshold voltage 
are  reduced with voltage scaling. As a result, radiation induced soft errors in 
the combinational logic are gaining increasing attention and are expected to 
become as important as directly induced errors for state elements. The 
problem of SEU on transistors has been highlighted by the International 
Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS), although the problem was 
ignored previously until the scaling of transistors had reached deep submicron 
technology. In a 2011 report, the ITRS listed SEU as one of the factors 
responsible for the decreased reliability of the device.  
The severity of SEU toward high density memory devices can be 
illustrated on DRAM and SRAM, as they are important elements in an 
advanced IC. SRAM is less dense compared with DRAM since it is normally 
built from four or six transistors, whereas DRAM is built from a single 
transistor and a capacitor.  
Data 
By 
RAM 
Size 
RAM 
Type/Test 
Avg FIT 
Rate 
#Diff 
Devs 
Range FIT 
Rates 
Average 
Up/bit-
hr 
IBM 4M D/A 3500 5* 53-10300 8.9E-13 
IBM 1M D/A 3300 2* 2500-4100 3.3E-12 
IBM 1M D/F 325 2* 230-420 3.1E-13 
Mot 256K S/F 500 3 450-560 2E-12 
Mot 1M S/F 2070 2 1330-2800 2.1E-12 
Mot 4M S/F 5750 4 4500-8900 1.5E-12 
Table 1: Ground level soft error rates measured by RAM 
D-DRAM, S-SRAM, F-Field testing, A-Accelerated testing by using proton 
beam 
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From Table 1 [4] it can be observed that DRAM, which is tested using 
a proton beam, has an average FIT rate of 3300 for 1M and 3500 for 4M. 
Similarly, the average FIT rate for SRAM which has field testing is 2070 for 
1M and 5750 for 4M. It is concluded that high density memories have higher 
error rates compared with low density memories due to transistor scaling.  
Previously, soft errors were a concern for space applications, but now 
due to the increase in terrestial radiation, soft error affects everyone. The 
problems caused by single event upset can be illustrated by the examples 
below in the areas of security and finance: 
(a) In the United States alone, 50% of 12 million security cameras sold in 
2006 were digital cameras. An average digital camera once a year 
experiences an SEU causing its critical failure. So, the the number of 
critical failures is approximately 6 million. When a camera is locked due 
to SEU, it needs to be reset. This can be costly or in some applications 
unacceptable [5].  
(b) In a large enterprise such as bank that uses a system of 20,000 processors 
one flip-flop experiences one soft error every two days. This is highly 
unacceptable to the banking system and stock market as it can lead to 
huge losses being inccured by the financial industry. An example of the 
adverse effect of SEU on the banking system is when the most 
significant digit of the register storing the balance of a bank account flips 
from 1 to 0, or vice versa [6].  
 
The demands for lower power consumption have also heightened the need for 
asynchronous circuits, since they consume less power compared with 
synchronous circuits. However, one of the problems of asynchronous circuits 
is that they stay sensitive to SEU continuously for the whole cycle of 
operation. For asynchronous circuits, an acknowledgement signal is sent to the 
preceding register after the current operation is finished, indicating it is ready 
for the next operation. In the event of SEU hitting one of the registers, no 
acknowledgement signal is sent and therefore the preceding register does not 
assign the next operation to the current computational block. This is in 
contrast with synchronous circuits because they become sensitive to SEU only 
within a setup-hold window due to the operation being controlled by a global 
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clock. As a result of this, the reliability of synchronous circuits depends 
mainly on the upsets in flip-flops, whilst in asynchronous circuits both the 
memory elements and the logic gates are important. Compared with other 
logics, the C-element is the most important component in asynchronous 
circuits and therefore the study of the C-element is vital in order to understand 
the reliability of asynchronous circuits towards SEU. 
1.2 Objectives 
As discussed in Section 1.1, SEU is responsible for temporary data corruption. 
This thesis focuses on the factors involved in a state holder experiencing SEU. 
The state holder focussed on is the C-element. Different configurations of C-
elements have different vulnerabilities towards SEU.  The vulnerability of the 
C-element can be compared by calculating the error rate of the individual 
nodes and adding the error rate to obtain the total error rate of the individual 
circuit.  
The second focus of this thesis is on the soft error mitigation in the C-element. 
Most existing techniques have many vulnerable nodes especially on C-
element. These vulnerable nodes can be protected against SEU at the expense 
of the area of the circuit and the power dissipation. Another factor is the 
capability of the circuit, not only that it is able to detect an error but most 
importantly it is able to correct the error. This is especially important in 
asynchronous circuits because illegal symbols generated from SEU can cause 
deadlock. Thus it is worth trading area and power in order to improve circuit 
performance against deadlock.  
The third focus is on testing the proposed latches against SEU by using 
complex logic. This is important to ensure the latches can function correctly 
with complex logics. It can also provide the Integrated Circuit (IC) designer 
with information on the effectiveness of proposed circuits against SEU.   
A set of objectives are summarised below. State-of-the-art software and 
equipment has been used, such as Cadence 90-nm technology, Matlab and 
Quartus II. 
a) To analyse the vulnerability of different configurations of C-elements.  
 
b) To develop a method of calculating the error rate of C-elements. 
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b) To propose error detection and correction of latches built from C-
elements. 
 
c) To test the proposed latches against SEU by using complex logic. 
 
1.3 Thesis Overview 
There are eight chapters presented in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 presents a literature review, as well as basic concepts of SEU and 
asynchronous circuits. 
Chapter 3 presents current injection resemble SEU current at the vulnerable 
nodes on different configurations of C-elements under four different scenarios: 
process corner, temperature, voltage, and size scaling with different inputs 
combination of the circuit. The objectives are to identify the vulnerable nodes 
due to SEU and to find the critical charges needed to flip the output from low 
to high (0-1) and high to low (1-0) on different configurations of C-elements.  
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of soft error rate on vulnerable nodes. A new 
method is developed to calculate the error rate of the four different C-element 
circuits. The total error rates with respect to process corner, temperature, 
voltage, and size scaling of the circuits are compared. From the error rate 
values, a comparison of vulnerability towards SEU with different 
configurations of C-elements can be made with respect to the change of the 
four factors above. 
Chapter 5 presents an error detection latch (ED) design and error detection 
and correction latch (EDC). The functionality of both ED and EDC latches are 
demonstrated using Cadence UMC 90nm. The waveforms under fault free 
conditions and in the event of an SEU striking the vulnerable nodes are 
obtained. The performance of ED and EDC latches are analysed in terms of 
propagation delay and switching power.   
Chapter 6 presents error detection for a dual rail latch (EDD and error 
detection and correction for dual rail latch (EDCD)). The functionality of both 
EDD and EDCD latches are demonstrated using Cadence UMC 90nm. The 
waveforms under fault free conditions and in the event of SEU striking the 
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vulnerable nodes are obtained. The performance of EDD and EDCD latches 
are analysed in terms of propagation delay and switching power. The error 
detection and correction with transient error correction latch (EDCDT) is also 
proposed in this chapter. 
Chapter 7 presents the systems that utilise the proposed EDCD latches. Using 
Quartus II, the functionality EDCD latches are demonstrated by using 
waveforms under fault free conditions and in the event of SEU hitting the 
vulnerable nodes. An asynchronous communication is used to demonstrate the 
functionality of EDCD latches. The effect of the system using latches that has 
no capablity of detecting and correcting errors is also demonstrated in this 
chapter.   
Chapter 8 presents conclusions and future work related to the project.  
1.4 Thesis Contribution 
The contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
a) Investigation of the vulnerable node on various C-elements and 
obtaining the critical charge on each of the nodes of different 
configurations of C-elements. 
 
b) Development of a new technique to calculate the error rate of various 
types of C-elements and comparison of each of the C-elements in terms 
of vulnerability towards soft error.  
 
c) Design of a single rail error detection latch (ED) and error detection 
and correction latch (EDC). The latches are tested with process 
variations and temperature changes.  
 
d) Design of a dual rail error detection latch (EDD), dual rail error 
detection and correction latch (EDCD), and error detection and 
correction with transient correction latch (EDCDT). The latches are 
tested with process variations and temperature changes. 
 
e) Implementation of EDCD latch with an asynchronous communication 
system.   
 
1.5 Publications 
The following papers have been published for publications: 
N Julai, A Yakovlev and A Bystrov , Soft Errors Analysis involving C-
Elements Postgraduate Conference Newcastle University 2011 
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N Julai, A Yakovlev and A Bystrov, Soft Errors Analysis involving C-
Elements, UK Electronic Forum, Manchester University 2011 
 
N Julai, A Yakovlev and A Bystrov, Error Detection and Correction of Single 
Event Upset (SEU) Tolerant Latch, Postgraduate Conference Newcastle 
University 2012 
 
N Julai, A Yakovlev and A Bystrov, Error Detection and Correction of Single 
Event Upset (SEU) Tolerant Latch, International On-line Testing Symposium 
2012, pp 3-8 
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Chapter 2. Basic Concepts 
 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review and basic concepts of single event 
upset (SEU) and asynchronous circuits. 
2.1 Radiation Effects in Digital Systems 
In section 2.1 radiation is discussed, starting from the sources of radiation, the 
effect of radiation on transistors and modelling of current due to radiation. The 
focus is on presenting certain ideas and definitions that will help with the 
evaluation of calculating the critical charge and the error rate, as discussed 
later in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.1.1 Sources of Radiation 
The particles that can cause error are alpha particles from packaging material 
[7] [8], high energy neutrons with energy of more than 1 MeV [9]-[11], and 
the interaction of Boron with cosmic ray thermal neutrons [12]-[15]. There are 
three main sources of radiation that can cause soft error in electronic devices 
[16], as follows: 
a) The first source of ionizing radiation is package devices. Package devices 
contain certain impurities that are capable of emitting alpha particles. 
Alpha particles are produced by a nucleus of unstable isotopes. Alpha 
particles are known to have two neutrons and two protons that emit kinetic 
energy in the range of 4-9 MeV. There are many different isotopes known 
but Uranium and Thorium are the two isotopes that have the highest decay 
activities. The decay activities of Uranium and Thorium occur naturally in 
the environment. In the terrestrial environment, major sources of alpha 
particles are radioactive impurities, such as lead-based isotopes in solder 
bumps of flip-chip technology, gold used for bonding wires and lid plating, 
aluminium in ceramic packages, lead-frame alloys, and interconnecting 
metallization. 
b) The second source of ionizing radiation is cosmic rays. At terrestrial 
altitude, less than 1% of primary particles from cosmic rays include 
muons, pions, protons and neutrons that reach sea level. However, muons 
and pions live are brief and therefore do not cause error. Another particle, 
protons, are weakened by columbic interaction. The only possibility is that 
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neutrons are the particles that can cause error. The density of neutron 
fluxes depends on the altitude (i.e. It is proportional to the altitude). It also 
depends on earth magnetic fields, which vary depending on the 
geographical location. The neutron energy spectrum that causes SEU is 
shown in Figure 2.1 [17]. The neutron energy spectrum was obtained 
using a neutron beam at Weapon Neutron Research (WNR) in the Los 
Angeles Alamos National Laboratory. The neutron beam was used to 
obtain a similar energy spectrum as the atmospheric neutron spectrum. At 
WNR, neutrons are produced in spallation reactions of 800 MeV protons 
incident on a tungsten target which is widely used for SEU testing. From 
Figure 2.1 it can be seen that the neutron flux decreased by 10X as the 
neutron energy increased by 10X.    
 
Figure 2.1 : Neutron energy spectrum 
 
c) The third significant source that can induce soft error is the interaction of 
thermal neutrons and Boron. Boron is used as a p-type dopant implant 
species in silicon and used for formation of a BPS dielectric layer. Boron 
consists of two isotopes: 𝐵10  (80.1% abundance) and  𝐵11 (19.9% 
abundance). However,  𝐵10  is unstable when it interacts with neutrons. 
The interaction between 𝐵10  and a neutron results in two particles, 𝐿𝑖7  
and alpha particles, being produced. Both newly produced particles are 
capable of inducing soft error in electronic devices, as shown in Figure 2.2 
[16]. For low energy neutrons (less than 1MeV), the neutrons are not well 
defined since neutrons depend on many factors, such as the local 
environment, and at this range are more scattered. However, for the 
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purpose of comparison of the spectrum below 1 MeV, the thermal neutron 
spectrum [18] is used as shown in Figure 2.3. There are five outdoor 
measurements of neutron flux. It can be observed that there are two peaks 
of flux, located at 1 MeV to 10−7 MeV.  
 
Figure 2.2: Interaction of Boron and a neutron 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Neutron spectrum below 1 MeV, including thermal-energy 
neutrons 
 
2.1.2 The Effects of Radiation 
The drain of an off PMOS and drain of an off NMOS transistor are more 
vulnerable toward soft error. Figure 2.4 shows the single event transient (SET) 
produced [19]. A neutron from the atmosphere strikes the silicon causing a 
collision between the nucleus and the neutron within the substrate. The density 
of electron-hole pairs is produced by particles, as shown in Figure 2.4(a). The 
carriers are swept to diffusion junction by an electric field and cause the 
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charge collection to expand due to drift current (Figure 2.4(b)), resulting in the 
sudden current pulse. Then, the diffusion current dominates until all the excess 
carriers have been removed from the junction area (Figure 2.4(c)). The size of 
the funnel, as shown in Figure 2.4(b), and collecting time are very much 
inversely proportional to the substrate doping. The collection time is usually 
completed within picoseconds and the diffusion current begins to dominate 
until all the excess carriers have been collected [20]. 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 2.4: SEU produced  
Circuits that are exposed to radiation may have both long-term and 
short-term effects. Long-term effects are due to charge trapped at the oxide 
and the interface layer. The effects include shifting the threshold voltage, 
reducing the mobility of the inversion layer and shifting in the IV graph 
causing the MOSFET to turn OFF more slowly. Short-term effects include 
temporary data corruption due to single event upset. 
Under normal operation, the threshold voltage for an n-channel and p-
channel can be given by equation (2.1) [21]. This equation is valid assuming 
that there is no charge at gate oxide.  
 
𝑉𝑇 =
{
 
 ∅𝑀𝑆 + 2∅𝐹 +
1
𝐶𝑜𝑥
√2𝜀𝑠𝑞𝑁𝐴(2∅𝐹)       𝑛 − 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙
∅𝑀𝑆 + 2∅𝐹 −
1
𝐶𝑜𝑥
√2𝜀𝑠𝑞𝑁𝐷(2|∅𝐹|)    𝑝 − 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙
 
 
(2.1) 
 
Where ∅𝑀𝑆  is the metal-semiconductor workfunction,  𝜀𝑠  is the dielectric 
constant, ∅𝐹 is the bulk potential, 𝐶𝑜𝑥 is the oxide capacitance per unit area, 
and 𝑁𝐴  and 𝑁𝐷  are the doping densities of p-type and n-type respectively. 
However, in the event of the charge being trapped in the oxide due to it being 
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radiation-induced, the change in the threshold voltage is given by equation 
(2.2) [21]. 
 
∆𝑉𝑇 = −
1
𝜀𝑜𝑥
∫ 𝑥𝜌0𝑥(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑥0𝑥
0
 
(2.2) 
 
Where 𝑥0𝑥 is the oxide thickness,  𝜀𝑜𝑥 is the dielectric constant, 𝜌0𝑥  is the 
volume density charge in the oxide, and 𝑥 is the position in the oxide.  
The total change of threshold voltage is given by equation (2.3) [21]. 
∆𝑉𝑇 = ∆𝑉𝑜𝑡 + ∆𝑉𝑖𝑡 (2.3) 
 
From equation (2.3), the change of threshold voltage due to being radiation 
induced consists of two components. The first component is due to the oxide 
trapped charge density, 𝑄𝑜𝑡, and is given by equation (2.4) [21]. 
 
∆𝑉𝑜𝑡 = −
𝑄𝑜𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑥
 
𝐶𝑜𝑥 =
𝜀𝑜𝑥
𝑥𝑜𝑥⁄  
(2.4) 
 
The second component is due to the interface trapped charge density, 𝑄𝑖𝑡, and 
is given by equation (2.5) [21]. 
 
∆𝑉𝑖𝑡 = −
𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑥
 
𝐶𝑜𝑥 =
𝜀𝑜𝑥
𝑥𝑜𝑥⁄  
(2.5) 
 
Another effect of being radiation induced is the sub-threshold slope. 
The sub-threshold slope represents the time taken for the MOSFET to turn 
OFF. The steeper the slope, the quicker the turn OFF time. However, in the 
event of radiation, the interface-trap charge increases and the turn OFF time is 
longer, causing a leakage current even if there is no voltage applied at the gate 
of MOSFET. The drain current versus the gate voltage for MOSFET is shown 
in Figure 2.5 [21], illustrating the change in the slope of the drain current in 
the event of interface-trap charge due to radiation. 
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Figure 2.5: The drain current versus the gate voltage for MOSFET 
 
The charge stored at the logic node is a function of the supply voltage 
and the node capacitance, as shown in equation (2.6). 
𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑉𝑑𝑑 (2.6) 
 
As mentioned before, the drain node of CMOS is more sensitive when 
it is in the OFF mode. The duration and amplitude of the current pulse depend 
on the load capacitance and supply voltage. Other factors include the strength 
of the particle energy and the sizing of the transistor. The particle energy 
creates an electron-hole pair and generates current pulse. The deposition of 
energy is given by equation (2.7) [22]. 
𝐸𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 
3.6𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒
1.6𝑒−19
 
(2.7) 
 
Where 3.6eV is the energy required to generate an electron-hole pair in silicon 
and 𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the charge collected at the node after particle strike. 
2.1.3 Single Event Upset Modelling 
There are certain equations that are most commonly used to represent current 
pulse that causes SEU. The first equation uses known rising and falling times 
and is given in equation (2.8) [11] [23]. This equation uses double exponential 
current pulse. 
𝐼(𝑡) =
𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝜏𝑓− 𝜏𝑟
(𝑒
−𝑡
𝜏𝑓⁄ − 𝑒
−𝑡
𝜏𝑟⁄ ) 
 
(2.8) 
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Where 𝜏𝑟 and 𝜏𝑓 represent rising and falling time respectively. The author of 
[24, 25] suggested that the constant 𝜏𝑟  and 𝜏𝑓   is 50 ps and 164 ps 
respectively. 𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 represents the total collected charge after the current pulse 
hits the vulnerable nodes. 
The second equation uses single exponential current pulse. Unlike the 
first equation that uses rising and falling time, this equation uses process 
technology-dependent time constant and is given in equation (2.9). 
𝐼(𝑡) =
2𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇√𝜋
√
𝑡 
𝑇
𝑒
−𝑡
𝑇⁄  
 
 
(2.9) 
Where 𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the amount of collected charge and T is a process technology-
dependent time constant. 
Based on equations (2.8) and (2.9), several publications have been 
published to model current pulse in the simplest form. Since the above current 
pulse modelling is non-linear, approximation needs to be done to avoid the 
complexities of the equations. Based on the literature and previous works on 
modelling current pulse, three different shapes are identified: piece-wise linear 
function-shaped, triangular-shaped, and trapezoidal-shaped. 
The author of [26] modelled the current pulse as a piece-wise linear 
function, as shown by Figure 2.6.  
 
Figure 2.6: Piece-wise linear function modelling for SEU  
The peak represents funnelling charge collection and the tail represents 
decaying charge. The model was injected in 6T SRAM, since it is the most 
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convenient circuit to obtain verification. Results showed that the simulated 
data agreed with the experimental data based on 0.25 um technology. 
The author of [27] modelled the current pulse as a simple triangle with 
a rising time of 50fs and falling time of 5ps. This is shown in Figure 2.7. The 
model was injected in 6T SRAM with a simple latch, which were based on 65 
nm and 45 nm technology. However, the majority of previous works [19, 20, 
28] concluded that the rising is in the range of picoseconds and the falling time 
is in the range of a few hundred picoseconds.  
 
Figure 2.7: Triangular-shaped modelling for SEU 
 
The author of [28] introduced a trapezoid shaped current, as shown by 
Figure 2.8, to be the approximation of current pulse. The rising time is 20 ps 
and the falling time is 250 ps. The author also proposed the pulse width to be 
100 ps for this model. This model was injected on TH23 gates and single 
Schmitt and double Schmitt in order to measure the sensitivity of the particle 
strike.  
 
Figure 2.8: Trapezoidal-shaped SEU 
 
 
 16 
 
2.2 Asynchronous Design 
In this section the asynchronous design is discussed, including the advantages 
of asynchronous design, the classification of asynchronous design, the C-
element and the implementation. It is not the goal of these sections to cover all 
related theories of asynchronous design but rather to focus on certain ideas and 
key components that will help the evaluation of asynchronous design 
presented in chapters 5 to 7.  
2.2.1 Advantages of Asynchronous Design 
In digital design there are two types of design: synchronous design and 
asynchronous design. In synchronous design, a global clock is one of the main 
systems that consumes a lot of power. Power in synchronous design is 
consumed by the clock even if there is no data processing taking place. 
Asynchronous design that depends on data is clockless and as far as the power 
is concerned, asynchronous design does not consume much power compared 
with synchronous design, which really makes asynchronus design the 
preffered choice for low power consumption. Besides having low power 
consumption, there are many advantages of aynchronous design compared 
with synchronous design.  
(a) Absence of clock skew 
Clock skew refers to the arrival time difference of the clock signal 
reaching different parts of the system and is one of the main design 
challenges in synchronous design. The presence of process variations 
may cause adverse effects on clock frequencies. 
(b) Better than worst case performance 
The worst case scenario needs to be taken into account in synchronous 
design to ensure the circuit will not fail under the worst case scenario. 
For asynchronous design, the average case performance is the most 
likely case due to the data-dependant data flow and functional unit that 
shows data-dependant delay. 
(c) Automatic adaption to physical properties 
Delay depends on many factors, such as process variation, environment 
factors (temperature) and voltage supply. In synchronous design, these 
factors need to be considered and to ensure the design is reliable, the 
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worst of the above conditions needs to be calculated accordingly. 
However, in asynchronous design, since it is depends on the data as a 
clock, the above factors are adjusted and hence the designer need not 
worry about the functionality of the circuit even under the worst case 
scenario. 
(e) Reduced electromagnetic interference 
A synchronous circuit needs to be very precise in terms of the clock 
system and this results in a very narrow spectral band in the clock 
frequency. Any interference, for example due to electromagnetic 
interference, with the system clock in synchronous design may result in 
the circuit functioning slower or even to the extend of failing 
completely. This is not the case for asynchronous design as the 
activities of the circuit are very much independent from one another. 
Therefore, a more distributed noise spectrum which results from 
independent activities in asynchronous design makes the circuit more 
dependable compared with synchronous design.  
 
2.2.2 C-Element 
As mentioned above, one of the disadvantages of asynchronous circuits is 
circuit failure due to deadlock: a state where the system will be disabled 
indefinitely until the system has been reset or the error is filtered or corrected 
from the system. That means the circuit will be in the waiting state unless 
there is feedback or some kind of acknowledgement signal, since it is depends 
on the data itself rather than the clock to function. The C-element is one of the 
most commonly found circuits in asynchronous circuits, as shown in Figure 
2.9(a). The C-element gives logic 0 and 1 if both inputs are 0 and 1 
respectively. It maintains the previous value if the inputs are not equal. Figures 
2.2.1(b) and 2.2.1(c) also show the asymmetric C-element which is derived 
from a Muller C-element. The difference between them is the number of 
PMOS and NMOS transistors present in the circuit. In Figure 2.9(b), the 
output is 1 only if both inputs are 1. However, if input b is 0, the output is 0, 
irrespective of the value of b. Similarly, in Figure 2.9(c), if input b is 0, then 
the output is 0, irrespective of the value of c. 
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(a) Muller C-element          (b) Asymmetric C-element         (c) 
Asymmetric C-element 
Figure 2.9 
 
2.2.3 Classification of Asynchronous Circuits 
The  classification of asynchronous circuits, based on the definition of [29], is 
based on timing assumption criteria. 
A speed independent circuit (SI) is based on the assumption that the 
gates have positive and bounded delay, and most importantly with no delay. 
However, this assumption is not very realistic, especially in advanced 
technology processing. In long wire communication, for example, the delay of 
wires can be quite significant. 
A delay insensitive circuit (DI) refers to the circuit that has finite delay 
for both wires and gates. This circuit can function correctly irrespective of the 
delay in wires and gates.  
A quasi delay insensitive circuit (QDI) is a delay insensitive circuit 
(DI) with an extra timing constraint. The extra timing constraint refers to the 
signal transition occurring at the same time for both branches, which is known 
as isochronic forks.  
A circuit that relies on the correct engineering timing assumption is 
known as a self-timed circuit.  
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2.2.4 Asynchronous Circuit Implementation 
In this section, some asynchronous circuits are described that are used in the 
subsequent chapter. 
Asynchronous Buffer 
Asynchronous buffers are made by cascading C-elements, as shown in Figure 
2.10. The first port of a C-element is reserved for the data and the second port 
is for the acknowledgement signal. A C-element is used as it is capable of 
holding data and controlling data independently. Like any other memory 
element, using a C-element as a buffer is subject to SEU error. The corrupted 
output is generated when one of the nodes in the C-element suffers SEU error. 
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the C-elements are modified to include error 
detection correction for a single and dual rail respectively.  
 
Figure 2.10: Asynchronous buffer implementation  
 
Asynchronous Implementation 
The implementation of a asynchronous circuit by employing a buffer which 
acts as a latch is shown in Figure 2.11. Combinational logics are inserted 
between buffers. The completion detector (CD) is used to generate an 
acknowledgement signal for the preceding buffers to indicate that the current 
buffers are ready to process new data. Despite all the advantages of 
asynchronous circuits, as listed previously, asynchronous circuits have two 
major weakness: deadlock and complexity of the design. Deadlock refers to a 
situation where the system fails to proceed to the next stage due to two or 
more processes expecting a response from each other and blocking each other 
from continuing. It is a common situation in asynchronous design that the 
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system faces deadlock due to incorrect circuit design, token missmatch and 
also arbitration. Single event upset (SEU) can also cause a circuit to have 
deadlock due to data corruption. The design of CD is a trivial task but in some 
cases it is a complex task since the asynchronous design is data dependant. 
The simplest CD is a dual rail CD which is basically an XOR gate. For an m to 
n code detector, the CD is a complex circuit and this complex CD adds extra 
hardware to the system and the design is made even more complex with the 
CD. 
 
Figure 2.11: Asynchronous implementation  
 
MUX  
MUX is used to steer multiple inputs to one output by selecting the select line 
(Sel) to choose the appropriate inputs, as shown in Figure 2.12. In Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6, the proposed error detection and correction latches incorporate 
the use of MUX to select the correct value. The first port of MUX is connected 
with the main latch and the other port is connected with the shadow latch. In 
the event of SEU, the value from the shadow latch is selected to correct the 
SEU error. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Multiplexer (MUX) 
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2.3 Dual Rail Data 
In this section dual rail is discussed, starting from dual rail data encoding, 
handshake protocols and the effect of single event upset (SEU) on dual rail 
pipelines. The aim is to present the effects of data corruption due to SEU on 
dual rail pipelines. In Chapter 6, dual rail error detection and correction latches 
based on C-elements are proposed. The effects of SEU on asynchronous 
circuits are demonstrated in Chapter 7 with and without the proposed latches.   
2.3.1 Dual Rail Data Encoding 
Dual rail data use two wires to represent 1 bit of information due to their 
robustness. This is a type of delay insensitive code. The first rail is asserted 
with a ‘0’ and the second rail is asserted with a ‘1’ in order to be considered 
valid data. Each piece of dual rail data is separated with a spacer which is 
represented by ‘00’ on both rails. Table 2 shows the corresponding dual rail 
encoding. 
d.t d.f State 
0 0 Spacer 
0 1 Logic ‘0’ 
1 0 Logic ‘1’ 
1 1 Not allowed 
Table 2: Dual rail encoding 
 
Figure 2.13 [29] shows the implementation of a dual rail AND gate 
which consists of four C-elements and an OR gate. The idea behind using C-
elements is that they wait for all of the inputs to become valid, which is the 
basis of delay-insensitive design. This can be achieved if one of the four wires 
goes high. The design of a dual rail AND gate is based on direct mapping from 
the sum of the min-term expression. 
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Figure 2.13: Dual rail AND gate 
 
In an asynchronous circuit, the Muller pipeline forms the basis of the 
control system, employing dual rail data. Figure 2.14 [29] shows the Muller 
pipeline latch which is constructed mainly of C-elements, inverters and an OR 
gate. 
 
Figure 2.14: Muller pipeline latch  
 
The functionality of the Muller pipeline can be described as follows. Suppose 
the output, do.f and do.t, holds a spacer. This causes a ‘0’ to propagate to the 
inverter and cause acko to be in logic ‘1’. Consequently, in the next stage the 
Muller latch is ready to latch data and set acki to logic ‘1’. Similarly, suppose 
the output, do.f and do.t, holds valid data. The data is latched and causes acko 
to be set to ‘0’. Hence, the previous Muller latch is ready to latch the spacer. 
The spacer is latched when acki is changed to logic ‘0’ and when the spacer is 
latched, acko is changed to logic ‘1’. 
2.3.2 Handshake Protocols 
In asynchronous communication, two protocols are commonly used: the 4-
phase dual rail protocol and the 2-phase dual rail protocol. The 4-phase has 
disadvantages compared with the 2-phase, such as superfluous return to zero. 
As a result, it is more costly in terms of time and money. The 4-phase is 
shown in Figure 2.15 [29]. 
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Figure 2.15: 4-phase dual rail protocol  
 
The 4-phase handshaking sequence can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Valid data is issued by the sender. 
(b) The receiver receives the data and acknowledges the receipt by setting 
the ack signal to logic ‘1’. 
(c) The spacer is issued by the sender as a response to the receiver. 
(d) The receiver receives the spacer and acknowledges the receiving spacer 
by setting the ack signal to logic ‘0’. 
The 2-phase dual rail protocol also employs 2 wires per bit but the information 
is defined as a transition, as shown in Figure 2.16 [29]. This protocol does not 
have a spacer. The handshaking can be explained as follows: 
(a) The valid data is issued by the sender and acknowledged. 
(b) More data is issued and this is also acknowledged. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: 2-phase dual rail protocol  
 
A 4-phase bundle pipeline is shown in Figure 2.17 [29]. Initially, a 
valid request and inverted acknowledgement cause the C-element to go high 
and enable the latch. The latch is in the transparent mode and allows the data 
to propagate to the output. The subsequent request is issued and causes the 
subsequent C-element to go high. The new acknowledgement is issued and 
inverted, causing the current C-element to disable along with the deactivated 
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signal. This causes the latch to go into the reset mode. When it is in the reset 
mode, a new request is issued to the subsequent C-element. This causes the 
current C-element in the transparent mode and the process is repeated in this 
manner. This process allows valid data to propagate followed by a null. 
 
Figure 2.17: 4-phase bundle pipeline 
 
Figure 2.18 [29] illustrates a 2-phase bundle pipeline without a 
processing block which uses 2-phase transition to interpret the control signal. 
Basically, there are two control signals, Capture (C) and Pass (P). Assuming 
initially the latch is in transparent mode, which allows the input to propagate 
to the output; in this instance, the C is equal to P. When there is a valid request 
signal, it causes the output of the C-element and consequently the C is flipped. 
In this instance C is not equal to P, resulting in the latches to hold their values. 
When there is a valid acknowledgement signal the C is equal to P, causing the 
latch to be in the transparent mode.   
 
Figure 2.18: 2-phase bundle pipeline  
 
Figure 2.19(a) [30] shows a proposed 2-phase pipeline by Montek 
without a processing block known as “Mousetrap”. The working principle of 
Mousetrap can be summarised as follows. Assuming data and request signal 
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propagate to the stage, the acknowledgement signal at stage N is sent to the 
preceding stage (N-1) and at the same time the stage N pipeline is deactivated 
via the XNOR gate. The data and the request signals are then propagated to 
stage N+1. The acknowledgement signal (ack(N+1)) is sent to the N-stage and 
in this instance enables the stage N pipeline. The delay is inserted, as shown in 
Figure 2.19(b) [29], and used to compensate the delay in the processing block. 
The Mousetrap function is under the assumption that the request signal is fast 
enough to disable the pipeline. 
 
Figure 2.19: 2-phase pipeline Mousetrap 
 
2.3.3 Effects of SEU on Dual Rail Data 
Soft error in dual rail encoding can cause data corruption in three different 
ways: 
a) Data generation - During the reset phase (‘00’), soft error can generate 
valid dual rail data, either ‘01’ or ‘10’. This type of error is caused by a 
single SEU on a memory circuit. As a result, the CD circuit recognises 
this as new data instead of a spacer. Soft error can also cause 1-1 error. 
This occurs when valid dual rail data is corrupted by SEU, causing the 
data to temporarily change the state from 0 to 1. 
b) Data vanishing - Soft error can cause data to temporarily change the 
state from 1 to 0. This is known as 0-0 error. The system recognises 
this type of error as spacer generation causing the data to disappear. As 
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for data generation error, this type of error is also due to single SEU on 
a memory element.  
c) Data modification – This error is caused when valid dual rail data 
change from ‘10’ to ‘01’. Unlike the case of data generation and data 
vanishing, which is caused by single error, this type of error is obtained 
by injecting two currents simultaneously in a memory element. 
The first case is the circuit function correctly or circuit ignores the 
glitch as described by author in [31].  Figure 2.20 shows a one-bit dual rail 
under fault free conditions. At time 1, a valid ‘01’ data propagates to the left 
channel at time 2. The CD detects the presence of valid data and sends the 
acknowledgement signal at time 3. The valid data continues to propagate to 
the right channel at time 4 and 5. Upon receiving valid data, the second CD 
sends an acknowledgement signal at time 6 and resets the left channel. The 
right channel is also reset after time 7, 8 and 9. 
 
Figure 2.20: Fault free 1-bit dual rail 
 
Figure 2.21 illustrates deadlock in the event of SEU on a pipeline due to data 
generation. Data generation refers to the generating of new and valid dual rail 
data from spacer(null) due to SEU changing the output from 0 to 1. This has 
been illustrated by author in [31] as a symbol-loss due to race-through where 
the spacing between successive symbols is lost. At time 1, the null propagates 
to the left channel and SEU hits one of the C-elements, causing the output of 
the C-element to change from 0-1 at time 2. This causes the CD signal to go 
high at time 3, as the data is valid data. The data is valid as a result of SEU 
being ready to propagate to the right channel at time 4 and 5. The CD signal 
recognises it as valid data at time 7 and sends an acknowledgement signal to 
the left channel. This causes the left channel to reset and block valid data from 
propagating to the left channel. Null appears at time 9 upon receiving requests 
at time 8 at the right channel. 
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Figure 2.21: Case 1 - 1-bit dual rail pipeline  
 
Figure 2.22 illustrates the effect of the data vanishing effect on 
asynchronous communication due to SEU. Data vanishing is a scenario 
whereby the output of the C-element is changed from 1 to 0. This causes valid 
data to change to null. Author in [31] defined as symbol corruption resulting in 
an illegal symbol where the glitch causes 0-0 error. At time 2, valid dual rail 
data propagates to the left channel when SEU hits one of the C-elements, 
causing the output of the C-element to change from 1 to 0. This causes CD to 
go as low as ‘00’, not a valid signa1, at time 3. The corrupted signal is ready to 
propagate to the right channel at time 4. The CD does not recognise it as a 
valid signal and sends a low signal which enables the left channel to accept a 
null to pass through at time 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.      
 
Figure 2.22: Case 2 - 1-bit dual rail pipeline 
 
Figure 2.23 illustrates the effect of another data generation effect on 
asynchronous communication due to SEU. This scenario is different from the 
previous one in terms of data generation as the previous one produces valid 
dual rail data but in this case invalid data is produced. This is another example 
of symbol corruption resulting in an illegal symbol where the glitch causes 1-1 
error as defined by author in [31]. At time 2, valid dual rail data propagates to 
the left channel when SEU hits one of C-elements, causing the output of the 
C-element to change from 0 to 1. This causes CD to go as low as ‘11’, not a 
valid signa1, at time 3. The corrupted signal is ready to propagate to the right 
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channel at time 4 and 5. The CD does not recognise it as a valid signal and 
sends a low signal which enables the left channel to accept a null to pass 
through at time 7, 8 and 9.      
 
 
Figure 2.23: Case 3 - 1-bit dual rail pipeline 
 
2.4 Fault Tolerant Latch 
In this section soft error mitigation is discussed starting from the single rail 
fault tolerant latch and dual rail fault tolerant latch. The focus is on previous 
proposed latches aimed at mitigating error due to SEU and comparing them 
with the proposed single rail latch and dual rail latch described in chapter 5 
and chapter 6 respectively.   
2.4.1 Single Rail Fault Tolerant Latch 
The area of hardening latches is becoming an increasing important research 
area, as data corruption due to SEU can cause whole asynchronous systems to 
become deadlocked and consequently there is a risk of the system failing. The 
SET/SEU-tolerant latch proposed by Fazeli et Al. [32] is shown in Figure 
2.24. It consists of 3 C-elements that filter out any incoming single event 
transient (SET). Under fault-free conditions, when CLK=1 and DATA=1,  a ‘1’ 
appears at nodes 1 and 2, while a ‘0’ appears at nodes 3 and 4. This value 
propagates to the third C-element. The main principal of this configuration is 
that any SET or SEU at the input of the C-element causes it to hold the 
previous data.  For example, any SET which occurs at node 1 causes C-
element 1 to retain its previous value, since node 2 does not change its values. 
The same principle applies at nodes 3 and 4. However, the main weakness 
with this method is that node x,y and z are very vulnerable to SEU events. 
This is due to the weak keeper that is attached to the output to prevent the 
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output node from entering a high impedance state. It can also be noted that 
node x and node y are also vulnerable to SEU. 
 
 
Figure 2.24: FERST  
 
Omana et Al. [33] proposed the hardened latches shown in Figure 2.25 
and Figure 2.26. When CLK=1, the input propagates to the output. At the 
output, Out, the resulting signal is fed back to the inputs via two inverters. 
This causes either pair of PMOS and NMOS transistors to conduct and 
reinforce the output values. As discussed in section 2.1.2, the drain of an off 
PMOS and drain of an off NMOS transistor are more vulnerable toward soft 
error. Therefore depending on the output, either node x and node y are very 
vulnerable to error.  There is also a problem with this configuration when a 
particle hit occurs at node z. This causes the output to change the state 
momentarily to ‘0’ and this value is propagated to both inputs, causing a pair 
of NMOS devices to conduct. However, the input to output delay for this 
configuration is very small. Another problem with the circuit shown in Figure 
2.25 is the electrical contention between the input and the output. In order to 
solve the problem, an improved version of SIN-HR, as shown in Figure 2.26, 
has been designed to avoid electrical contention between the input and output. 
However, the vulnerability to SEU events remains at node x, y and z.   
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Figure 2.25: SIN-LC  Figure 2.26: SIN-HR  
  
 
Figure 2.27: SDT 
 
Another fault-tolerant latch proposed by Zhao and Dev [34] is shown 
in Figure 2.27. It consists of two C-elements which are connected by a 
transmission gate (TG). DATA2 is the delayed version of DATA1. DATA1 is 
not equal to DATA2 in the event of erroneous inputs causing C-element 2 to 
disconnect from the voltage supply. The previous output is locked at the 
output until the input signals are equal. However, this configuration is 
vulnerable to SEU at nodes x, y and z as it can correct the transient error.  At 
nodes x,y and z, the corrupted value due to SEU propagates directly to the 
output causing the data to be corrupted   
Mitra [6] [35] proposed a detection system known as Built-in Soft 
Error Resilience (BISER) that employs latches and C-elements to detect the 
presence of soft error. The properties of the C-element are exploited here by 
taking advantage of the unequal value of inputs that will force the output to 
remain. Consider the BISER circuit shown in Figure 2.28(a). The output of the 
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combinational logic feeds two latches when CLK =1. The outputs of the 
latches, A and B, are compared by the C-element and it propagates if the 
values are equal. Suppose a soft error strikes and the values of A and B are not 
equal; this forces the old value to be kept by the keeper and hence the error 
does not propagate to the output. Two methods as an extension of BISER have 
been proposed: soft error logic using duplication and soft error logic using 
time shift. By using duplication (Figure 2.28(b)), the combinational logics are 
duplicated. The outputs of these duplications are fed into the C-element and 
compared using the same techniques as above. The second method (Figure 
2.28(c)) exploits the properties of the soft error and places a delay element into 
the second input of the C-element. If a soft error strikes, one of the inputs into 
the C-element is delayed and compared by the C-element. Therefore, the 
presence of soft error can be detected.  There are weaknesses with BISER 
techniques as a latch. The first problem is suppose SEU strike at the output of 
D latches and the outputs are compared by C-element. The error is not 
corrected and C-element uses the old values if the inputs is not equal. The 
second problem is the use of D-latch which is built from four NAND gates and 
one inverter. All of BISER techniques use two D-latch and overhead power 
and area increased compared with other proposed latch. The overhead power 
and area is very significant with BISER with duplication.  In the event of the 
inputs of C-element is not equal, nodes x,y and z is vulnerable to soft error and 
these nodes are not protected. This error can easily propagates to the outputs 
of C-element. 
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(a) BISER (b) BISER with duplication 
 
 
 
 
(c) BISER with time delay (d) C-element used in BISER 
Figure 2.28 
 
2.4.2 Dual Rail Fault Tolerant Latch 
The easiest method is the method known as the duplication method, as shown 
in Figure 2.29 [36]. As the name implies, the duplication latch inputs receive 2 
identical inputs from two combinational logics (one is copied from the others). 
The data will only be latched if the inputs are identical. However, as the 
simplicity of the duplication latch will be at the expense of the area, the 
combinational logic needs to be duplicated.  
 
Figure 2.29: Duplication latch 
 
 33 
 
Monet [37] presented the idea of the rail synchronization latch, as shown 
in Figure 2.30, which filters the transient faults or, in the case of undetectable 
faults, an appropriate signal (“11”) will be issued. Four possible transient 
faults have been proposed by Monet: 
a) The fault is stopped by logic gates 
b) The fault is not memorized 
c) The fault is  memorized the circuit operation is not affected 
d) The fault is memorized and circuit may fail to function 
Basically, the circuit’s computation and memory have two synchronizers, a 
pair of D(2) and a pair of Ack(1). If there is a transient fault in the C-element 
there will be two possible cases of data, either case c or case d. Case d will be 
memorized and compared at the output. The invalid code of “11” will appear 
at the output, by assuming valid data has propagated through before the faulty 
data is acknowledged. 
 
Figure 2.30: Rail synchronization latch 
 
Gardiner et al. [36] proposed a C-element-based latch that has the 
capability of correcting transient error. The proposed latches use four C-
elements to latch dual rail data, controller and logic gates to detect spacer, 
error and data. The approach is modified to include error correction for both 
transient error and SEU error, in the event of SEU striking the vulnerable node 
in the C-element. 
The three techniques on dual rail fault tolerant latch have one common 
problem which is the use of unprotected C-element expose the latches to SEU 
error. There are three vulnerable nodes on two-input C-element and hence the 
output data might get corrupted due to SEU.  
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2.5 Factors Affecting CMOS Performance 
In this section two factors affecting CMOS performance are discussed. The 
aim is to present how the voltage supply, process variation and temperatures 
affect the reliability of transistors towards SEU, as described in chapters 3, 4, 
5 and 6. 
2.5.1 Voltage Supply 
Due to the transistors scaling, the supply voltage is scaled down. As a result, 
the critical charge needed to change the state is also decreased because the 
stored charged needed to flip the output is reduced which is according to the 
linear formula 
𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑉𝑑𝑑      (2.10) 
𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 = node capacitance, 𝑉𝑑𝑑= supply voltage  
The scaling down of voltage supply result in the transistors become more 
vulnerable to SEU. SEU will happen when the collected charge is equal to the 
critical charge deposited at the junction [27].  
2.5.2 Process Variation 
Designing integrated circuits (IC) has two main challenges, process variations 
of CMOS and environment parameters. One of the methods of testing the 
functionality of the design due to process variation is by using process corner 
variation. Process corner represents the extremes of parameter variation and 
the circuit should be able to function correctly under all process corner 
variations. Even though it is rare for the IC to have extreme process variation, 
under normal circumstances it is very useful for the designer to test the circuit. 
Process variation can be classified into two contributing factors: 
a) Die to die variation: This type of variation can affect every element in 
the combinational logic. 
b) Within die variation - This type of variation can cause non-uniformity 
between the devices. 
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As the name implies, process corners can be be classified into 5 types: SS 
(slow NMOS and PMOS), FF (fast NMOS and PMOS), TT (typical PMOS 
and NMOS), SNFP (slow NMOS fast PMOS), and FNSP (fast NMOS and 
slow PMOS). SS, FF and TT are known as even corners since both PMOS and 
NMOS transistors are evenly affected. This type of process corner does not 
disturb the correctness of the logic function as it only affects the speed of the 
devices. The other two process corners (SNFP and FNSP) are known as 
skewed corners. These process corners can cause great concern to the designer 
due to the disparity in both devices. The disparity between PMOS and NMOS 
transistors can cause the logic function to fail. Under process corner variation, 
the intended circuit may run slower, faster, at higher or lower temperature, 
depending on which process corner is applied. Process corners differ in terms 
of nominal threshold voltage, lateral difussion, parasitic capacitances, 
temperature, and nominal voltage supply.  
2.5.3 Temperature Variation 
The other factor is temperature. Temperature can affect the transistor’s 
reliability by reducing the drain current, making the transistor more vulnerable 
to SEU. The drain current of transistors is given by  
𝐼𝑑(𝑇) = 𝜇(𝑇)
𝑊
𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝑃𝑙(𝑉𝑔𝑠 − 𝑉𝑇(𝑇))
𝛼
2𝑉𝑑𝑠    (2.11) 
𝜇 = mobility constant, 𝑃𝑙= constant to specific technology, VT= threshold 
voltage, Leff 
= effective channel length, 𝛼= velocity saturation index 
Two temperature-dependant factors that can affect the drain current which are 
mobility of carriers and the threshold voltage. 
As temperature increases, the mobility of the carriers decreases. In other 
words, the temperature increase has a negative impact on mobility. The 
relation between mobility and temperature is given by equation (2.12). 
𝜇(𝑇) = 𝜇(𝑇0) (
𝑇
𝑇0
⁄ )
−𝑚
 (2.12) 
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Where 𝑇0  is room temperature and m is the mobility temperature constant 
[38]. 
The constant m has the typical value of 1.5 and can vary for different 
processes [39]. Holes move slower than electrons. By increasing temperature, 
the mobility of holes is decreased more than the electron due to the critical 
electric field for holes decreasing more than the critical electric field for the 
electron [40]. Therefore, it is concluded that the reduction of drain current for 
PMOS transistors is more comparable with the reduction in drain current for 
NMOS transistors. As a result, the vulnerability of PMOS toward SEU is 
reduced more than the vulnerability of NMOS with an increase in temperature. 
This is shown in Chapter 3. 
The temperature increase is inversely proportional to the voltage 
threshold which is due to the Fermi energy level and band gap energy shifts 
[41]. The relation between voltage threshold and temperature is given in 
equation (2.13) below: 
𝑉𝑡ℎ(𝑇) =  𝑉𝑡ℎ(𝑇0) − 𝑘(𝑇 − 𝑇0) (2.13) 
Where 𝑇0 is room temperature and k is threshold voltage coefficient. From 
equation (2.13) it can be concluded that the threshold voltage decreases 
linearly as the temperature increases. The typical value of 𝑘 is 0.8 mV/K[42]. 
As mentioned before, the drain current is also a function of threshold voltage. 
When the gate voltage is higher, any change in the threshold voltage does not 
effect the drain current. The change of the carrier mobility and saturation 
velocity cause significant change to the drain current. However, when the gate 
voltage is lower, the drain current is strongly function of the threshold voltage 
and overcomes the effect of mobility and saturation velocity. Hence, it makes 
the transistors become less temperature dependant.  
2.6 CMOS Power Dissipation 
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 the proposed error detection and correction for 
single rail and dual rail is presented. The performance of the latches is 
considered by calculating the power dissipation in the event of no error and an 
error being detected. Generally, power dissipation in CMOS is the result of 
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switching (dynamic) power, short circuit power and leakage power, as shown 
by equation 2.14 
𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑃𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔−𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡−𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒  (2.14) 
Switching power is defined as the power needed to switch the logic 
state from 0 to 1. In other words, this is the power needed to charge up the 
capacitor. Energy drawn from the voltage supply is used to charge up the 
loading capacitor and also dissipated as heat in the circuits. Switching power 
is given by  
𝑃𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔−𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 𝐶𝐿𝑉𝐷𝐷
2 𝑃0→1𝑓𝐶𝐿𝐾   (2.15) 
 CL= loading capacitor, VDD= voltage supply, fCLK= clock frequency, P01= 
activity factor 
Short circuit power is consumed when both NMOS and PMOS 
transistors are ‘ON’. The duration of short circuit power is when 
𝑉𝑇𝑛 < 𝑉𝑖𝑛 < 𝑉𝐷𝐷 − 𝑉𝑇𝑝 
Short circuit power is estimated as  𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡−𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡 =
1
12
𝑘𝜏𝑓𝐶𝐿𝐾(𝑉𝐷𝐷 − 2𝑉𝑇)
3       
(2.16) [43] 
k= gain factor of transistor, τ= rising and falling time, VT= threshold voltage 
When temperature increases, the short circuit power is increased due to the 
decreases of threshold voltage, as shown in equation (2.16). The short circuit 
power is more significant at high supply voltage than at lower supply voltage.  
The third components of power dissipation is due to the leakage power 
is given by  
𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑉𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒       (2.17) 
Leakage current is the result of three factors, which are the reverse bias diode 
leakage, gate induced drain leakage current and gate oxide tunnelling. Leakage 
current is increased by increasing temperature. A simulation by [44] shows 
that the leakage current rises exponentially with supply voltage at 1000𝐶 and 
rises linearly at a temperature of 400𝐶 and below. 
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It is concluded from the above discussion that increasing temperature can 
deteriorate the reliability towards SEU and increase the power dissipation of 
transistors. 
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Chapter 3. Analysis of Single Event Upset on Different 
Configurations of C-Elements 
 
This chapter presents current injection resemble single event upset (SEU) 
current at the vulnerable nodes on different configurations of C-elements 
under four different scenarios: process corner, temperature, voltage, and size 
scaling of the circuit. The objectives are to identify the vulnerable nodes due 
to SEU and to find the critical charges needed to flip the output from low to 
high (0-1) and high to low (1-0) on different configurations of C-elements. 
3.1 Introduction 
  Advancement in silicon technology has resulted in transistors 
becoming smaller which has in turn lowered operating voltage and capacitance 
[45]. Therefore, these transistors are more sensitive toward radiation-induced 
errors. As the demand for low power applications for digital electronics 
devices with high density continues to increase, the radiation effect on such 
electronic devices is becoming significant. Even though soft error due to 
radiation is not a permanent error, this type of error can cause data to be 
corrupted. 
In this chapter, the current pulse causing SEU is injected into different 
nodes of different C-elements. The amplitude of the current is increased until 
the output of the C-element is changed. Different configurations of C-elements 
are compared in terms of the charges needed to flip the output from 0-1 
change or 1-0 change. The minimum charge needed to cause state change is 
known as the critical charge. 
3.2 Experiments Setup and Work Flow 
The workflow of the analysis is summarized below 
Step 1: Modelling the current pulse causing Single Event Upset  
A current pulse can be represented as having fast rising time and slow 
falling time. The amplitude, rising time and falling time of the current pulse 
depend on factors such as the type of particle, the energy of the particle and 
the angle of the strike. These factors can add complexities in modelling 
current pulse. The model shown in Figure 3.1 is used as a current injection to 
compare the critical charges between the nodes and C-elements. The model is 
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based on Equation 2.1.8 in Chapter 2 that use double exponential current 
pulse: the author in [24] stated the rising and falling times of current pulse to 
be 50 ps and 164 ps respectively.  
 
Figure 3.1: SEU Current Modelling  
 
Step 2: Modelling the Circuit  
In order to compare different configuration of C-elements against SEU, the 
circuits are modelled to have the same width of the main transistors and the 
feedback transistors. For this purpose, CADENCE UMC90nm technology is 
used in the simulation.  
Step 3: Identifying the Vulnerable Nodes 
The current pulses are injected at the main transistors and the output of the 
circuit is described in the Section 3.3. 
Step 4: Identifying the Sources of Variation 
The sources of variations in the analysis are process corner, temperature, 
voltage and size scaling. It is assumed these parameters are Gaussian and 
mutually independent.  
Step 5: Set inputs A=1,B=0. Repeat A=0,B=1  
Assuming two inputs are A and B. There are two possibilities combination of 
input: A=1,B=0 and A=0, B=1. For each combination of input, there are two 
possibilities transition of output: High (1) to Low (0) and Low (0) to high (1). 
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Inputs Outputs 
A=1, B=0 0-1 
1-0 
A=0, B=1 0-1 
1-0 
 
Step 6: Varying the Amplitude of SEU Current  
As mentioned in step 1, the rising and falling times of the current pulse is 
fixed. However, in order to change the area under the curve, the amplitude is 
varied until the output is flipped. The simulation is done using circuit analyser 
(spectre).  
Step 7: Identifying the Amplitude of SEU Current that causes State Change  
The amplitude of the current pulse is increased until the output is flipped at 
different nodes, different C-elements and different source of variation.  
Step 8: Calculating Critical Charge  
The critical charge which corresponds to the amplitude of the current pulse 
that causes the state to change is obtained at different nodes, different C-
elements and different source of variations.  
Step 9: Calculating the Standard Deviation of Critical Charges  
Standard deviation of critical charges is calculated to observe the dispersion 
value of critical charge when one of the factors mentioned above changes 
Step 10: Calculating Error Rates  
Error rate is calculated at for each of the nodes of different C-elements. The 
total error rate of each C-element is calculated and compared.  
Step 11: Calculating Standard Deviation of Errors Rates  
Standard deviation of error rate is calculated to observe the dispersion value of 
error rate when one of the factors mentioned above changes. Step 9 and step 
10 are discussed in Chapter 4.  
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The work flow is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Workflow of the experiments 
 
3.3 Critical Charge Analysis for C-elements 
Four different implementations of C-elements are used in the analysis: 
(a) Single rail with inverter latch 
 
SIL 
(b) Single rail with conventional pull-up pull-down 
 
SC 
(c) Single rail symmetric implementation 
 
SS 
(d) Differential logic with inverter latch  DIL 
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In order to make a fair comparison between different types of C-elements, the 
general sizes of the transistors are as follows:  
a) The ratio of PMOS and NMOS for the main transistors is 1.125. This 
is consistent with Faraday Library for 90 nm technology. 
b) The ratio between the main transistor and feedback transistor is 4:1 
The analyses are subjected to the following assumptions: 
a) The current pulse is assumed to hit the middle of the drain of the Off 
PMOS or NMOS transistor. The worst-case scenario is compared with 
different implementation of C-elements towards SEU. Thus, the values 
might be different to the actual experiments 
b) The current pulse is assumed to resemble trapezoidal shapes with fast 
rising time and slow falling time and with maximum amplitude. 
Current pulse is injected at different nodes for different configurations 
of C-elements. The purpose of the experiment is to find the charge needed to 
flip the output at the sensitive nodes due to the injected SEU under five 
different variables 
a) Process corner variation: Five different process corners are varied: TT, 
SS, FF, SNFP and FNSP.  
b) Temperature variation: Temperature is varied from −40𝑜𝐶 to 100𝑜𝐶 
taking only 4 distinct points (−400𝐶, 00𝐶, 270𝐶 and 1000𝐶 ). 
c) Voltage supply scaling: Voltage supply is varied from 0.8 V to 1.2 V 
(+/-20% of nominal voltage) with 0.1 V step intervals. 
d) Size scaling: The widths of all transistors are varied from 50% to 150% 
of nominal size with three distinct sizes (50%, 100%, and 150% of 
nominal size). 
The Latin numerals (i)-(v) are used to denote the sensitive nodes. If the 
injected charge is less than the critical charge, it causes no effect to the output 
or the pulse is generated and may cause a problem to the combinational logics. 
There is further discussion on this in Chapter 4. 
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3.3.1 Critical Charge Analysis for Single Rail with Inverter Latch  
Configuration 
A single rail with inverter latch (SIL) consists of main pull up 
transistors (P1, P2), main pull down transistors (N1, N2), inverter (P3, N3) 
and weak inverter (P4, N4) as shown in Figure 3.3 [46]. The feedback is 
weaker so that it can be overpowered by the main pull up and pull down 
transistors. The circuit suffers a race problem at the output Out and therefore, 
minimum size transistors for the keeper should be chosen to reduce the 
problem. Suppose both inputs A and B are low causing the main pull up 
transistors to change the output Out to low. Similarly, if both inputs A and B 
are high causing the main pull down transistors to change the output Out to 
high. If the inputs are not equal, transistors P1 and P2 are disconnected from 
the power supply and transistors N1 and N2 are disconnected from the ground. 
The state of output Out is maintained by feedback inverters. Current pulse is 
injected at node (iii) as shown by the dashed box in Figure 3.3, and the state 
change at node Out is observed. The experiments are repeated at nodes (i) and 
(ii). If A=0, B=1, node (ii) is connected to voltage supply, and therefore the 
charge needed to change the state are much higher compared with node (i). 
Similarly, if A=1,B=0 node (i) is connected to ground, and therefore the 
charge needed to change the state are much higher compared with node (ii). 
Therefore, node (ii) and node (i) are ignored in the analysis for A=0, B=1 and 
A=1,B=0 respectively. 
 
Figure 3.3 : SIL configuration  
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Five different process corner variations are performed and the charges 
needed to change the state of each process are compared. To observe the 
change in critical charge with respect to the process variations, the temperature 
is set at 270𝐶 and the voltage supply is set at 1 V. As expected, the SS corner 
yields the smallest critical charge and the FF corner yields the highest critical 
charge. The highest critical charges of the FF process are due to the larger pull 
up and pull down strength of transistors. As a result, the strength of transistors 
give better stabilization in the voltage level of the storage node and hence 
higher critical charge is needed to flip the output [47].  Figure 3.4(a) shows the 
critical charge when inputs A=1, B=0 and Figure 3.4(b) shows the critical 
charge when inputs A=0, B=1. The critical charge at nodes (ii), (iii) of 0-1 is 
lower than node (ii) and (iii) of 1-0 change when A=1, B=0. Similarly, the 
critical charge at nodes (i), (iii) of 0-1 is lower than node (i) and (iii) of 1-0 
change when A=0, B=1. The factor variations of critical charges between the 
extreme process corner variations are between 1.26X to 1.39X  when inputs 
A=1, B=0 and 1.28X to 1.47X when inputs A=0, B=1, depending on the 
location of the SEU. The critical charges for TT, SNFP and FNSP are 
statistically equal since the standard deviation are 0.42f and 0.33f compared 
with the standard deviation of SS and FF which are 4f and 2.89f when inputs 
A=1, B=0 and inputs A=0, B=1 respectively. Thus, the critical charges for TT, 
SNFP and FNSP do not differ much. In the SNFP corner, PMOS transistors 
have relatively stronger current compared with NMOS transistors and in the 
FNSP corner, NMOS transistors have relatively stronger current compared 
with PMOS transistors. However, the stronger PMOS or NMOS transistors 
counter balances the weaker NMOS or PMOS transistors and hence produce a 
comparable critical charge compared with the TT corner.  These findings 
suggested that, in general, for the SIL configuration, critical charges are 
sensitive to process corner variations in particular the process corners SS and 
FF. 
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Figure 3.4 (a): Process Corner Variation for SIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 (b): Process Corner Variation for SIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
Generally, as temperature increases, it degrades the threshold voltage, 
carrier mobility and saturation velocity [47, 48, and 49]. As a result of 
degrading carrier mobility, the drain current becomes lower and the sensitivity 
of the node towards SEU is increased. Hence, the critical charge needed to flip 
the output is decreased. To observe the change in temperature variations, the 
process corner is set to TT and the voltage supply is set to 1 V. The result is 
shown in Figure 3.5(a) and (b). The critical charges decrease by 11.3% for 0-1 
change and 19.1% for 1-0 change when inputs A=1, B=0 as the temperature 
increases from −400 𝐶 to 1000𝐶 . Similarly when inputs  A=0, B=1 the 
critical charges decrease by 9% for 0-1 change and 17.6% for 1-0 change on 
the same temperature increment. From the percentage change of the critical 
charge as above for 0-1 change and 1-0 change, it is concluded that PMOS 
transistors have a greater effect on temperature variation than NMOS. By 
increasing temperature, the mobility of holes is decreased more than the 
electron due to the critical electric field for holes decreasing more than the 
critical electric field for the electron. This is proven by the author in [48] that 
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suggested the mobility of PMOS is reduced more than the mobility of NMOS 
at a temperature of 1250𝐶 for 65nm technology.  
 
Figure 3.5 (a): Temperature Variation for SIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
 
Figure 3.5 (b): Temperature Variation for SIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
In addition to the variation observed critical charge within process 
generations and temperature, it is also interesting to compare the critical 
charges with respect to voltage and size scaling as shown in Figure 3.6-3.8. To 
observe the change of voltage and size scaling, the process corner is set to TT 
and the temperature is set to 270𝐶. The effect of critical charges by scaling 
both voltage and size is shown in Figure 3.6(a) and (b). When A=1, B=0, the 
charges decrease by 48.9% when voltage and size are scaled from 1.2 V to 1 V 
and 150% to 100% respectively and further decrease by 61.7% when voltage 
and size are scaled from 1 V to 0.8 V and 100% to 50% respectively for 0-1 
change. Similarly, the charges decrease by 46.3% and further decrease by 
62.2% with the same scaling for 1-0 change. When A=0, B=1, the charges 
decrease by 50.4% when voltage and size are scaled from 1.2 V to 1 V and 
150% to 100% respectively and further decrease by 64.3% when voltage and 
size are scaled from 1 V to 0.8 V and 100% to 50% respectively for 0-1 
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change. Similarly, the charges decrease by 50.5% and further decrease by 
61.8% with the same scaling for 1-0 change. The charges decrease 
quadratically when voltage and size are scaled together. Generally, as voltage 
decrease, the critical charge needed to change the state also decreased. As a 
result, the stored charge needed to flip the output is also reduced. Similarly, 
reducing the size of the transistors decrease the gate capacitance from the 
output and therefore the collected charge needed to flip the output is also 
becoming smaller [47]. Scaling voltage supply and the size of the transistors 
causes the critical charge to decrease quadratically instead of linearly. 
 
Figure 3.6  (a): Voltage and Size Scaling  for SIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.6 (b): Voltage and Size Scaling  for SIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
The critical charges with voltage scaling keeping constant nominal size are as 
shown in Figure 3.7(a) and (b). When A=1,B=0, the critical charges needed to 
change the state decrease by 44.9% and 47.7% as the voltage is scaled from 
1.2 V to 0.8 V for 0-1 and 1-0 respectively. When A=0,B=1, the critical 
charges needed to change the state decrease by 51.3% and 42.7% as the 
voltage is scaled from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 0-1 and 1-0 respectively. 
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Figure 3.7 (a): Voltage Supply Scaling for SIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.7  (b): Voltage Supply Scaling for SIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
The critical charges with size scaling keeping constant nominal voltage 
are as shown in Figure 3.8(a) and (b). When A=1,B=0, the critical charges 
needed to change the state from 0-1 increase by 48.9% as the size is scaled 
from 100% to 150% and decrease by 46.7% as the size is scaled from 100% to 
50%. Similarly, the critical charges needed to change the state from 1-0 
increase by 43.4% as the size is scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease by 
46% as the size is scaled from 100% to 50%. When A=0,B=1, the critical 
charges needed to change the state from 0-1 increase by 47.4% as the size is 
scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease by 47.3% as the size is scaled from 
100% to 50%. Similarly, the critical charges needed to change the state from 
1-0 increase by 41.9% as the size is scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease 
by 46.4% as the size is scaled from 100% to 50%. 
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Figure 3.8 (a): Size Scaling for SIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.8 (b): Size Scaling for SIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
3.3.2 Critical Charge Analysis for Single Rail with Conventional Pull-Up 
Pull-Down Configuration 
A single rail with conventional pull-up pull-down configuration (SC) 
circuit consists of main pull up transistors (P1,P2), pull down transistors 
(N1,N2), inverter (P3,N3) and feedback transistors (P4,P5,N4,N5) as shown in 
Figure 3.9 [49]. The feedback transistors should be made as small as possible 
to reduce the loading effect. Suppose both inputs A and B are low causing the 
pull up transistors to change the output Out to low. Similarly, if both inputs A 
and B are high cause the pull down transistors to change the output Out to 
high. If the inputs are not equal, transistors P1 and P2 are disconnected from 
the power supply and transistors N1 and N2 are disconnected from the ground. 
The weak feedback transistors (P6, N6) are activated via transistors (P4, N4) 
or (P5, N5) to maintain the output value. Current are injected at nodes (i), (ii) 
and (iii) and the state change at node Out is observed. Node (iv) and node (v) 
are not injected with current as these nodes connected to voltage supply and 
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ground respectively when 𝐴 ≠ 𝐵 . Therefore bigger charges are needed to 
change the output from low to high and high to low. For the purpose of charge 
analysis and error rate calculation, node (iv) and node (v) are excluded as the 
charge needed to change the state are much higher compared with node (i),(ii) 
and (iii). If A=0, B=1, node (ii) is connected to voltage supply, and therefore 
the charge needed to change the state are much higher compared with node (i). 
Similarly, if A=1,B=0 node (i) is connected to ground, and therefore the 
charge needed to change the state are much higher compared with node (ii). 
Therefore, node (ii) and node (i) are ignored in the analysis for A=0, B=1 and 
A=1,B=0 respectively. 
 
Figure 3.9: SC configuration  
 
The critical charge when inputs A=1, B=0 and when inputs A=0, B=1 
are shown in Figure 3.10(a) and (b) respectively. The critical charge 0-1 is 
lower than critical charge of 1-0 change for both combinations of inputs. The 
factor variations of critical charges between the extreme process corner 
variations are between 1.27X to 1.38X when inputs A=1, B=0 and 1.30X to 
1.41X when inputs A=0, B=1, depending on the location of the SEU. The 
critical charges for TT, SNFP and FNSP are statistically equal since the 
standard deviation are 0.05f and 0.1f compared with the standard deviation of 
SS and FF which are 1.85f and 1.97f when inputs A=1, B=0 and inputs A=0, 
B=1 respectively. Thus, the critical charges for TT, SNFP and FNSP do not 
differ much. . For the temperature change as shown by Figure 3.11(a) and (b), 
the critical charges decrease by 7.4% for 0-1 change and 18.6% for 1-0 change 
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when inputs A=1, B=0 as the temperature increases from −400 𝐶 to 1000𝐶. 
Similarly when inputs  A=0, B=1 the critical charges decrease by 5.2% for 0-1 
change and 14.6% for 1-0 change on the same temperature increment. 
The effect of critical charges by scaling both voltage and size for SC is 
shown in Figure 3.12(a) and (b). When A=1, B=0, the charges decrease by 
48.4% when voltage and size are scaled from 1.2 V to 1 V and 150% to 100% 
respectively and further decrease by 61.2% when voltage and size are scaled 
from 1 V to 0.8 V and 100% to 50% respectively for 0-1 change. Similarly, 
the charges decrease by 46.1% and further decrease by 63.1% with the same 
scaling for 1-0 change. When A=0, B=1, the charges decrease by 49.3% when 
voltage and size are scaled from 1.2 V to 1 V and 150% to 100% respectively 
and further decrease by 64% when voltage and size are scaled from 1 V to 0.8 
V and 100% to 50% respectively for 0-1 change. Similarly, the charges 
decrease by 46.1% and further decrease by 58.8% with the same scaling for 1-
0 change.  
With voltage scaling keeping constant nominal size as shown in Figure 
3.13(a) and (b), when A=1,B=0, the critical charges needed to change the state 
decrease by 44% and 47.1% as the voltage is scaled from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 0-
1 and 1-0 respectively. When A=0,B=1, the critical charges needed to change 
the state decrease by 49% and 43.5% as the voltage is scaled from 1.2 V to 0.8 
V for 0-1 and 1-0 respectively. The critical charges with size scaling keeping 
constant nominal voltage are as shown in Figure 3.14(a) and (b). When 
A=1,B=0, the critical charges needed to change the state from 0-1 increase by 
48.1% as the size is scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease by 46.5% as the 
size is scaled from 100% to 50%. Similarly, the critical charges needed to 
change the state from 1-0 increase by 43 % as the size is scaled from 100% to 
150% and decrease by 46.2% as the size is scaled from 100% to 50%. When 
A=0,B=1, the critical charges needed to change the state from 0-1 increase by 
45.6% as the size is scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease by 47.7% as the 
size is scaled from 100% to 50%. Similarly, the critical charges needed to 
change the state from 1-0 increase by 44.8% as the size is scaled from 100% to 
150% and decrease by 45.9% as the size is scaled from 100% to 50%. 
 53 
 
 
Figure 3.10(a) : Process Corner Variation for SC configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.10(b) : Process Corner Variation for SC configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 3.11(a) : Temperature Variation for SC configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.11(b) :  Temperature Variation for SC configuration (A=0, B=1) 
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     Figure 3.12 (a): Voltage and Size Scaling for SC configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
       Figure 3.12(b): Voltage and Size Scaling for SC configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
     Figure 3.13(a): Voltage Supply Scaling for SC configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
       Figure 3.13(b): Voltage Supply Scaling for SC configuration (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 3.14(a) : Size Scaling for SC configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.14(b) : Size Scaling for SC configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
3.3.3 Critical Charge Analysis for Single Rail Symmetric Implementation 
Configuration 
A Single rail symmetric configuration (SS) is similar to SC 
implementation. It consists of main pull up transistors (P1,P2,P3,P4), pull 
down transistors (N1,N2,N3,N4), inverter (P5,N5) and feedback transistors 
(P6,N6) as shown in Figure 3.15 [50]. The feedback transistors should be 
made as small as possible to reduce the loading effect. The symmetrical 
structure gives an advantage with respect to the speed that due to the 
symmetrical design. Suppose both inputs A and B are low cause the pull up 
transistors to change the output Out to low. Similarly, if both inputs A and B 
are both high causing the pull down transistors change the output Out to high. 
If the inputs are not equal, and Out =0, the output is retained by a conducting 
paths either transistors P1, P6, P4 or transistors P2, P6, P3. Symmetrically, if 
the inputs are not equal, and Out =1, the output is retained by a conducting 
path either transistors N1, N6, N4 or transistors N2, N6, N3. Current is 
injected at nodes (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) and the state change at node Out is 
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observed. If A=0, B=1, node (iii) is connected to voltage supply and node (ii) 
is connected to ground, and therefore the charge needed to change the state are 
much higher compared with node (i) and (iv). Similarly, if A=1,B=0 node (i) 
is connected to ground and node (iv) is connected to voltage supply, and 
therefore the charge needed to change the state are much higher compared 
with node (ii) and (iii). Therefore, node (ii) and node (iii) are ignored in the 
analysis for A=0, B=1 and node (i) and (iv) are ignored for  A=1,B=0 
respectively. 
 
Figure 3.15: SS configuration 
  
The critical charge when inputs A=1, B=0 and when inputs A=0, B=1 
are shown in Figure 3.16(a) and (b) respectively. The critical charge 0-1 is 
lower than critical charge of 1-0 change for both combinations of inputs. The 
factor variations of critical charges between the extreme process corner 
variations are between 1.31X to 1.38X when inputs A=1, B=0 and 1.31X to 
1.37X when inputs A=0, B=1, depending on the location of the SEU. The 
critical charges for TT, SNFP and FNSP are statistically equal since the 
standard deviation are 0.21f and 0.2f compared with the standard deviation of 
SS and FF which are 2.55f and 2.51f when inputs A=1, B=0 and inputs A=0, 
B=1 respectively. Thus, the critical charges for TT, SNFP and FNSP do not 
differ much.  For the temperature change as shown by Figure 3.17(a) and (b), 
the critical charges decrease by 4.29% for 0-1 change and 17.5% for 1-0 
change when inputs A=1, B=0 as the temperature increases from −400 𝐶 to 
1000𝐶 . Similarly when inputs  A=0, B=1 the critical charges decrease by 
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5.9% for 0-1 change and 15.65% for 1-0 change on the same temperature 
increment. 
The effect of critical charges by scaling both voltage and size for SS is 
shown in Figure 3.18(a) and (b). When A=1, B=0, the charges decrease by 
49.7% when voltage and size are scaled from 1.2 V to 1 V and 150% to 100% 
respectively and further decrease by 63.9% when voltage and size are scaled 
from 1 V to 0.8 V and 100% to 50% respectively for 0-1 change. Similarly, 
the charges decrease by 46.1% and further decrease by 63.9% with the same 
scaling for 1-0 change. When A=0, B=1, the charges decrease by 48.9% when 
voltage and size are scaled from 1.2 V to 1 V and 150% to 100% respectively 
and further decrease by 64.3% when voltage and size are scaled from 1 V to 
0.8 V and 100% to 50% respectively for 0-1 change. Similarly, the charges 
decrease by 46.7% and further decrease by 62.9% with the same scaling for 1-
0 change.  
With voltage scaling keeping constant nominal size as shown in Figure 
3.19(a) and (b), when A=1,B=0, the critical charges needed to change the state 
decrease by 48.3% and 47.2% as the voltage is scaled from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 
0-1 and 1-0 respectively. When A=0,B=1, the critical charges needed to 
change the state decrease by 48.1% and 47.3% as the voltage is scaled from 
1.2 V to 0.8 V for 0-1 and 1-0 respectively. The critical charges with size 
scaling keeping constant nominal voltage are as shown in Figure 3.20(a) and 
(b). When A=1,B=0, the critical charges needed to change the state from 0-1 
increase by 48.7% as the size is scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease by 
47.5% as the size is scaled from 100% to 50%. Similarly, the critical charges 
needed to change the state from 1-0 increase by 42.8 % as the size is scaled 
from 100% to 150% and decrease by 48.1% as the size is scaled from 100% to 
50%. When A=0,B=1, the critical charges needed to change the state from 0-1 
increase by 47.4% as the size is scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease by 
48.5% as the size is scaled from 100% to 50%. Similarly, the critical charges 
needed to change the state from 1-0 increase by 44.6% as the size is scaled 
from 100% to 150% and decrease by 46.7% as the size is scaled from 100% to 
50%. 
 
 58 
 
 
Figure 3.16(a) : Process Corner Variation for SS configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.16(b) : Process Corner Variation for SS configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 3.17(a) : Temperature Variation for SS configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.17(b) : Temperature Variation for SS configuration (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 3.18(a): Voltage and Size Scaling for SS configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.18(b): Voltage and Size Scaling for SS configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 3.19(a): Voltage Supply Scaling for SS configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.19(b): Voltage Supply Scaling for SS configuration (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 3.20(a): Size Scaling for SS configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.20(b): Size Scaling for SS configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
3.3.4 Critical Charge Analysis for Differential Logic with Inverter Latch 
Configuration 
The implementation of Differential Logic with Inverter Latch 
Configuration (DIL) employs two pull down networks consisting four NMOS 
transistors (N1,N2,N3,N4) and feedback latch (P5,N5,P6,N6) as shown in 
Figure 3.15 [51].  Compared with SIL, SC and SS implementation, DIL 
requires two inputs and their complements. Suppose both inputs A and B are 
high and under this condition the output Out’ is low. The output Out is pulled 
up to high by a transistor P6. In a similar manner, if both inputs A and B are 
low, the output Out’ is pulled up to high by transistor P5. Therefore the PMOS 
transistors (P5 and P6) are responsible to pull up the output Out or Out’. As a 
result, the sizing of PMOS is important to have correct operation. If Wp is too 
small, it increases rise time delay and if it is too big, the circuit suffers race 
problem at the falling output node [51]. When both inputs A and B are not 
equal and Out’ is equal to 1, the output value Out’ is maintained by a weak 
transistor PMOS. The current are injected at node (i), (ii) (iii) and (iv) and the 
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state change at node Out is observed depending on the inputs combination. If 
A=0, B=1, node (i) is connected to voltage supply, and therefore the charge 
needed to change the state are much higher compared with node (ii). Similarly, 
if A=1,B=0 node (ii) is connected to ground, and therefore the charge needed 
to change the state are much higher compared with node (i). 
 
Figure 3.21: DIL configuration  
 
The critical charge when inputs A=1, B=0 and when inputs A=0, B=1 
are shown in Figure 3.22(a) and (b) respectively. The critical charge 0-1 is 
lower than critical charge of 1-0 change for A=1, B=0 and the opposite for 
A=0, B=1. The factors variation of critical charges between the extreme 
process corner variations is 1.5X and 1.25X for A=1,B=0 and A=0,B=1. The 
critical charges for TT, SNFP and FNSP are statistically equal since the 
standard deviation are 0.48f and 0.81f compared with the standard deviation of 
SS and FF which are 3.93f and 4.38f when inputs A=1, B=0 and inputs A=0, 
B=1 respectively. Thus, the critical charges for TT, SNFP and FNSP do not 
differ much. It can be concluded that critical charges on DIL are very sensitive 
to the process variation. For the temperature change as shown by Figure 
3.23(a) and (b), the critical charges decrease by 11.1% for 0-1 change and 
18.3% for 1-0 change when inputs A=1, B=0 as the temperature increases 
from −400 𝐶 to 1000𝐶. Similarly when inputs  A=0, B=1 the critical charges 
decrease by 17.8% for 0-1 change and 12.2% for 1-0 change on the same 
temperature increment. 
As with others configurations, the DIL configuration is also scaled 
both voltage and size to investigate the effect of critical charges as shown in 
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Figure 3.24(a) and (b). When A=1, B=0, the charges decrease by 50.4% when 
voltage and size are scaled from 1.2 V to 1 V and 150% to 100% respectively 
and further decrease by 64.7% when voltage and size are scaled from 1 V to 
0.8 V and 100% to 50% respectively for 0-1 change. Similarly, the charges 
decrease by 47.7% and further decrease by 60.4% with the same scaling for 1-
0 change. When A=0, B=1, the charges decrease by 47.4% when voltage and 
size are scaled from 1.2 V to 1 V and 150% to 100% respectively and further 
decrease by 58.5% when voltage and size are scaled from 1 V to 0.8 V and 
100% to 50% respectively for 0-1 change. Similarly, the charges decrease by 
51.2% and further decrease by 64.7% with the same scaling for 1-0 change.  
With voltage scaling keeping constant nominal size as shown in Figure 
3.25(a) and (b), when A=1,B=0, the critical charges needed to change the state 
decrease by 52.5% and 42.7% as the voltage is scaled from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 
0-1 and 1-0 respectively. When A=0,B=1, the critical charges needed to 
change the state decrease by 42.2% and 52.8% as the voltage is scaled from 
1.2 V to 0.8 V for 0-1 and 1-0 respectively. The critical charges with size 
scaling keeping constant nominal voltage are as shown in Figure 3.26(a) and 
(b). When A=1,B=0, the critical charges needed to change the state from 0-1 
increase by 44.9% as the size is scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease by 
47.3% as the size is scaled from 100% to 50%. Similarly, the critical charges 
needed to change the state from 1-0 increase by 47.9 % as the size is scaled 
from 100% to 150% and decrease by 46.8% as the size is scaled from 100% to 
50%. When A=0,B=1, the critical charges needed to change the state from 0-1 
increase by 48.7% as the size is scaled from 100% to 150% and decrease by 
44.9% as the size is scaled from 100% to 50%. Similarly, the critical charges 
needed to change the state from 1-0 increase by 46.1% as the size is scaled 
from 100% to 150% and decrease by 46.4% as the size is scaled from 100% to 
50%. 
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Figure 3.22(a): Process Corner Variation for DIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.22(b): Process Corner Variation for DIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 3.23(a) : Temperature Variation for DIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.23(b) : Temperature Variation for DIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
TT SS FF SNFP FNSP
Critical Charge (fC) 
node (i) 0-1
node (iii) 0-1
node (i) 1-0
node (iii) 1-0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
TT SS FF SNFP FNSP
Critical Charge (fC) 
node (ii) 0-1
node (iv) 0-1
node (ii) 1-0
node (iv) 1-0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
-40 10 60
C
ri
ti
ca
l 
C
h
a
rg
e 
(f
C
) 
Temperature (C) 
node (i) 0-1
node (iii) 0-1
node (i) 1-0
node (iii) 1-0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
-40 10 60
C
ri
ti
ca
l 
C
h
a
rg
e 
(f
C
) 
Temperature (C) 
node (ii) 0-1
node (iv) 0-1
node (ii) 1-0
node (iv) 1-0
 64 
 
 
Figure 3.24(a): Voltage and Size Scaling for DIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.24(b): Voltage and Size Scaling for DIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 3.25(a): Voltage Supply Scaling for DIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.25(b): Voltage Supply Scaling for DIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 3.26(a) : Size Scaling for DIL configuration (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.26(b) : Size Scaling for DIL configuration (A=0, B=1) 
 
3.4 Circuit Vulnerability Against Single Event Upset -Critical Charge 
In this section, the values of standard deviation are used in order to 
compare the vulnerability of C-elements with respect of SEU. These values 
are used to investigate the node sensitivity towards SEU as different factors 
changes and to show how the critical charges change with respect to the 
parameter changes.  
The nodes sensitivity of different configurations of C-elements with 
respect to the process variation, temperature, voltage and size scaling are 
presented as shown in Figure 3.27-3.31 when A=1, B=0. The nodes sensitivity 
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every nodes in C-elements. The formulae of standard deviation can be found 
in Appendix A.  The purpose is to observe the dispersion value of critical 
change when one of the factors as mention above is changing. It is observed 
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ways to protect C-elements against SEU is by increasing the size of the 
transistors. However, in Chapter 4, it is observed that the SEU rate is also 
proportioned with the size. The probability of getting SEU is higher when the 
size is bigger compared with the smaller size of circuit. It is also observed that 
the standard deviations for SIL are the highest compared with other single rail 
configurations (SS and SC) as shown in Figure 3.27-3.31 since it has the least 
number of transistors. This is true without taking into consideration the size of 
SIL compared with other circuits. Therefore any variation of process, 
temperature, voltage and sizing affects more on SIL compared with SS and 
SC. In Chapter 4, it is shown that with the size taken into consideration, SC 
and SS have higher SEU rate compared with SIL. Another observation is that 
the standard deviations of 1-0 change are generally higher compared with 0-1 
change with the exception of DIL. It is concluded that PMOS transistors are 
more sensitive to any variations compared with NMOS transistors. Figure 3.28 
shows that the standard deviations difference between PMOS and NMOS 
transistors for all the configurations are quite significant for the temperature 
variation. These showed PMOS transistors are more sensitive to the change of 
temperature compared with NMOS transistors. 
 
 Figure 3.27(a): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to Process 
Corner (A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 3.27(b): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to Process 
Corner (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 3.28(a): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to 
Temperature (A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 3.28(b): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to 
Temperature (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 3.29(a): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to Voltage and 
Scaling (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.29(b): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to Voltage and 
Scaling (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 3.30(a): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to Voltage 
Scaling (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 3.30(b): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to Voltage 
Scaling (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 3.31(a): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to Size Scaling 
(A=1, B=0) 
 
 
Figure 3.31(b): Comparison of Standard Deviation with respect to Size 
Scaling (A=0, B=1) 
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charges due to the larger pull up and pull down strength of transistors. As a 
result, the strength of transistors give better stabilization in the voltage level of 
the storage node and hence higher critical charge is needed to flip the output. 
For temperature, as temperature increases, it degrades the threshold voltage, 
carrier mobility and saturation velocity As a result of degrading carrier 
mobility, the drain current becomes lower and the sensitivity of the node 
towards SEU is increased. Hence, the critical charge needed to flip the output 
is decreased. For voltage, as voltage decrease, the critical charge needed to 
change the state also decreased. As a result, the stored charge needed to flip 
the output is also reduced. Finally, for size, reducing the size of the transistors 
decrease the gate capacitance from the output and therefore the collected 
charge needed to flip the output is also becoming smaller  
It is observed that size is the most important factors of critical charge 
variation since it has the highest standard deviation compared with others 
factors. This is due to the increasing the size of the transistors increase the gate 
capacitance from the output and therefore the collected charge needed to flip 
the output is also larger. However, as the size of the circuit is bigger, the 
probability of hitting by SEU is also increased even though the circuit is more 
resistant against SEU. This is discussed in chapter 4. The least significant 
factor is the temperature. As the temperature increased, the mobility of the 
carrier is reduced and degrades the performance of the transistor. It is also 
observed that the standard deviations for SIL are the highest compared with 
other single rail configurations (SS and SC) since it has the least number of 
transistors. This is true without taking into consideration the size of SIL 
compared with other circuits. 
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Chapter 4. Error Rate Analysis of Different Configurations of 
C-elements 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of soft error rate on vulnerable nodes. A new 
method is developed to calculate the error rate of the four different C-element 
circuits. The total error rates with respect to process corner, temperature, 
voltage, and size scaling of the circuits are compared. From the error rate 
values, a comparison of vulnerability towards SEU with different 
configurations of C-elements can be made with respect to the change of the 
four factors above. 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, the nodes are injected with the current pulse causing SEU 
and the critical charges are obtained on each node of C-elements. Different 
configurations of C-elements have been compared in term of the critical 
charges needed to flip the output and the standard deviation of critical charges. 
However, in order to accurately compare the vulnerability of C-elements, the 
error rate due to SEU in four different C-elements need to be obtained. As the 
values lies between low to high, no clear interpretation by the circuit or system 
on this value that lead to circuit malfunction In this chapter, a method of 
calculating error rate of different configurations is proposed by taking into 
account the values lies between low to high.   
Previous chapter considered the responses of the state holders by 
observing only the change of the state holder from 1-0 change or 0-1 change. 
In this chapter, all of the responses of the state holders are considered: 
a) No change to the state holder – There is insignificant output pulse that 
has been generated and does not cause any state change. It is assumed 
that if the generated pulse is less than 20% [52] of the input pulse such 
pulse can be further attenuated in the following gates and caused no 
further damage. This is shown in Figure 4.1 (a) and Figure 4.2(a). 
b) Pulse output is generated- Over a small range of input pulse amplitude, 
the pulse output is generated. It is assumed that if the generated pulse 
is 20% [52] or more of the input pulse, such pulse can be very likely to 
cause the problem. This is shown in Figure 4.1(b) and Figure 4.2(b)  
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c) State change – At certain amplitude of current pulse, the state holder 
can change its state. This is shown in Figure 4.1 (c) and Figure 4.2(c) 
  
Figure 4.1: State holder change from 
low to high (0-1) 
Figure 4.2: State holder change from 
high to low (1-0) 
 
4.2 Mathematical Modelling of Soft Error 
For simplicity, an injected current that resemble SEU is assumed to 
have trapezoidal shape with width (𝑡𝑤), fast rising time (𝑡𝑟), slow falling time 
(𝑡𝑓)  and an amplitude 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 . Let 𝐴𝑚𝑝1 be an amplitude of injected pulse in 
such a way that produce Out(t) ≥ 0.2 and 𝐴𝑚𝑝2 is the amplitude of injected 
pulse that cause the output to corrupt or change the state to change. Since the 
generated pulse directly proportion with the ratio of the injected charge that 
produced Out(t) ≥ 0.2, (𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑), with the injected charge that cause the 
state to change, (𝑄𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒−𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒), the mathematical expressions are derived to 
describe the response of the state holders as illustrated as above. Furthermore, 
whether the state is corrupted or not is depended on the polarity of the current 
source. The positive polarity of current on n-type drain can cause the state to 
change from 1-0-1. The negative polarity on n-type drain can only reinforce 
logic state 1 [53]. Therefore, by taking into consideration the polarity of 
current, a constant 
1
2
 is added to the response equation to indicate that there are 
50% chances of current to cause SEU. The response of the state holder 
equation is given by 4.1 
 
 
 74 
 
Response, 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖)= 
[
0                     𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 < 𝐴𝑚𝑝1
1
2
𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 
𝑄𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒−𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
  𝐴𝑚𝑝1 ≤ 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝐴𝑚𝑝2
0.5               𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 > 𝐴𝑚𝑝2
] 
 
(4.1) 
 
It is assumed that the shape of current pulse resemble trapezoidal as illustrated 
in the Chapter 3, then the above equation can be expanded as shown by 4.2   
Response, 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖)= 
[
 
 
 
        0                                           𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 < 𝐴𝑚𝑝1
0.5∗(𝑡𝑟+𝑡𝑓)∗𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖+𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖∗𝑡𝑤
0.5∗(𝑡𝑟+𝑡𝑓)∗𝐴𝑚𝑝2+𝐴𝑚𝑝2∗𝑡𝑤
   𝐴𝑚𝑝1 ≤ 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝐴𝑚𝑝2
      0.5                                        𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 > 𝐴𝑚𝑝2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
(4.2) 
 
Equation 4.2 could be simplified as shown by equation 4.3 by assuming the 
rising time, width and falling time is constant. The only variable is the 
amplitude of the current pulse.  
Response, 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖)= 
[
  0                           𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 < 𝐴𝑚𝑝1
𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖
𝐴𝑚𝑝2
     𝐴𝑚𝑝1 ≤ 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 ≤ 𝐴𝑚𝑝2
 0.5                         𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖 > 𝐴𝑚𝑝2
] 
 
(4.3) 
 
The following terms are defined to illustrate the sensitive area of n-type and p-
type of different C-elements implementations:  
(a) 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of SIL at node (i)  
 
(b) 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive p-type drain area of SIL at node (ii)  
 
(c) 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive p-type drain area of SIL at node (iii) 
  
(d) 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of SIL at node (iii)  
 
(e) 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of SC at node (i)  
 
(f) 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive p-type drain area of SC at node (ii)  
 
(g) 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive p-type drain area of SC at node (iii) 
  
(h) 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of SC at node (iii)  
 
(i) 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of SS at node (i)  
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(j) 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of SS at node (ii)  
 
(k) 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive p-type drain area of SS at node (iii)  
 
(l) 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑣)
 The area of sensitive p-type drain area of SS at node (iv) 
  
(m) 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑣)
 The area of sensitive p-type drain area of SS at node (v)  
 
(n) 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑣)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of SS at node (v)  
 
(o) 𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of DIL at node (i) 
  
(p) 𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of DIL at node (ii) 
  
(q) 𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of DIL at node (iii) 
  
(r) 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑣)
 The area of sensitive n-type drain area of DIL at node (iv)  
 
The total areas of vulnerable 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 nodes of different configurations of 
C-elements are the sum of the drain of p-type and n-type, which are given by 
(4.4)-(4.7). 
(a) 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑆𝐼𝐿) = 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 4.4 
(b) 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑆𝐶) = 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖) + 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖) + 𝐴𝑃2,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝐴𝑃6,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝐴𝑁1,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) +𝐴𝑁6,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
 4.5 
(c) 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝑆𝑆) = 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑣)
+ 2𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑣)
+ 2𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑣)
 4.6 
(d) 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(𝐷𝐼𝐿) = 𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖)
+𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑣)
 4.7 
 
Therefore, the probability of current that hit each of the drain of NMOS and 
PMOS for any given nodes are given by 4.8 and 4.9  
𝑃𝑛−𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒= 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) * 
𝐴𝑛
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
 
 
(4.8) 
𝑃𝑝−𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒= 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) * 
𝐴𝑝
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
 
 
(4.9) 
𝐴𝑛
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
= Sensitive area of each n-type drain  
 
 
𝐴𝑝
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
= Sensitive area of each p-type drain  
 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡= Total area of the corresponding C-element: SIL,SC,SS or DIL  
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The number of events is reduced in quadratic with neutron energy. On 
a log-log plot of the number of event per energy, 
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝐸
 versus Energy (MeV), as 
shown in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 can be approximated by a straight line for the 
interval of [1 100] MeV. The line can be used to predict the error rate of the 
state holders by neutron energy. Two parameters  𝐶1  and 𝐶2 can be extracted 
from the graph as follows: 
1) Constant 𝐶1 equals to the y-intersect of the straight line segment of the plot. 
2) Constant 𝐶2 is the slope of the straight line segment of the plot. 
The straight line of spectrum density of neutron that is larger or equal to 1 
MeV, 𝑆𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛>1𝑀𝑒𝑉, can be modelled as in (4.10) 
𝑆𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛>1𝑀𝑒𝑉= 𝐶1 ∗ 𝐸
−𝐶2 MeV/𝑐𝑚2/hr 
 
(4.10) 
For spectrum density of neutron that is equal or smaller to 1 MeV, 
𝑆𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛<1𝑀𝑒𝑉 , the equation can be approximated from Figure 2.3 in 
Chapter 2. The simulations on four different configurations of C-elements 
show that the critical energy needed to cause 0.2 of input pulse or causing the 
state to change is lies between 0.15 MeV to 0.9 MeV. In other words, energy 
that is less than 1 MeV is sufficient to cause the output of C-element to 
change. This range is as shown by the red circle in Figure 2.3. The constant 
3600 refers to the conversion of second to hour. The approximate equation of 
the line is given by 4.11 
𝑆𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛<1𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 3600 ∗ 10
𝐶3𝐸−𝐶4 MeV/𝑐𝑚2/hr 
 
(4.11) 
Two parameters  𝐶3and 𝐶4 can be extracted from the graph of Figure 
2.3 as follows: 
1) Constant 𝐶3  equals to the slope of the straight line segment. 
2) Constant 𝐶4 equals the y-intersect of the straight line segment. 
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Figure 4.3: Normalized atmospheric neutron cross section with the drain area 
 
The ratio of normalized atmospheric neutron cross section with the 
drain area of PMOS and NMOS with  0.1 𝜇𝑚 technologies for neutron energy 
is shown in Figure 4.3[54]. As the 90 nm-technology is used in the simulation, 
the ratio can be approximated by neutron cross section and drain cross section 
with 0.1 𝜇𝑚  technology. It is very obvious from the graph that NMOS 
transistor is more vulnerable towards SEU compared with PMOS transistor. 
Karnik [17] suggested that for the same transistor width, NMOS transistor is 
2.2 times more sensitive compared with PMOS transistor. This is due to the 
collected charge for drain NMOS is higher for drain PMOS. The equations for 
normalized cross section of PMOS and NMOS straight-line for 0.1 𝜇𝑚 
technology are given by 4.12 and 4.13 
𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 = 10
(𝑑1𝑄+𝑑2) (4.12) 
 
𝑝𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 = 10
(𝑒1𝑄+𝑒2) 
 
(4.13) 
𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑒1and 𝑒2 are constants  
 
Four parameters  𝑑1, 𝑑2,𝑒1and 𝑒2 can be extracted from the graph of 
Figure 4.3 as follows: 
1) Constant 𝑑1 and 𝑒1 equal to the slope of the straight line segment of nmos 
and pmos graph respectively. 
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2) Constant 𝑑2  and 𝑒2  equal the y-intersect of the straight line segment of 
nmos and pmos graph respectively. 
The error rate of neutron spectrum energy that cause failure for any 
node of NMOS transistor for spectrum of energy more than 1 MeV in state 
holder is given by 4.14. 
𝑅𝑛,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒>1𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 𝑃𝑛−𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒  *  (𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑) * 𝑆𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛>1𝑀𝑒𝑉 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 (4.14) 
 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 is the vulnerable area in different configurations of C-elements given (4.4)-
(4.7) 
 
Equation 4.14 can be written as shown by 4.15 
𝑅𝑛,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒>1𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) * 
𝐴𝑛
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
 *  10(𝑑1𝑄+𝑑2) *𝐶1𝐸
−𝐶2*𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
4.15 
 
Similarly the error rate of neutron spectrum energy that cause failure 
for any node of NMOS transistor for spectrum of energy less than 1 MeV in 
state holder is given by equation 4.16. 
𝑅𝑛,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒<1 𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 𝑃𝑛−𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒  *  (𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑) * 𝑆𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛<1𝑀𝑒𝑉 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 (4.16) 
 
Equation 4.2.16 can be written as in shown by 4.17 
𝑅𝑛,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒<1𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) * 
𝐴𝑛
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
 *  10(𝑑1𝑄+𝑑2) * 3600 ∗ 10𝐶3𝐸−𝐶4 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
 
(4.17) 
 
Equation 4.16 and equation 4.17 are added to calculate the total error rate of 
neutron spectrum energy that cause failure for any node of NMOS transistor is 
given by 4.18 and 4.19. 
𝑅𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑛 = 𝑅𝑛,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒<1𝑀𝑒𝑉 + 𝑅𝑛,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒>1𝑀𝑒𝑉 
 
(4.18) 
𝑅𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑛 = 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) ∗  
𝐴𝑛
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ 10(𝑑1𝑄+𝑑2) ∗ 𝐶1𝐸
−𝐶2 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 +
𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) ∗ 
𝐴𝑛
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
 * 10(𝑑1𝑄+𝑑2) ∗ 3600 ∗ 10𝐶3𝐸−𝐶4*𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
 
(4.19) 
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The error rate of neutron spectrum energy that cause failure for any 
node of PMOS transistor for spectrum of energy more than 1 MeV in state 
holder is given by equation 4.20. 
𝑅𝑝,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒>1𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 𝑃𝑝−𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒  *  (𝑝𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑) * 𝑆𝐷𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛>1𝑀𝑒𝑉 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 (4.20) 
 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 is the vulnerable area in different configurations of C-elements given (4.4)-
(4.7) 
 
Equation 4.20 can be written as shown by equation 4.21. However, 
since energy that is less than 1 MeV only affect NMOS transistor [55], the 
total the total error rate of neutron spectrum energy that cause failure for any 
node of PMOS transistor is equal to equation 4.22 
𝑅𝑝,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒>1𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) * 
𝐴𝑝
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
 *  10(𝑒1𝑄+𝑒2) * 𝐶1𝐸
−𝐶2*𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
 
 
4.21 
𝑅𝑝,𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒<1𝑀𝑒𝑉 = 0 
 
 
𝑅𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑝 = 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) * 
𝐴𝑝
(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
 *  10(𝑒1𝑄+𝑒2) * 𝐶1𝐸
−𝐶2*𝐴𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 
4.22 
 
The probability can be extended in order to find the total probability 
due to the drain of NMOS or PMOS transistor of any given C-element circuit 
as shown by (4.23)-(4.30) 
𝑃𝑛,𝑆𝐼𝐿=
1
𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖)
+𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
) 
 
(4.23) 
𝑃𝑝,𝑆𝐼𝐿=
1
𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖)
+𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
) 
 
(4.24) 
𝑃𝑛,𝑆𝐶=
1
𝐴𝑆𝐶
(𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
) 
 
(4.25) 
𝑃𝑝,𝑆𝐶=
1
𝐴𝑆𝐶
(𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝐶
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
) 
 
(4.26) 
𝑃𝑛,𝑆𝑆= 
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆
(𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖)
+𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑛,𝑆𝑆
(𝑣)
) 
 
(4.27) 
𝑃𝑝,𝑆𝑆= 
1
𝐴𝑆𝑆
(𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑖𝑣)
+𝐴𝑝,𝑆𝑆
(𝑣)
) 
 
(4.28) 
𝑃𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿= 
1
𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖)
+𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
+ 𝐴𝑛,𝐷𝐼𝐿
(𝑖𝑖𝑖)
) (4.29) 
𝑃𝑝,𝐷𝐼𝐿 = 0 (4.30) 
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𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐿 , 𝐴𝑆𝐶 , 𝐴𝑆𝑆and 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝐿 are the total area of SIL, SC, SS and DIL respectively 
 
The total probability of current pulse that hit for NMOS and PMOS 
transistor in circuit are given by 4.31 and 4.32. 
𝑃𝑛,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙= 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) * (𝑃𝑛,𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡) (4.31) 
 
𝑃𝑝,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙= 𝑅𝑖(𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑖) * (𝑃𝑝,𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡) (4.32) 
 
circuit= SIL,SC,SS or DIL 
 
The total errors rate due to SEU of any configurations of C-elements 
are given by 4.33-4.34 
𝑅𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙= Total error rate due to NMOS + Total error rate due to PMOS  
 
(4.33) 
𝑅𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑃𝑛,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ∗ 10
(𝑑1𝑄+𝑑2) ∗ 𝐶1𝐸
−𝐶2 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡+𝑃𝑛,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙* 10
(𝑑1𝑄+𝑑2)  
 
∗ 3600 ∗ 10𝐶3𝐸−𝐶4*𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡+𝑃𝑝,𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙*  10
(𝑒1𝑄+𝑒2) * 𝐶1𝐸
−𝐶2*𝐴𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡 
(4.34) 
 
4.3 Proposed Methods to Calculate Soft Error Rate   
The methods are devised by using MATLAB to calculate the critical 
charges based on the amplitude that generate 20% of the input and the 
amplitude that cause the state to change for both NMOS and PMOS transistors 
and to all the nodes. The normalised cross sections of NMOS and PMOS with 
respect to neutron cross section are given by equations 4.12 and 4.13. The 
code is given by Method 4.1. 
Method 4.1  Calculate the critical charge and normalized cross section of NMOS/PMOS 
with neutron 
 
*Defining 𝑎1 = Amplitude of SEU that hit the drain of NMOS  which generate pulse of 
20% of the input 
   
*Defining 𝑎2  = Amplitude of SEU that hit the drain of NMOS  which cause state to 
change 
 
*Defining 𝑏1 = Amplitude of SEU that hit the drain of PMOS  which generate pulse of 
20% of the input 
   
*Defining 𝑏2 = Amplitude of SEU that hit the drain of PMOS  which cause state to change 
 
*Calculate critical charge of NMOS = charge needed to change the current state 
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                  Critical charge (𝑄1) = 
1
2
∗ (𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)*𝑎2 + (𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ)*𝑎2 
 
*Calculate critical charge of PMOS = charge needed to change the current state 
 
                  Critical charge (𝑄2) = 
1
2
∗ (𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)*𝑏2 + (𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ)*𝑏2 
 
 *Calculate the normalized cross section of NMOS with the area of neutron 
 
                  Ratio NMOS = 10(𝑑1𝑄1+𝑑2) 
 
 *Calculate the normalized cross section of PMOS with the area of neutron 
 
                  Ratio PMOS = 10(𝑒1𝑄2+𝑒2)                                                                                                                      
 
As shown by Figure 4.1 and 4.2, the response of the state holder when 
current pulse hit the vulnerable nodes can be categorized into three 
possibilities. The calculation is devised as shown by Method 4.2 to calculate 
the three possibilities. If the amplitude of the state holder, (𝑎𝑖) , is less than 
20% of the input (𝑎1), the probability is assigned to 0. If the amplitude of the 
state holder, (𝑎𝑖), is more than 20% of the input (𝑎1)  but less than critical 
charge amplitude, (𝑎2), the probability is assigned with 
0.5∗𝑎𝑖 
𝑎2
 for NMOS. 
Otherwise the probability is equal to 0.5. As the neutron that is less than 1 
MeV is only affect p-type dopant (NMOS transistor), the charge, energy and 
error rate are calculated when current pulse hit the drain of NMOS transistor. 
The critical energy for all of the circuits and all nodes lies between 0.15 MeV 
to 0.9 MeV, which is denoted by a circle as in Figure 2.3, the maximum 
amplitude is limited to 380 𝜇𝐴 as this correspond to 1 MeV of energy. The 
number of samples equal to 1000 and generate the amplitudes randomly.  
Method 4.2  Calculate charge, energy and rate of error with amplitude less than 380  
 
% Defining the number of samples 
    
  nsamples = 1000; 
 
%Generate randomly amplitudes,  
 
For i=1:1:nsamples; 
     
    𝑎𝑖 = 0+380*rand(1); 
 
if (𝑎𝑖  < than 𝑎1) 
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                 Probability = 0; 
 
Else if (𝑎1 ≤ 𝑎𝑖  < 𝑎2) 
 
                 Probability = 
0.5∗𝑎𝑖 
𝑎2
 
 
Else 
 
                 Probability = 0.5; 
 
         end; 
 
    if (𝑎1 ≤ 𝑎𝑖) 
 
                 Charge less than 1 MeV (𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒)  = 
1
2
∗ (𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)* 𝑎𝑖   + 
(𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ)* 𝑎𝑖   
 
                 Energy less than 1 MeV (E) = 
3.6𝑒𝑉 𝑥 𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒
1.6𝑥10−19𝐶
 
 
              Rate less than 1 MeV = 3600 ∗ 10(𝑐3∗𝐸−𝑐4)  *Area of vulnerable*Ratio 
NMOS 
 
        End                                                                                                    
 
For energy of neutron that is more than 1 MeV, the amplitude from 
380 𝜇𝐴  to 3620 𝜇𝐴  is generated randomly. This correspond to the neutron 
energy equal to 1 MeV and 10 Mev of energy respectively, which is defined 
by [56] as neutron environment at ground level. Method 4.3 is devised to 
calculate the charge, energy and error rate when SEU hit the drain of NMOS 
and PMOS transistor respectively. The differences of error rate between 
PMOS and NMOS lies in the normalized cross section of PMOS and NMOS 
and neutron cross section. 
Method 4.3 Calculate charge, energy and rate of error with amplitude more than 380 
 
% Defining the number of samples 
    
  nsamples = 1000; 
 
%Generate randomly amplitudes for NMOS(𝑎𝑖) and PMOS(𝑏𝑖) respectively,  
 
For i=1:1:nsamples; 
     
    𝑎𝑖= 380+3620*rand(1)  
 
    𝑏𝑖= 380+3620*rand(1) 
 
*Calculate the charge, energy and error rate for NMOS with amplitude of SEU more than 
380 𝜇𝐴 
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                 Charge more than 1 MeV (𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒)  = 
1
2
∗ (𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)* 𝑎𝑖  + 
(𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ)* 𝑎𝑖 
 
                  Energy more than 1 MeV (E)  = 
3.6𝑒𝑉 𝑥 𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒
1.6𝑥10−19𝐶
 
 
               Rate more than 1MeV = 𝑐1𝐸
−𝑐2 * Area of vulnerable *Ratio NMOS 
 
    *Calculate the charge, energy and error rate for PMOS with amplitude of SEU more than 
380 𝜇𝐴 
 
                 Charge more than 1 MeV (𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒)  = 
1
2
∗ (𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)* 𝑏𝑖  + 
(𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ)* 𝑏𝑖 
 
                  Energy more than 1 MeV (E)  = 
3.6𝑒𝑉 𝑥 𝑄𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒,𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒
1.6𝑥10−19𝐶
 
 
               Rate more than 1 MeV = 𝑐1𝐸
−𝑐2 * Area of vulnerable *Ratio PMOS 
 
 
The error rates of current pulse hitting the drain of NMOS and PMOS 
respectively are calculated for energy of neutron less than 1 MeV and more 
than 1 MeV. For current that hit the drain of NMOS transistor, the error rate of 
SEU less than 1 MeV and more than 1 MeV are added. But for the drain of 
PMOS transistor, only the error rate of SEU for the neutron energy more than 
1 MeV were taking into account as energy less than 1 Mev does not affect the 
PMOS transistor. Method 4.4 is used to calculate the total error of SEU.  
Method 4.4  Calculate error rate 
 
*Calculate the probability of SEU event of the circuit with amplitude of SEU less than 380 
𝜇𝐴 
 
Probability of SEU (NMOS) = Probability*
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑀𝑂𝑆
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
; 
 
*Calculate the error rate of SEU 
 
SEU Error Rate less than 1 MeV = Rate less than 1MeV* Probability of SEU (NMOS); 
     
    *Calculate the Sum of SEU Rate 
 
 Sum of SEU Rate less than 1 MeV =Sum(SEU Error Rate less than 1MeV); 
 
*Calculate the probability of SEU event of the circuit with amplitude of SEU more than 380 
𝜇𝐴 
 
Probability of SEU (NMOS)= 0.5*
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑀𝑂𝑆
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
; 
 84 
 
 
*Calculate the error rate of SEU 
 
SEU Error Rate more than 1 MeV = Rate more than 1 MeV* Probability of SEU (NMOS); 
     
    *Calculate the Sum of SEU Rate 
 
 Sum of SEU Rate  more than 1 MeV=Sum(SEU Error Rate more than 1 MeV); 
 
*Calculate the total error rate of NMOS error rate of SEU 
 
  Total Error rate of NMOS = Sum of SEU Rate less than 1 MeV + Sum of SEU Rate  more 
than 1 MeV 
 
*Calculate the probability of SEU event of the circuit with amplitude of SEU more than 380 
𝜇𝐴 
 
Probability of SEU (PMOS)= 0.5*
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑀𝑂𝑆
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
; 
 
*Calculate the error rate of SEU 
 
SEU Error Rate more than 1 MeV = Rate more than 1 MeV* Probability of SEU (PMOS); 
     
    *Calculate the Sum of SEU Rate 
 
 Sum of SEU Rate  more than 1 MeV=Sum(SEU Error Rate more than 1 MeV); 
 
 
4.4 Results and Analysis 
In order to calculate the SEU error rate, Method 4.1, Method 4.2, 
Method 4.3 and Method 4.4 are used under four different setting as mentioned 
in Chapter 3. The SEU current are injected at the numbered nodes and the 
amplitudes of the current which generated pulses of 20% or more of the input 
pulse and the amplitudes of current pulse which caused the output to flip are 
recorded.  
4.4.1 Error Rate for Single Rail with Inverter Latch Configuration 
The SIL configuration and the layout with the corresponding vulnerable node 
(i),(ii) and (iii) are shown in Figure 4.4(a)(b). The total surface area for SIL 
configuration is 18.1 𝜇𝑚2. 
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Figure 4.4: (a) SIL Configuration Figure 4.4(b) : Layout SIL 
Configuration [57] 
 
The error rates as shown in Figure 4.5(a) of 0-1 change are higher 
compared with error rate of 1-0 change by a factor of 4.09X at TT process 
corner when A=1, B=0. Similarly, when A=0, B=1 the error rate of 0-1 change 
are higher by a factor of 2.6X with the same process as shown by Figure 
4.5(b). As expected, SS process corner has the highest error rate due to the 
slowest transistors and FF process corner has the lowest rate due to the fastest 
transistor for all nodes.  In order to compare the relative error rate between the 
process corners, the error rate for the same processes from Figure 4.5(a) and 
(b) are added as shown in Figure 4.6(a) and (b). It is shown that the factor 
variation between the extreme process corner (SS and FF) is 1.98X and 1.64X 
when A=1,B=0 and A=0,B=1 respectively . The standard deviation of (TT, 
SNFP and FNSP) is much smaller compared with the standard deviation of 
(SS and FF) as shown by Table 4.1.   The relatively small standard deviation 
of TT, SNFP and FNSP indicates that the error rate between these process 
corner are statistically identical compared with SS and FF. 
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No Process Corner Standard 
Deviation (σ) 
Percentage 
difference w.r.t  
(i) 
A=1 B=0 SS,FF 5.61E-13 - 
TT,SNFP,FNSP 1.18E-13 13.1% 
SS,FF,TT,SNFP,FNSP 3.69E-13 64.7% 
A=0 B=1 SS,FF 3.18E-12 - 
TT,SNFP,FNSP 5E-14 1.6% 
SS,FF,TT,SNFP,FNSP 2.02E-12 63.5% 
Table 4.1 : Standard Deviation for the Process Corner-SIL 
 
 Figure 4.5(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SIL(A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.5(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SIL(A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 4.6 (a): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SIL(A=1, B=0) 
 
 
Figure 4.6 (b): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SIL(A=0, B=1) 
 
As shown in Figure 4.7(a) and (b), the error rates increase with the 
increase of temperature due to the degradation of the mobility carrier. As a 
result of degrading carrier mobility, the drain current becomes lower and the 
sensitivity of the nodes towards SEU increase. Therefore, these nodes are 
more vulnerable to SEU at high temperature. The error rates of 0-1 change 
increase by 29.1% and the error rates of 1-0 change increase by 132% by 
increasing the temperature from −40𝑜𝐶 to 100𝑜𝐶 when A=1,B=0. Similarly 
when inputs  A=0, B=1 the error rates increase by 14.1% for 0-1 change and 
increase by 54.7% for 1-0 change on the same temperature increment. From 
the increment of critical charge, it is concluded that the PMOS transistors had 
greater effect on temperature variation compared with NMOS. This is 
consistent with the results as in Chapter 2. The error rates for the same 
temperature as in Figure 4.7(a) and (b) are added to obtain the total error rate 
of SIL due to temperature variation as shown in Figure 4.8(a) and (b) when 
A=1,B=0 and A=0, B=1 respectively . It is shown that the factor variation 
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between the extreme temperature variation are 1.46X and 1.23X and the 
standard deviation due to the temperature variation is 2.4E-13 and 1E-13 
respectively. This is smaller compared with standard deviation due to process 
which is 3.69E-13 and 2.02E-13.We can conclude from the standard deviation 
that temperature has lower effect on SEU compared with process corner.  
 
Figure 4.7 (a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature SIL (A=1 B=0) 
 
Figure 4.7 (b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature SIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
 Figure 4.8(a): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature-SIL(A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 4.8(b): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature-SIL(A=0, B=1) 
 
From Figure 4.9(a), 4.10(a) and 4.11(a), it is observed that the error 
rate between 0-1 change and 1-0 change decrease when the size is scaled. For 
example, at nominal voltage of 1 V, the error rates between 0-1 change and 1-
0 change are 7.31X, 4.03X and 2.11X for the size of 150%, 100% and 50% 
respectively when A=1, B=0. Similarly from Figure 4.9(b), 4.10(b) and 
4.11(b), the error rates between 1-0 change and 0-1 change are 4.02X,2.77X 
and 1.69X  respectively when A=0, B=1.  This indicates that as the size is 
scaled, the resistance of PMOS transistors towards SEU decrease more than 
NMOS transistors. As voltage supply is reduced, the error rate increases due to 
the reduced in driving current causing the stored charged needed to flip the 
output is also reduced. As a result the node is vulnerable to SEU when voltage 
supply is reduced. The error rate with the same voltage are from Figure 4.9(a), 
4.10(a) and 4.11(a) and Figure 4.9(b), 4.10(b) and 4.11(b) are added as shown 
by Figure 4.12(a) and (b). When A=1,B=0 the soft error rate increases by a 
factor 12.5X, 6.05X and 2.64X by scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 
150%, 100% and 50% of nominal size respectively. Similarly when A=0,B=1 
the soft error rate increases by a factor 4.64X, 2.99X and 1.77X by scaling 
voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 150%, 100% and 50% of nominal size 
respectively. Compared with process corner variation and temperature, voltage 
scaling has the highest impact on the rate of SEU error. Generally, as the size 
increases, the critical charge needed to change the state is increased. By 
increasing the width of the transistor, the output node capacitance is also 
increased and therefore the charge needed to change the state is also increased. 
In other words, the smaller is the size, the circuit is more vulnerable to SEU. 
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However, as the size of circuit is decreased, the probability of hitting by 
current pulse is also smaller. For error rate, there is a trade-off between the 
size of the circuit and the probability of hitting by SEU.  
 
 Figure 4.9(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 50% SIL (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.9(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 50% SIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
 Figure 4.10(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 100% SIL (A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 4.10(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 100% SIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 4.11(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 150% SIL (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.11(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 150% SIL (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 4.12(a): Total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for  SIL (A=1, B=0) 
 
 
 Figure 4.12(b): Total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect 
to Voltage Supply for SIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
Sensitivity Analysis for SIL configuration 
In chapter 3, the nodes sensitivity are obtained by calculating the 
standard deviation of the critical charge on every node in C-elements. In this 
chapter, the nodes sensitivity are obtained by calculating the standard 
deviation of the error rate on every nodes to obtain the correct representation 
of the variation of the critical charges towards process corner, temperature, 
voltage and size scaling as shown by Figure 4.13 (a) and (b). Voltage scaling 
has the highest value of standard deviation which suggests that the error rates 
are very sensitive to the change in the voltage supply. Standard deviation for 
the process is significant than size for inputs A=0,B=1 which suggests that the 
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NMOS transistors are more sensitive to the process variation than the size. 
When inputs A=1, B=0, the standard deviation for the size is higher than 
process variation which suggests that the PMOS transistors are less sensitive 
to the process variation compared with size. The temperature variations have 
the lowest values of standard deviation. The percentage increment of error rate 
for A=1,B=0 is higher than inputs A=0,B=1 because PMOS transistor is more 
sensitive with temperature variation compared with NMOS transistor. 
However, the standard deviation due to temperature for A=1,B=0 is lower than 
inputs A=0,B=1 since the error rates for A=0,B=1 is higher than A=1,B=0 
result in higher standard deviations. 
 
 Figure 4.13 (a): Standard Deviation of Error rate due to neutron energy 
spectrum with respect to Process Corner, Temperature, Voltage and Size 
Scaling SIL(A=1, B=0) 
 
 
Figure 4.13 (b): Standard Deviation of Error rate due to neutron energy 
spectrum with respect to Process Corner, Temperature, Voltage and Size 
Scaling SIL(A=0, B=1) 
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4.4.2 Error Rate for Single Rail with Conventional Pull-Up Pull-Down 
Configuration 
The above procedures are repeated with other configurations. The SC 
configuration and the layout with the corresponding vulnerable node (i),(ii) 
and (iii) are shown by Figure 4.14(a) and (b). The total surface area for SC 
configuration is 22.4 𝜇𝑚2 , which is slightly higher compared with SIL 
configuration. 
 
 
Figure 4.14(a): SC Configuration Figure 4.14(b): Layout SC 
Configuration[57] 
 
The error rates as shown in Figure 4.15(a) of 0-1 change are higher 
compared with error rate of 1-0 change by a factor of 2.31X at TT process 
corner when A=1, B=0. Similarly, when A=0, B=1 the error rate of 0-1 change 
are higher by a factor of 1.78X with the same process as shown by Figure 
4.15(b). In order to compare the relative error rate between the process 
corners, the error rate for the same processes from Figure 4.15(a) and (b) are 
added as shown in Figure 4.16(a) and (b). It is shown that the factor variation 
between the extreme process corner (SS and FF) is 1.71X and 1.43X when 
A=1,B=0 and A=0,B=1 respectively . The standard deviation of (TT, SNFP 
and FNSP) is much smaller compared with the standard deviation of (SS and 
FF) as shown by Table 4.2.   The relatively small standard deviation of TT, 
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SNFP and FNSP indicates that the error rate between these process corner are 
statistically identical compared with SS and FF. 
No Process Corner Standard 
Deviation (σ) 
Percentage 
difference w.r.t  
(i) 
A=1 B=0 SS,FF 9.28E-13 - 
TT,SNFP,FNSP 1.21E-13 13.1% 
SS,FF,TT,SNFP,FNSP 5.99E-13 64.7% 
A=0 B=1 SS,FF 3.16E-12 - 
TT,SNFP,FNSP 5.88E-14 1.9% 
SS,FF,TT,SNFP,FNSP 2E-12 63.4% 
Table 4.2 : Standard Deviation for the Process Corner-SC 
 
 Figure 4.15(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SC(A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.15(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SC(A=0, B=1) 
0.00E+00
2.00E-13
4.00E-13
6.00E-13
8.00E-13
1.00E-12
1.20E-12
1.40E-12
1.60E-12
SC (Error Rate /hr) vs Process Corner 
Out=0-1                                                                                         Out=1-0 
0.00E+00
1.00E-12
2.00E-12
3.00E-12
4.00E-12
5.00E-12
6.00E-12
7.00E-12
8.00E-12
SC (Error Rate /hr) vs Process Corner 
Out=0-1                                                                                         Out=1-0 
 96 
 
 
Figure 4.16(a): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SC(A=1, B=0) 
 
 Figure 4.16(b): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect 
to Process Corner SC(A=0, B=1) 
 
The error rates of 0-1 change increase by 14.2% and the error rates of 
1-0 change increase by 73.9% by increasing the temperature from −40𝑜𝐶 to 
100𝑜𝐶  when A=1,B=0 as shown by Figure 4.17(a). Similarly when inputs  
A=0, B=1 the error rates increase by 6.3% for 0-1 change and increase by 
30.3% for 1-0 change on the same temperature increment as shown by Figure 
4.17(b). The error rates for the same temperature as in Figure 4.17(a) and (b) 
are added to obtain the total error rate of SC due to temperature variation as 
shown in Figure 4.18(a) and (b) when A=1,B=0 and A=0, B=1 respectively . It 
is shown that the factor variation between the extreme temperature variations 
are 1.29X and 1.14X and the standard deviation due to the temperature 
variation is 3.29E-13 and 8.66E-13 respectively. This is smaller compared 
with standard deviation due to process which is 5.99E-13 and 2E-12 
respectively. We can conclude from the standard deviation that temperature 
has lower effect on SEU compared with process corner 
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 Figure 4.17(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature SC(A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.17(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature SC(A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 4.18 (a): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect 
to Temperature SC (A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 4.18 (b): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect 
to Temperature SC (A=0, B=1) 
 
From Figure 4.19(a), 4.20(a) and 4.21(a), it is observed that the error 
rate between 0-1 change and 1-0 change decrease when the size is scaled. For 
example, at nominal voltage of 1 V, the error rates between 0-1 change and 1-
0 change are 2.89X, 2.47X and 1.50X for the size of 150%, 100% and 50% 
respectively when A=1, B=0. Similarly from Figure 4.19(b), 4.20(b) and 
4.21(b), the error rates between 1-0 change and 0-1 change are 2.50X,1.76X 
and 1.51X when A=0, B=1.  The error rates with the same voltage are added 
as shown by Figure 4.22(a) and (b) for A=1,B=0 and A=0,B=1 respectively.  
The soft error rate increases by a factor 6.03X, 3.63X and 2.06X by scaling 
voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 150%, 100% and 50% of nominal size 
respectively for A=1,B=0  . Similarly, when A=0,B=1 the soft error rate 
increases by a factor 2.89X, 2.06X and 1.51X by scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 
0.8 V for 150%, 100% and 50% of nominal size respectively A=0,B=1. 
 
Figure 4.19(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 50% SC (A=1, B=0) 
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 Figure 4.19(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 50% SC (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 4.20(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 100% SC (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.20(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 100% SC (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 4.21(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 150% SC (A=1, B=0) 
 
 Figure 4.21(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 150% SC (A=0, B=1) 
 
 
Figure 4.22(a): Total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
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Voltage Supply for  SC (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.22(b): Total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for  SC (A=0, B=1) 
 
Sensitivity Analysis for SC configuration 
The nodes sensitivity are obtained by calculating the standard 
deviation of the error rate on every nodes to obtain the correct representation 
of the variation of the critical charges towards process corner, temperature, 
voltage and size scaling as shown by Figure 4.23 (a) and (b). As for SIL, 
voltage scaling has the highest value of standard deviation which suggests that 
the error rates are very sensitive to the change in the voltage supply. Standard 
deviation for the process is significant than size for inputs A=0,B=1 which 
suggests that the NMOS transistors are more sensitive to the process variation 
than the size. When inputs A=1, B=0, the standard deviation for the size is 
higher than process variation which suggests that the PMOS transistors are 
less sensitive to the process variation compared with size. The temperature 
variations have the lowest values of standard deviation. As for SIL, the 
percentage increment of error rate for A=1,B=0 is higher than inputs A=0,B=1 
because PMOS transistor is more sensitive with temperature variation 
compared with NMOS transistor. However, the standard deviation due to 
temperature for A=1,B=0 is lower than inputs A=0,B=1 since the error rates 
for A=0,B=1 is higher than A=1,B=0 result in higher standard deviations. 
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 Figure 4.23(a): Standard Deviation of Error rate due to neutron energy 
spectrum with respect to Process Corner, Temperature, Voltage and Size 
Scaling SC(A=1, B=0) 
 
 
Figure 4.23(b): Standard Deviation of Error rate due to neutron energy 
spectrum with respect to Process Corner, Temperature, Voltage and Size 
Scaling SC (A=0, B=1) 
4.4.3 Error Rate for Single Rail Symmetric Implementation Configuration 
The SS configuration and the layout with the corresponding vulnerable node 
(i),(ii),(iii),(iv) and (v) are shown in Figure 4.24(a)(b). The total surface area 
for SS configuration is 28.8 𝜇𝑚2, which is the largest C-elements compared 
with SIL,SC and DIL configurations. 
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Figure 4.24(a): SS 
configuration 
Figure 4.24(b): Layout SS 
Configuration[57] 
 
For SS configuration, injecting current pulse at node (ii),(iii) and (v) 
cause 0-1 change and 1-0 change when A=1, B=0 and node (i),(iv) and (v) 
when A=0,B=1. The error rates as shown in Figure 4.25(a) of 0-1 change are 
higher compared with error rate of 1-0 change by a factor of 3.31X at TT 
process corner when A=1, B=0. Similarly when A=0, B=1 the error rate of are 
higher by a factor of 2.77X with the same process as shown by Figure 4.25(b). 
In order to compare the relative error rate between the process corners, the 
error rate for all the processes from Figure 4.25(a) and (b) are added as shown 
in Figure 4.26(a) and (b). It is shown that the factor variation between the 
extreme process corner (SS and FF) is 1.91X and 1.76X when A=1,B=0 and 
A=0,B=1 respectively . The standard deviation of (TT, SNFP and FNSP) is 
much smaller compared with the standard deviation of (SS and FF) as shown 
by Table 4.3.   The relatively small standard deviation of TT, SNFP and FNSP 
indicates that the error rate between these process corner are statistically 
identical compared with SS and FF. 
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No Process Corner Standard 
Deviation (σ) 
Percentage 
difference w.r.t  
(i) 
A=1 B=0 SS,FF 5.24E-12 - 
TT,SNFP,FNSP 3.18E-13 6.1% 
SS,FF,TT,SNFP,FNSP 3.34E-12 63.8% 
A=0 B=1 SS,FF 7.18E-12 - 
TT,SNFP,FNSP 2.4E-13 3.3% 
SS,FF,TT,SNFP,FNSP 4.57E-12 63.6% 
Table 4.3 : Standard Deviation for the Process Corner-SS 
 
 Figure 4.25(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SS (A=1, B=0) 
 
 
Figure 4.25(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SS (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 4.26(a): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SS (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.26(b): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner SS (A=0, B=1) 
 
The error rates of 0-1 change increase by 15.1% and the error rates of 
1-0 change increase by 91.2% by increasing the temperature from −40𝑜𝐶 to 
100𝑜𝐶  when A=1,B=0 as shown by Figure 4.27(a). Similarly when inputs  
A=0, B=1 the error rates increase by 14.5% for 0-1 change and increase by 
51.2% for 1-0 change on the same temperature increment as shown by Figure 
4.27(b). The total error rates with respect to the temperature are as shown in 
Figure 4.28(a) and (b) when A=1,B=0 and A=0, B=1 respectively . It is shown 
that the factor variation between the extreme temperature variation are both 
1.24X and the standard deviation due to the temperature variation is 1.28E-12 
and 1.91E-12 respectively. This is smaller compared with standard deviation 
due to process which is 3.34E-12 and 4.57E-12 respectively. We can conclude 
that temperature has lower effect on SEU compared with process corner. 
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Figure 4.27(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature SS (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.27(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature SS (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 4.28(a): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature SS (A=1, B=0) 
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 Figure 4.28(b): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect 
to Temperature SS (A=0, B=1) 
 
As for SIL and SC configurations, the error rate of SS configuration 
for the size of 50%,100% and 150% are shown in Figure 4.29(a), 4.30(a) and 
4.31(a) as the voltage is varied from 0.8 to 1.2 V to observe the effect of error 
rate with respect to voltage and size scaling. At nominal voltage of 1 V, the 
error rates between 0-1 change and 1-0 change are 5.38X, 3.31X and 1.86X 
for the size of 150%, 100% and 50% respectively when A=1, B=0. Similarly 
from Figure 4.29(b), 4.30(b) and 4.31(b), the error rates between 1-0 change 
and 0-1 change are 5.08X,2.78X and 1.67X when A=0, B=1.  The error rates 
with the same voltage are added as shown by Figure 4.32(a) and (b) for 
A=1,B=0 and A=0,B=1 respectively.  The soft error rate increases by a factor 
7.84X, 3.64X and 1.99X by scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 150%, 
100% and 50% of nominal size respectively for A=1,B=0. Similarly, when 
A=0,B=1 the soft error rate increases by a factor 6.99X, 3.11X and 1.84X by 
scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 150%, 100% and 50% of nominal size 
respectively A=0,B=1. 
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Figure 4.29(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 50% SS (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.29(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 50% SS (A=0, B=1) 
 
 
Figure 4.30(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 100% SS (A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 4.30(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 100% SS (A=0, B=1) 
 
 
Figure 4.31(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 150% SS (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.31(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 150% SS (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 4.32(a): Total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for  SS (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.32(b): Total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for  SS (A=0, B=1) 
 
Sensitivity Analysis for SS configuration 
The standard deviation rate of spectrum energy for 1-0 and 0-1 on four 
different factors for SS configuration is shown by Figure 4.33(a) and (b). As 
for SIL and SC, voltage scaling has the highest value of standard deviation 
which suggests that the error rates are very sensitive to the change in the 
voltage supply. Standard deviation for the process is significant than size for 
inputs A=0,B=1 which suggests that the NMOS transistors are more sensitive 
to the process variation than the size. When inputs A=1, B=0, the standard 
deviation for the size is higher than process variation which suggests that the 
PMOS transistors are less sensitive to the process variation compared with 
size. The temperature variations have the lowest values of standard deviation. 
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It is observed that the standard deviation due to temperature for A=1,B=0 is 
almost equal than inputs A=0,B=1 since the error rates for both combination 
inputs are almost equal. 
 
 Figure 4.33(a): Standard Deviation of Error rate due to neutron energy 
spectrum with respect to Process Corner, Temperature, Voltage and Size 
Scaling SS (A=1, B=0) 
 
 
Figure 4.33(b): Standard Deviation of Error rate due to neutron energy 
spectrum with respect to Process Corner, Temperature, Voltage and Size 
Scaling SS(A=0, B=1) 
 
4.4.4 Error Rate for Differential Logic and an Inverter Latch Configuration 
Previous error rate calculations involve single-rail C-element. The 
error rate calculations for single rail C-element are compared with error rates 
for dual rail C-element with the DIL configuration and the layout with all the 
vulnerable nodes as shown by Figure 4.34(a) and (b) respectively. The total 
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surface area for DIL configuration is 14.5 𝜇𝑚2 , which is the smallest C-
elements compared with SIL,SC and SS configurations. 
 
 
Figure 4.34(a): DIL Configuration Figure 4.34(b): Layout DIL 
configuration 
 
It is observed from Figure 4.35(a) and (b) that the error rate of 0-1 is 
higher than 1-0 by 3.16X when A=0, B=1 and the error rate of 1-0 is higher 
than 0-1 by 3.04X when A=1,B=0 respectively. The error rate for all the 
processes from Figure 4.35(a) and (b) are added as shown in Figure 4.36(a) 
and (b). It is observed that the error rate for A=0, B=1 and A=1, B=0 are 
almost equal due to the symmetric shape of DIL.  The factor variation between 
the extreme process corner (SS and FF) is 1.62X and 1.63X when A=1,B=0 
and A=0,B=1 respectively. Due to the symmetric shape, the standard deviation 
between the process corner for both inputs are almost equal as shown by Table 
4.4.  
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No Process Corner Standard 
Deveiation (σ) 
Percentage 
difference 
w.r.t  (i) 
A=1 B=0 SS,FF 3.83E-12 - 
TT,SNFP,FNSP 3.33E-13 8.7% 
SS,FF,TT,SNFP,FNSP 2.44E-12 63.6% 
A=0 B=1 SS,FF 3.8E-12 - 
TT,SNFP,FNSP 3.33E-13 8.8% 
SS,FF,TT,SNFP,FNSP 2.42E-12 63.6% 
Table 4.4 : Standard Deviation for the Process Corner-DIL 
 
 Figure 4.35(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner DIL(A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.35(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Process Corner DIL(A=0, B=1) 
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Figure4.4.33(a): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect 
to Process Corner DIL (A=1, B=0) 
 
 Figure 4.36(b): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect 
to Process Corner DIL(A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 4.37(a) and (b) show the error rates for every nodes with respect 
to the temperature for inputs A=1,B=0 and A=0,B=1 respectively . As for SIL, 
SC and SS configurations, the error rate for DIL is also increased with 
temperature. The error rates of 0-1 change increase by 16.9% and the error 
rates of 1-0 change increase by 58.2% by increasing the temperature from 
−40𝑜𝐶 to 100𝑜𝐶 when A=1,B=0 as shown by Figure 4.37(a). However when 
inputs  A=0, B=1 the error rates increase by 58.9% for 0-1 change and 
increase by 17.8% for 1-0 change on the same temperature increment as 
shown by Figure 4.37(b). The total error rates with respect to the temperature 
are as shown in Figure 4.38(a) and (b) when A=1,B=0 and A=0, B=1 
respectively . It is shown that the factor variation between the extreme 
temperature variation are both 1.26X and the standard deviation due to the 
temperature variation is 1.33E-12 and 1.34E-12 respectively. This is smaller 
compared with standard deviation due to process which is 2.44E-12 and 
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2.42E-12 respectively. We can conclude that temperature has lower effect on 
SEU compared with process corner. 
 
Figure 4.37(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature DIL (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.37(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature DIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
 Figure 4.38(a): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect 
to Temperature DIL (A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 4.38(b): Total Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Temperature DIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
As shown by Figure 4.39(a), 4.40(a) and 4.41(a), when A=1,B=0 the 
soft error rate increases by a factor 2.88X, 3.10X and 1.74X by scaling voltage 
from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 150%, 100% and 50% of nominal size respectively. 
Similarly, when A=0,B=1 the soft error rate increases by a factor 2.82X, 
3.11X and 1.73X by scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 150%, 100% and 
50% of nominal size respectively as shown by Figure 4.39(b), 4.40(b) and 
4.41(b). The error rates with the same voltage are added as shown by Figure 
4.42(a) and (b) for A=1,B=0 and A=0,B=1 respectively.  The soft error rate 
increases by a factor 4.53X, 2.69X and 1.63X by scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 
0.8 V for 150%, 100% and 50% of nominal size respectively for A=1,B=0. 
Similarly, when A=0,B=1 the soft error rate increases by a factor 4.72X, 
2.71X and 1.64X by scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V for 150%, 100% and 
50% of nominal size respectively A=0,B=1. 
 
 Figure 4.39(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 50% DIL (A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 4.39(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 50% DIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 4.40(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 100% DIL (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.40(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 100% DIL (A=0, B=1) 
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Figure 4.41(a): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 150% DIL (A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.41(b): Error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for 150% DIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 4.42(a): Total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for  DIL (A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 4.42(b): Total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum with respect to 
Voltage Supply for  DIL (A=0, B=1) 
 
Sensitivity Analysis for DIL configuration 
The standard deviation rate of spectrum energy for 1-0 and 0-1 on four 
different factors for DIL configuration is shown in Figure 4.43(a) and (b). 
Voltage scaling has the highest value of standard deviation which suggests 
that the error rates are very sensitive to the change in the voltage supply and 
followed process corner and size scaling. The standard deviation of sizing are 
larger than process in  SIL,SC and SS configurations, however in DIL, the 
standard deviation of the process variation is larger than size due to the 
construction of the DIL that consists of NMOS transistors as the main 
transistors. As expected, the temperature variation has the lowest values of 
standard deviation. 
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Figure 4.43(a): Standard Deviation of Error rate due to neutron energy 
spectrum with respect to Process Corner, Temperature, Voltage Scaling and 
Sizing DIL(A=1, B=0) 
 
 
 Figure 4.43(b): Standard Deviation of Error rate due to neutron energy 
spectrum with respect to Process Corner, Temperature, Voltage Scaling and 
Sizing DIL(A=0, B=1) 
 
4.5 Circuit Vulnerability Against Single Event Upset -Error Rate 
In Chapter 3 two methods are used in order to compare the vulnerability of C-
elements with respect to SEU which are comparing the normalised critical 
charge at the output of C-elements (Out) and the node sensitivity by 
calculating the standard deviation of the critical charges. In this chapter, the 
vulnerability of C-elements with respect to SEU are obtained by comparing 
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the total error rate and standard deviation of the error rate with different 
parameters as described before. 
4.5.1 Error Rate Comparisons 
The total error rate for A=1,B=0 and A=0, B=1 are added for all 
configuration of C-Elements . The sums of total error are compared with 
respect to process, temperature and voltage variations as shown by Figure 
4.44-4.46.  From Figure 4.44, factor variations of error rate between SS and 
FF are 1.67, 1.47, 1.82 and 1.62 for SIL,SC,SS and DIL respectively. SS has 
the highest factor variation between extreme process and SC has the lowest 
factor variation. This shows that SS is sensitive with process variation 
compared with other configurations.  From Figure 4.45, factor variations of 
error rates from -40 C to 100 C are 1.26, 1.17, 1.24 and 1.26 for SIL,SC,SS 
and DIL respectively. SC and DIL has the highest factor variation between 
extreme temperature and SC has the lowest factor variation. This shows that 
SIL and DIL are sensitive with process variation compared with other 
configurations. From Figure 4.46, factor variations of error rate from 0.8 V to 
1.2 V are 3.25, 2.26, 3.31 and 2.71 for SIL,SC,SS and DIL respectively. SS 
has the highest factor variation between extreme voltage and SC has the 
lowest factor variation. This shows that SS is sensitive with voltage variation 
compared with other configurations  
 
 Figure 4.44: Comparison of total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum 
with respect to process at nominal sizing  
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Figure 4.45: Comparison of total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum 
with respect to temperature at nominal sizing  
 
Figure 4.46: Comparison of total error rate due to neutron energy spectrum 
with respect to voltage at nominal sizing 
 
It is obvious that SS has the highest error rate compared with other 
configurations. SC and SS have the same number of transistors. However due 
to the constructions of SS has more vulnerable nodes to soft error compared 
with SC. SIL has the lowest error rates compared with others and therefore 
more resistant towards soft error.   
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Figure 4.47(a) and (b) and 4.48(a) and (b) for A=1,B=0 and A=0, B=1 
respectively . The nodes sensitivity are obtained by calculating the standard 
deviation of the error rates of C-elements.  
 
Figure 4.47(a): Standard deviation of error rate due to neutron spectrum 
energy for 0-1(A=1, B=0) 
 
Figure 4.47(b): Standard deviation of error rate due to neutron spectrum 
energy for 1-0(A=1, B=0) 
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Figure 4.48(a): Standard deviation of error rate due to neutron spectrum 
energy for 0-1(A=0, B=1) 
 
Figure 4.48(b): Standard deviation of error rate due to neutron spectrum 
energy for 1-0(A=0, B=1) 
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charge as in Chapter 3, the standard deviation of size scaling is more than the 
standard deviation of voltage scaling as shown by Figure 3.27-3.31.  This is 
due to the SEU rate is proportioned with the size. The probability of getting 
SEU is higher when the size is bigger compared with the smaller size of 
circuit. However, as the size is increased, the circuit is more hardened towards 
SEU compared with the smaller size. Thus there is a trade-off between the size 
0.00E+00
1.00E-12
2.00E-12
3.00E-12
4.00E-12
5.00E-12
6.00E-12
7.00E-12
Standard Deviation of Error Rate(0-1)  
0.00E+00
5.00E-13
1.00E-12
1.50E-12
2.00E-12
2.50E-12
3.00E-12
3.50E-12
4.00E-12
4.50E-12
Standard Deviation of Error Rate (1-0) 
 125 
 
of the circuit and the error rate. The temperature is the least factors that can 
vary the error rate. In general, SS configuration has the highest standard 
deviation compared with other configuration and therefore the least stable 
against four factors (Process corner, temperature, voltage and size scaling). 
This is due to the construction of circuit which has the most number of 
vulnerable nodes and hence the highest error rate. Any variation of the highest 
error rate will contribute to the highest standard deviations. We can conclude 
that SIL and SC configurations are the most stable configurations against SEU 
since the standard deviation values are lower compared with SS and DIL 
configurations. In contrast, the SIL configuration is the least stable as shown 
by Figure 3.27-3.31 in Chapter 3, only if the value of critical charge is taking 
into account. However, after the overall size of is taking into consideration the 
standard deviation of error rate of SIL is lower compared with SS and DIL. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we developed a method to calculate the error rate due 
to neutron energy spectrum at different nodes and with different 
implementation of C-elements. As in Chapter 3, there are four different factors 
that we used to study the error rate: Process corner, temperature, voltage and 
size scaling. Voltage scaling has the highest value of standard deviation which 
suggests that the error rates are very sensitive to the change in the voltage 
supply and followed process corner and size scaling. Our calculation and 
observation shows that the most significant factors of error rate is voltage 
scaling. This is in contrast with the standard deviation for critical charge found 
in Chapter 3 that suggest size has the highest standard deviation compared 
with voltage scaling. This is due to the SEU rate is proportioned with the size. 
As the size is increased, the circuit is more resistant against SEU compared 
with the smaller size, however, the probability of hitting by SEU is also 
increased.The standard deviation of sizing are larger than process in SIL,SC 
and SS configurations, however in DIL, the standard deviation of the process 
variation is larger than size due to the construction of the DIL that consists of 
NMOS transistors as the main transistors. As expected, the temperature 
variation has the lowest values of standard deviation. In general, it is observed 
that the SS and DIL have the most error rate compared with SIL and SC. SIL 
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has the lowest error rate. Therefore in general, the standard deviations for SS 
and DIL are higher compared with SC and SIL. 
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Chapter 5. Error Detection and Correction of Single Event 
Upset Tolerant Latch for Single Rail Data   
 
This chapter presents an error detection latch (ED) design and error detection 
and correction latch (EDC). The functionality of both ED and EDC latches are 
demonstrated using Cadence UMC 90nm. The waveforms under fault free 
conditions and in the event of an SEU striking the vulnerable nodes are 
obtained. The performance of ED and EDC latches are analysed in terms of 
propagation delay and switching power.   
5.1 Introduction 
The mitigation of soft error in digital circuit is one of the important 
research area in modern integrated circuit.  It is desireable to construct a latch 
which is not only can detect errors, but also has the capability of correcting 
them. In this chapter, the fault-tolerant latch based on C-element is proposed 
since it can hold the signal data and control data independently. The latch is 
designed based on Razor flip-flop. 
The concepts of a Razor flip flop [58] is harnassed in the proposed 
latch to restore the correct values in the event of a particle strike that might 
possibly corrupt data. The operation of Razor flip-flop can be summarized as 
follows. Razor flip flop consists of main latch, shadow latch, comparator and 
MUX as shown in Figure 5.1. In the event of the delay in the combinational 
logic meets the setup time of the rising edge of clock, the correct data is 
latched by the main flip-flop and shadow latch. The output of main flip-flop 
and shadow latch is compared and since the timing requirement is met, no 
error is detected. However, in the event of the delay in the combinational logic 
becomes significant, the data is not latched by the main flip flop. Due to the 
delayed clock, the data is latched by shadow latch. The output of main flip 
flop is compared with the shadow latch and since it is not equal, the 
multiplexer (MUX) switch the value to allow the output of shadow latch to 
propagate to the main latch. The valid data is restored in the next cycle of 
clock. One of the problems of Razor flip-flop is the existence of short path 
between the clock and the delayed clock. This can lead to the corruption of the 
data in the shadow latch, and the minimum-path length constraint is added at 
the input of each Razor flip-flop in the design. 
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Figure 5.1: Razor Flip Flop 
 
5.2 Proposed Error Detection Latch 
The focus of the proposed error detection (ED) latch is to convert 
single-rail data into dual-rail data and back to single rail data. This design by 
incorporating the converters is used only if the data is a single rail data as 
shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2 : Proposed ED single rail latch 
 
Two SIL C-elements are used in order to latch a dual-rail signal. 
Invalid inputs are detected by a an ERROR signal, which is implemented via 
an XNOR gate. Suppose DATA= ‘1’ propagates from previous combinational 
logic. The ‘1’ is then converted into its corresponding dual rail value. The 
converter converts DATA=’1’ to its corresponding dual-rail value of ‘0’ and 
‘1’. The ‘0’ and ‘1’ propagate to C-element 1 and C-element 2 respectively. A 
’0’ appears at node 2. When the CLK is high, a ‘0’ appears at node 1 and a ‘1’ 
appears at node 3.  When CLK is low, a ‘1’ at node 3 is inverted to ‘0’ and 
propagates to node 1 to reinforce a ‘0’ at node 1. Similarly, a ‘1’ appears at 
nodes 4, 5, and a ‘0’ at node 6. When CLK is low, a ‘0’ at node 6 is inverted to 
‘1’ and propagates to node 5 to reinforce a ‘1’ at node 5.   
The dual rail converter and single rail converter are shown by Figure 5.3 and 
Figure 5.4 respectively. Dual rail converter consists of inverters and single rail 
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converter consists of inverter and AND gate. The operation of the converter 
can be explained as follows: If data is ‘1’, the dual rail convert data to ‘01’ and 
single rail convert back to ‘1’. If data is ‘0’, the dual rail convert data to ‘10’ 
and single rail convert back to ‘0’. The vulnerable nodes for dual rail converter 
and single rail converter are indicated by X. In dual rail, there are three nodes 
vulnerable to SEU which are node (a),(b) and (c).  However, any SEU error on 
these nodes are detected by ED latch and corrected by EDC latch as shown by 
Figure 5.33 and 5.34. There are two nodes vulnerable to SEU in single rail 
converter. Since these nodes are located after the error detector, any error on 
this nodes are not detected by ED latch. The results is summarized by Table 
5.1 
Component Vulnerable nodes Error detected 
/corrected 
Dual Rail Converter (a),(b) and (c) (a),(b) and (c) 
Single Rail Converter (a) and (b) - 
Table 5.1:Vulnerables nodes on converter 
 
Figure 5.3: Dual Rail Converter with vulnerable nodes 
 
Figure 5.4: Single Rail Converter with vulnerable nodes 
Two types of errors can occur in the event of a SEU occuring along 
nodes 3 and 6: A 0-0 error and a 1-1 error. Simulations result below 
demonstrate the effect of these errors on a C-element. Any 0-0 error or 1-1 
error on dual-rail line causing ERROR is set to high. The main advantage of 
using the proposed latch compared with other previous reported design is error 
is detected if any of the C-elements are subjected to particle strike. The 
proposed design can be re-designed to include the error correction as 
discussed in the next section. 
In order to verify the functionality of the proposed latch, the design is 
implemented using standard UMC90nm CMOS technology at a supply 
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voltage, 𝑉𝐷𝐷 of 1 V. The Faraday circuit library is used in the design and the 
design of C-element performed via the use of PMOS and NMOS transistors, 
with the sizing ratio set to (
1.8𝑢𝑚
90𝑛𝑚
) and (
1.6𝑢𝑚
90𝑛𝑚
) respectively. The aspect ratio of 
PMOS with NMOS is 1.12 and according to standard inverter ratio in Faraday 
library. The behaviours of the circuits are verified by simulation with nominal 
values for electrical parameters.  
The simulation for the case of fault-free and error detected operation at 
the middle of the functional signal is shown in Figure 5.5. Time T1 shows the 
waveform for the fault-free condition. A single rail data signal is converted 
into a dual rail data signal before it is converted to single rail. No error is 
detected. The data propagates succesful to the output of the latch. At time T2 
as shown in (a) illustrate node 6 is injecting with current pulse at the middle of 
the functional signal causing the output of C-element 2 changing from 0 to 1 
temporarily.  Node 3 remains undisturbed. As a result,  this causes a 1-1 error 
and this data is considered invalid and is marked as erroneous as shown in (c). 
The output, OUT, changes temporarily from 1 to 0 as shown in (e).Similarly, 
node 3 is injecting with current pulse at the middle of the functional signal 
causing the output of C-element 1 changes temporarily from 1 to 0 as shown 
in (b) at time T3. Node 6 remains undisturbed. As a result,  this causes a 0-0 
error and this data is considered  invalid and marked as erroneous as shown in 
(d). The output, OUT, changes  temporarily from 1 to 0 as shown in (f). For 1-
1 error and 0-0 error, the ERROR is high to indicate that SEU error taking 
place at node 3 and node 6 of C-elements. 
The simulation is repeated for the case of error detected operation at 
the edge of the functional signal as shown in Figure 5.6. At time T2 illustrate 
node 3 is injecting with current pulse at the edge of the functional signal 
causing the output of C-element 1 changing from 1 to 0 temporarily and thus 
creating 0-0 error as shown in (a). The output, OUT, changes temporarily from 
1 to 0 as shown in (e).Similarly node 6 is injecting with current pulse at the 
edge of the functional signal causing the output of C-element 2 changes 
temporarily from 0 to 1 at time T3 and thus creating 1-1 error as shown in (b). 
The output, OUT, changes  temporarily from 1 to 0 as shown in (f). For 1-1 
error and 0-0 error, the ERROR is high to indicate that SEU error taking place 
at node 3 and node 6 of C-elements as shown by (c) and (d) respectively 
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Figure 5.5: Fault-free and Error Detected operation at the middle of the 
functional signal for ED Latch 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Fault-free and Error Detected operation at the edge of the 
functional signal for ED Latch 
 
In order to observe the impact of voltage variation by +/-20% of its 
nominal value (0.8 V to 1.2 V), the simulation of the statistical variation of 
injecting current pulse to induce 0-0 error and 1-1 error is shown in Figure 5.7 
and Figure 5.8. All other electrical parameters are held constant. As shown in 
Figure 5.7, at time T2 and T3, as voltage is varied, a 1-1 and 0-0  errors are 
detected as shown in (c) and (d) when current pulse is injected at the middle of 
the functional signal at node 6 and node 3 as shown in (a) and (b) respectively. 
CLK 
DATA 
Node3 
Node6 
ERROR 
OUT 
T1 T2 T3 
(a) (b
) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
DATA 
CLK 
Node3 
Node6 
ERROR 
OUT 
T1 T2 T3 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
(e) (f) 
 132 
 
Output is temporarily changed to 0 as shown in (e) and (f). Similarly as shown 
in Figure 5.8, at time T2 and T3, a 0-0 and 1-1 errors are detected as shown in 
(c) and (d) when current pulse is injected at the edge of the functional signal at 
node 3 and node 6 as shown in (a) and (b) respectively. Output is temporarily 
changed to 0 as shown in (e) and (f). 
 
Figure 5.7: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault Free 
and Error Detected at the middle of functional signal for ED Latch 
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Figure 5.8: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault Free 
and Error Detected at the edges of the functional signal for ED Latch 
 
The analysis on process corner variation, voltage scaling and 
temperature (PVT) are obtained with respect to the propagation delay of the 
output. The propagation delay of ED latch with respect to the process corner 
and temperature variation is shown in Figure 5.9. For temperature analysis, the 
supply voltage is fixed at 1 V.  Three different temperatures are under 
consideration in the analysis, −400𝐶 , 270𝐶  and 1000𝐶 . Generally as the 
temperature increases result in the mobility of the carriers decreases. Equation 
(5.1) illustrates the relation between the propagation delay ( 𝜏𝑝) , output 
capacitance (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡), voltage supply (𝑉𝑑𝑑), threshold voltage (𝑉𝑇) and carrier 
mobility (𝜇(𝑡))[59]. 
𝜏𝑝𝛼
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑉𝑑𝑑
𝐼𝑑
=
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑉𝑑𝑑
𝜇(𝑡)(𝑉𝑑𝑑−𝑉𝑇(𝑇))
     (5.1) 
As the carrier mobility degrades, and therefore according to (5.1), the 
propagation delay ( 𝜏𝑝)  increases. The delay increases by 11.8% as 
temperature is increased from −400𝐶  to 270𝐶  and increases by 9.9% as 
temperature is increased from 270𝐶 to 1000𝐶. However, by changing process 
variation from SS to TT decreases delay by 21.9% and from TT to FF 
decreases delay by 17 %. From the above analysis, it is concluded that process 
variation has stronger effect on propagation delay compared with the 
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temperature variation. As expected, the lowest propagation delay is observed 
at FF and SS has the worst propagation delay. This is due to the stronger 
transistors in FF process corner compared with SS process corner and produce 
strong drain current [47]. Hence the propagation delay is increased by 
changing TT to SS process corner. 
 
Figure 5.9: Propagation delay of ED latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Temperature 
 
Generally, as voltage is decreased, the propagation delay is increased. 
Equation (5.1) shows the propagation delay increases with reduces voltage 
unless the threshold voltage 𝑉𝑇 is also scaled [60]. The propagation delay is 
shown in Figure 5.10 with different process corner variation as the voltage 
supply is varied from 0.8 V to 1.2 V and 0.1 V as a step voltage. For voltage 
variation analysis, the temperature is set at room temperature. It is observed 
that at voltage of 1.2 V, the propagation delay is relatively constant 
irrespective of different process corner at 1.2 V compared with the 
propagation delay at 0.8 V. The standard deviation of propagation delay at 1.2 
V is only 15.2 p compared with standard deviation at 0.8 V which is 48.8 p.  
At supply voltage about 0.8 V, the propagation delay is 1.79X between the 
worst propagation delay (SS) and the best propagation delay (FF). However, at 
supply voltage about 1.2 V, the worst propagation delay (SS) and the best 
propagation delay (FF) is only 1.39X which is relatively independent with 
process variation compared with the propagation delay at supply voltage of 0.8 
V. It is shown that the propagation delay is increased by 75.4% by scaling 
voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V at TT process corner. 
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Figure 5.10: Propagation delay of ED latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Voltage Supply 
 
The average dynamic power of ED latch is shown in Figure 5.11 at 
three different temperatures as before. The voltage is set to 1 V. Generally, as 
temperature increases, the power is also increased. This is due to the fact that 
increasing the temperature result in decreasing the threshold voltage [59]. 
Reducing the threshold voltage causes the sub-threshold leakage current 
increases [60]. Thus, the dynamic power increases with the increases of 
temperature. The factors variations of power dissipation between the extreme 
process corner variations (SS and FF) and at temperature of −400𝐶 is 3.1% 
and 20.1% at 1000𝐶.  As shown in Figure 5.2 the design of ED latch consists 
of dual rail converter and single rail converter. These converters contribute to 
higher dynamic power. In the event of SEU error is detected, the switching 
power is 70 uW at TT process corner and with temperature of 270𝐶.  
 
Figure 5.11: Power Dissipation of ED latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Temperature 
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We can characterize the switching energy of the circuit with respect of current 
pulse causing SEU charge into 3 distinct regions  
a) Pre-critical charges that cause small change to the switching energy – 
Over a small range of input pulse amplitude, the pulse output is 
generated. The energy of the circuit increases slightly with the 
increases of the current charge.  
b) Critical charge that causes significant change to the switching energy – 
At certain amplitude of current pulse, the state holder may change its 
state. The energy is suddenly increased its value significantly. At this 
point, the amount of charge that change the state holder is known as 
the critical charge and it varies from node to node. 
c) Post-critical charge that cause small change to the switching energy – 
When the current charge is higher than critical charge, it cause the 
switching energy to increase slightly. 
The SEU charge is varied by varying the amplitude of induced SEU 
until the state at node 3 and node 6 are changed. The switching energy of the 
circuit for 0-1 change by inducing node 6 with SEU and 1-0 change by 
inducing node 3 with SEU with respect to the process corner are shown in 
Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13. In this simulation, switching energy of the circuit 
is measured with different process variations-SS, TT and FF. The SS, TT and 
FF process variation are chosen as to compare the worst (SS), typical (TT) and 
the best (FF) values of switching energy with respect to the critical charge 
injected into the node.  The temperature is set to 270𝐶 and the supply voltage 
is 1 V. From Figure 5.12 for 0-1 change, it is shown that the SS has the lowest 
critical charge value of 26 fC, TT has the critical charge of 35 fC and FF has 
the highest critical charge value of 38 fC. From Figure 5.13 for 1-0 change, 
the corresponding values of critical charges are 52 fC, 61 fC and 70 fC for SS, 
TT and FF respectively. The critical charges for 1-0 change are double 
compared with 0-1 change due to NMOS transistor is 2.2 times more sensitive 
compared with PMOS transistor for the same width [54]. For 0-1 change, the 
SS has lowest maximum switching energy (100 fJ) compared with TT (109 fJ) 
and FF (123 FJ). For 1-0 change, the corresponding maximum switching 
energy values are 66 fJ, 70 fJ and 78 fJ for SS, TT and FF respectively. The 
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factor variation of switching energy between extreme process variation (FF 
and SS) is 1.23X for 0-1 change and 1.32X for 1-0 change. The higher 
maximum switching energy by 0-1 change is due to the lower gate leakage 
current in PMOS compared with NMOS [61] and therefore contributes to the 
higher switching energy for 0-1 change. It is observed that the latch has the 
initial switching energy values of 21.4 fJ (SS), 24.5 fJ (TT) and 25 fJ (FF) 
corresponding to the no current pulse injected into the node. The higher initial 
energy values are due to the switching activity of the single rail and dual rail 
converters. 
 
Figure 5.12: Switching Energy for ED Latch (0-1 Change) with Different 
Process 
 
Figure 5.13: Switching Energy for ED Latch (1-0 Change) with Different 
Process 
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The graph of switching energy of the circuit for 0-1 change and 1-0 
change are plotted with three different temperatures (−400𝐶 , 270𝐶  and 
1000𝐶) as shown in Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15. The supply voltage is fixed 
at 1 V and the process corner is fixed at TT. As temperature increases, it 
degrades the threshold voltage, carrier mobility and the saturation velocity. 
Hence, the critical charge needed to flip the output is decreased. The circuit is 
vulnerable to SEU at higher temperature. From Figure 5.14, the critical 
charges at −400𝐶 and 270𝐶 is 35 fC and the critical charge at 1000𝐶 is 32 fC 
for 0-1 change. From Figure 5.15, it is shown that the critical charge at −400𝐶 
is 70 fC, at 270𝐶  is 61 fC and at 1000𝐶  is 56 fC for 1-0 change. Critical 
charges decrease by 20% if the temperature is increased from −400𝐶  to 
1000𝐶. At higher temperature, the switching energy is higher due to higher 
leakage current [60]. The switching energies are 102 fJ, 109 fJ and 116 fJ at 
temperature of - −400𝐶 , 270𝐶  and 1000𝐶  respectively for 0-1 change. 
Similarly, the corresponding switching energies are 64 fJ, 70 fJ and 75 fJ at 
temperature of −400𝐶 , 270𝐶 and 1000𝐶 respectively. The switching energy 
increased by 13.7% when temperature is increased from −400𝐶 to 1000𝐶 for 
0-1 change and 17.2% for 1-0 change. It is interesting to note that the factor 
variation of switching energy for 1-0 change between temperature at −400𝐶 
and 1000𝐶 is higher compared with 0-1 change with the same temperature. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, PMOS transistors have greater effect on temperature 
variation compared with NMOS. 
 
Figure 5.14: Switching Energy for ED Latch (0-1 Change) with Different 
Temperature 
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Figure 5.15: Switching Energy for ED Latch (1-0 Change) with Different 
Temperature 
 
The vulnerable nodes on ED latch are shown in Figure 5.16. Nodes (a),(b) and 
node (e) correspond to the output of the converter as discussed earlier. Nodes 
1,2,3,4,5 and 6 and nodes (a),(b),(c) and (d) are detectable if there is error on 
the nodes due to SEU. Results are summarized in Table 5.2 
Component Vulnerable nodes Detected error on 
the nodes 
ED Latch 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 
(a),(b),(c),(d),(e) and (f) (a),(b),(c) and (d)  
Table 5.2: Vulnerable nodes on ED Latch 
 
 
Figure 5.16: ED Latch with vulnerable nodes 
5.3 Proposed Error Detection and Correction Latch 
As shown in Figure 5.2, even though the error is detected if the particle 
hits the sensitive nodes in both C-elements, it does not correct the output.  The 
concepts present in a Razor flip flop [58] is harnassed by utilizing a shadow 
latch clock to correct erroneous samples in the event of timing error. The 
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proposed error detection and correction (EDC) latch is shown in Figure 5.17. 
The corresponding shadow latch used in the proposed latch is shown by Figure 
5.18. 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Proposed EDC Latch 
 
Figure 5.18: Shadow Latch 
 
There is a difference between the constructions of the proposed latch 
using the Razor technique with the prior implementation of the Razor flip-
flop. In the prior implementation, the output of the shadow latch and the 
output of the main flip-flop are compared. In the event of timing error when 
the data is not latched by the main flip-flop, the shadow latch is employed to 
correct the values. The shadow latch is active low and is controlled by the 
delayed clock, and the supply voltage is tuned to monitor the error rate. EDC 
latch works on the basis that the error signal should arrive first before the data 
propagates to the single rail converter. This is important as the error signal 
should be able to switch the MUX and consequently the data from shadow 
latch replace the corrupted data due to SEU. If the error signal comes later 
than the output of single rail converter, the corrupted data propagates to the 
output of MUX without being replaces by the data from shadow latch. 
Hence, we used the concept of shadow latch to correct output values 
when the sensitive nodes in the main latch are subjected to particle hits which 
erroneously change its state, and would otherwise result in logical errors. The 
output of shadow latch is fed into MUX unlike the prior implementation the 
output is fed to comparator. The error signal is obtained by comparing the 
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latch values in two dual-rail C-elements. The operation of the proposed latch 
can be explained as follows.  When the clock is high, and no error signal is 
present, the data is propagated to C-elements. At this time, the output of the 
MUX is generated from the C-elements. Even though the output of the shadow 
latch is produced, it is not selected by MUX as no error is detected. Whenever 
an error is detected, the MUX chooses the output from shadow latch and 
propagates it to the output. The functionality of the system is described in 
more detail by waveform simulation as shown in Figure 5.19-5.22.  
The simulation for the case of fault-free and error detected and 
corrected operation at the middle of the functional signal is shown in Figure 
5.19. When CLK=1, the data is latched and propagates to the output. The 
shadow latch is controlled by the clock (CLK). At the same time, the output of 
shadow latch is generated. In this case no error is generated at time T1. The 
output produced resembled the DATA. Since there is no error, thus the value of 
shadow latch is not selected. At time T2, the 0-0 logic error is induced by 
injecting current pulse at the middle of the functional signal at node 3 as 
shown in (a). In this instance, an error signal is generated as shown in (c) and 
the shadow latch is activated. Consequently, the shadow latch produces its 
output and the corrected value is propagated to the output of the latch 
(OUTSL) as shown in (e). Similarly, in (b) shows the results of an injected 
current pulse at node 6 and inducing a 1-1 logic error.  As for the previous 
case, an error signal is generated as shown in (d) and the shadow latch is 
activated. Then, the shadow latch produces its output and the corrected value 
is propagated to the output of the latch (OUTSL) as shown in (f). 
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Figure 5.19: Fault Free, Error Detected and Error Corrected at the center of the 
functional signal of  for EDC Latch 
 
The simulation is repeated for the case of error detected and corrected 
operation at the edge of the functional signal as shown in Figure 5.20. At time 
T2 illustrate node 3 is injecting with current pulse at the edge of the functional 
signal causing the output of C-element 1 changing from 1 to 0 temporarily and 
thus creating 0-0 error as shown in (a). The ERROR is high to indicate that 
SEU error taking place at node 3 as shown in (c). The corrected output, OUT 
due to 0-0 error is shown in (e).Similarly node 6 is injecting with current pulse 
at the edge of the functional signal causing the output of C-element 2 changes 
temporarily from 0 to 1 at time T3 and thus creating 1-1 error as shown in (b). 
The ERROR is high to indicate that SEU error taking place at node 6 as shown 
in (d). The corrected output, OUT due to 1-1 error is  shown in (f) 
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Figure 5.20: Fault Free, Error Detected and Error Corrected at the edge of the 
functional signal of  for EDC Latch 
 
In order to observe the impact of voltage variation by +/-20% of its 
nominal value (0.8 V to 1.2 V), the simulation of the statistical variation of 
injecting current pulse to induce 0-0 error and 1-1 error is shown in Figure 
5.21 and Figure 5.22. All other electrical parameters are held constant. As 
shown in Figure 5.21, at time T2 and T3, as voltage is varied, a 0-0 and 1-1 
errors as shown in (c) and (d) are detected when current pulse is injected at the 
middle of the functional signal at node 3 and node 6 as shown in (a) and (b) 
respectively. The corrective output due to 0-0 and 1-1 errors are shown in (e) 
and (f) respectively. Similarly as shown in Figure 5.22, at time T2 and T3, a 0-
0 and 1-1 errors are detected as shown in (c) and (d) when current pulse is 
injected at the edge of the functional signal at node 3 and node 6 as shown in 
(a) and (b) respectively. The corrective output due to 0-0 and 1-1 errors are 
shown in (e) and (f) respectively. 
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Figure 5.21: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault 
Free and Error Corrected at the middle of functional signal for EDC Latch 
 
Figure 5.22: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault 
Free and Error Corrected at the edge of functional signal for EDC Latch  
 
The propagation delay of EDC latch with respect to the temperature 
variation and different process variation is shown in Figure 5.23. For EDC, the 
delay increases by 12.5% as temperature is increased from −400𝐶  to 270𝐶 
and increases by 10.2% as temperature is increased from 270𝐶  to 1000𝐶 . 
However, by changing process variation from SS to TT decreases delay by 
18.8% and from TT to FF decreases delay by 17.7 %. For a comparison 
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purpose, with the same process (TT) and the same room temperature, the 
propagation delay is only increased by 26.3% between ED and EDC latches 
from 171 ps to 216 ps. The extra delay is due to the propagation in MUX.  
 
Figure 5.23: Propagation delay of EDC latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Temperature 
 
The propagation delay of EDC latch with respect to process variation 
and voltage supply is shown in Figure 5.24. It is observed that the propagation 
delay is relatively constant irrespective of different process corner at 1.2 V 
compared with the propagation delay at 0.8 V. The standard deviation of 
propagation delay at 1.2 V is only 11.8 p and at 0.8 V is 53.3 p.  At supply 
voltage about 0.8 V, the propagation delay is 1.62X between the worst 
propagation delay (SS) and the best propagation delay (FF). However, at 
supply voltage about 1.2 V, the worst propagation delay (SS) and the best 
propagation delay (FF) is only 1.19X, which is relatively independent with 
process variation compared with the propagation delay at 0.8 V. It is shown 
that the propagation delay is increased by 90.5% by scaling voltage from 1.2 
V to 0.8 V at TT process corner. 
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Figure 5.24: Propagation delay of EDC latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Voltage Supply 
 
The factor variation of power dissipation between extreme process 
corner (SS and FF) is 39.1% at −400𝐶 and increases to 55.5% at 1000𝐶 as 
shown in Figure 5.25.  In the event of SEU error is detected, the switching 
power is 80.8 uW at TT process corner and with temperature of 270𝐶.  As a 
comparison, the switching power for ED latch is 70 uW at the same process 
corner and temperature. This is an increment of 15.4% of power, which is 
slightly more than ED latch due to the MUX switching activity. 
 
Figure 5.25: Power dissipation of EDC latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Temperature 
 
The switching energy of the EDC latch for 0-1 change and 1-0 change 
with respect to the process corner are investigated with the same setting 
applies with the temperature and voltage supply as in the previous experiment. 
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From Figure 5.26 and 5.27, it is shown that the process corner of SS, TT and 
FF have identical critical charge with ED latch for 0-1 change and 1-0 change. 
For 0-1 change, SS has the lowest maximum switching energy (106 fJ) 
compared with TT (119 fJ) and FF (134 fJ). The switching energy for FF is 
1.26X compared with SS. Similarly, for 1-0 change SS has the lowest 
maximum switching energy (68 fJ) compared with TT (81 fJ) and FF (28 fJ). 
The switching energy for FF is 1.4X compared with SS. For the same process 
corner, TT, the maximum switching energy for EDC latch is 19% higher 
compared with the maximum switching energy for ED latch. The latch has the 
initial switching energy values of 26 fJ (SS), 28 fJ (TT) and 30 fJ (FF) 
corresponding to the no current pulse injected into the node.  
 
Figure 5.26: Switching Energy for EDC Latch (0-1 Change) with Different 
Process Variation 
 
Figure 5.27: Switching Energy for EDC Latch (1-0 Change) with Different 
Process  Variation 
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The corresponding switching energy values are 110 fJ, 119 fJ and 124 
fJ at temperature of −400𝐶, 270𝐶 and 1000𝐶 respectively for 0-1 change as 
shown in Figure 5.28. The switching energy at 1000𝐶 is increased by 12.7% 
compared with switching energy at −400𝐶 . Similarly, the corresponding 
switching energy values are 69 fJ, 81 fJ and 88 fJ at temperature of −400𝐶, 
270𝐶 and 1000𝐶 respectively for 1-0 change as shown in Figure 5.29. The 
switching energy at 1000𝐶  is increased by 29% compared with switching 
energy at −400𝐶. As for ED latch, the factor variation of switching energy for 
1-0 change is higher compared with 0-1 change with the same temperature. 
This is due to the PMOS transistors have greater effect on temperature 
variation compared with NMOS. 
 
Figure 5.28: Switching Energy for EDC Latch (0-1 Change) with Different 
Temperature 
 
Figure 5.29: Switching Energy for EDC Latch (1-0 Change) with Different 
Temperature 
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The vulnerable nodes on EDC latch are shown in Figure 5.30. Error 
due to SEU on nodes 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 and nodes (a),(b),(c),(d),(g) and (h)) are 
detected and corrected. Only error due to SEU on nodes (e) and (f) are not 
detected and corrected. Results are summarized in Table 5.3. 
Component Vulnerable nodes Detected and corrected 
error on the nodes 
EDC Latch 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 
(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g) and (h) (a),(b),(c),(d),(g) and (h) 
Table 5.3: Vulnerables  nodes on EDC Latch 
 
 
Figure 5.30: EDC Latch with vulnerable nodes 
The simulation as shown in Figure 5.33 and 5.34 demonstrate the 
effect on the output data when SEU strikes on the vulnerable nodes on dual 
rail converter as shown in Figure 5.31.  At time T2 illustrate node c of dual rail  
is injecting with current pulse and thus creating 0-0 error as shown in (a) and 
(c) respectively. Similarly, at time T3 illustrate node a of dual rail  is injecting 
with current pulse and thus creating 1-1 error as shown in (b) and (d) 
respectively. These corrupted values propagate to both C-elements and set the 
ERROR to high to indicate that SEU error taking place as shown in (e) and (f). 
The corrected output, OUT due to SEU are shown in (g) and (h). This 
simulation proves that in the event of SEU strikes the vulnerable nodes on 
dual rail converter, it is detected and corrected. 
 
Figure 5.31: Dual Rail Converter with vulnerable nodes 
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Figure 5.32: Single Rail Converter with vulnerable nodes 
 
Figure 5.33: Error injected to Dual Rail Converter 
 
Figure 5.34: Corrected error due to the injected error to Dual Rail Converter 
The simulation in Figure 5.35 demonstrates the effect on the output 
data when SEU strikes on the vulnerable nodes on shadow latches(node h) and 
XNOR gate (node g) of Figure 5.30. If the SEU strikes on shadow latch as 
shown in (a), this value is not selected because the ERROR is still low. If SEU 
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strike on XNOR gate as shown in (b), the uncorrupted  value of shadow latch 
is selected. Only if SEU strike both shadow latch and XNOR gate at the same 
time corrupts the output. If SEU strike on single rail converter for example 
node b of Figure 5.32, the error is not detected and corrupted as shown in (c).  
 
Figure 5.35: Error is injected to Shadow Latch, XNOR gate and Single Rail 
Converter 
 
The comparison of ED latch and EDC latch in terms of propagation 
delay with a temperature of 270𝐶 with process corner is set to TT is reported 
in Table 5.4. The percentage difference between ED and EDC latches is 
26.3% and it is contributed by the propagation delay in the MUX. 
Latch Propagation Delay (ps) Percentage Differences 
ED 171 26.3 
EDC 216 
Table 5.4: Propagation Delay Between ED And EDC Latch 
The comparison of ED latch and EDC latch in terms of the average 
switching power when error is detected with a temperature of 270𝐶 and TT 
process corner is reported by Table 5.5. While the difference between ED and 
EDC latches in terms of propagation delay is not significant, the average 
switching power difference is is 15.4%.  Whenever error is detected, the MUX 
switch its current value to the value from shadow latches. The extra power is 
due to the switching activity by MUX 
DATA 
Node3 
Node6 
ERROR 
OUTSL 
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Latch Switching Power (uW) Percentage Differences 
ED 70 15.4 
EDC 80.8 
Table 5.5: Switching Power Between ED And EDC Latch 
5.4 Implementation of Full Adder System by using Error Detection and 
Correction Latch 
The EDC latch as shown in Figure 5.17 can be implemented into a 
system by incorporating a full adder in order to demonstrate the functionality 
of the latch against SEU. The full adder circuit is shown in Figure 5.36 and the 
truth table for the full adder is shown in Table 5.6. 
 
 
Figure 5.36 : Full Adder Circuit 
 
IN1  IN2  IN3    SUM CARRY 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
Table 5.6: Truth Table Full Adder 
 
Three EDC latches are used to feed three inputs of the full adder as 
shown in Figure 5.37. The errors are injected to one of the latch at node 3 and 
node 6 to create 1-1 error and 0-0 error respectively. The errors are 
represented by e1 and e2. Out C1 and Out C2 represent the output of C-
elements before the outputs are corrected. Error1 represents error detection 
port and Out1 represents the output of the latch.   
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Figure 5.37: Full Set-up of Adder System with EDC Latches 
 
The waveform for three inputs (DATA1,DATA2 and DATA3) and clock 
( CLK) is shown by Figure 5.38. The three inputs are fed to the full adder.  
For EDC latch, a single rail data signal is converted into a dual rail data signal 
before it is converted to single rail. The corresponding effects of injecting 
error are as shown by Figure 5.38(a) for 0-0 error and Figure 5.38(b) for 1-1 
error for node 3 and node 6 respectively. ERROR signal is high for both errors 
as shown by Figure 5.39(a) and (b) causing MUX select the value from 
shadow latch .The corrected outputs due to the injected error are shown by 
Figure 5.39(c) and Figure 5.39(d). From the truth table 5.4.1 if the In1, In 2 
and In3 are 1, the SUM is 1 and CARRY is 1 . From Figure 5.39(e) and Figure 
5.39(f) shows the corrected values of SUM and CARRY which are consistent 
with the truth table. 
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Figure 5.38: Inputs and Clocks signal 
 
Figure 5.39: Output of C-Elements and Error Signal 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented single event upset tolerant latch that 
includes error detection and correction capabilities. The first proposed latch 
detects errors by converting a single-rail data signal into a dual-rail data 
signal. Two C-elements are used to accommodate the dual-rail data. Any 
invalid data on dual-rail line due to current pulse events hitting the sensitive 
nodes is detected by an XNOR gate. The second proposed latch used the 
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concept of Razor flip-flop to correct errors by employing a shadow latch that 
is controlled by the same clock in order to restore correct values. By using 
Cadence UMC 90nm, the functionality of both ED and EDC latches are 
demonstrated by using waveforms under fault free condition and in the event 
of current pulse hits the vulnerable nodes. The performance of ED and EDC 
latches latch are analysed in terms of propagation delay versus process corner, 
temperature and voltage supply. It is concluded that ED latch is 26.3% faster 
than EDC latch and EDC latch consumes 15.4% more power compared with 
ED latch. The relation of current charge with respect to switching energy of 
both latches with different process corner and temperature  are also obtained. 
The functionality of the latches are also tested by incorporating a full adder in 
the system and it is concluded the latches works as expected. 
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Chapter 6. Error Detection and Correction of Single Event 
Upset Tolerant Latch for Dual Rail Data 
This chapter presents error detection for a dual rail latch (EDD and error 
detection and correction for dual rail latch (EDCD)). The functionality of both 
EDD and EDCD latches are demonstrated using Cadence UMC 90nm. The 
waveforms under fault free conditions and in the event of SEU striking the 
vulnerable nodes are obtained. The performance of EDD and EDCD latches 
are analysed in terms of propagation delay and switching power. The error 
detection and correction with transient error correction latch (EDCDT) is also 
proposed in this chapter. 
6.1 Introduction 
In globally asynchronous locally synchronous (GALS) design, single 
rail data which utilise N lines to represent N bit of information is the most 
common data representation in asynchronous communication [62]. However, 
this type of representation has disadvantage: The single rail is subjected to 
delay variation sensitive. It has timing constraint between the control signal 
and data and hence does not suitable for long on-chip communication [62]. 
Dual rail encoding is necessary for long on-chip interconnect since it is delay 
insensitive which refers to the data is transmitted correctly regardless of the 
delay in the interconnecting wires. It uses two wires to represent 1 bit of 
information. 
In this chapter, three types of latches for dual rail data are proposed to 
mitigate the effect of single event upset (SEU) and single event transient 
(SET) on dual rail data.  
a) Error detection for dual rail data (EDD) 
b) Error detection and correction for dual rail data (EDCD) 
c) Error detection and correction with transient correction for dual rail 
(EDCDT) 
6.2 Proposed Error Detection for Dual Rail Data 
The ED and EDC latches as proposed in Chapter 5 for single rail data 
latches suffer two main problems. The propagation delay of ED and EDC 
latches are quite significant due to the converters. The use of ED and EDC for 
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dual rail data can cause increase the overhead areas. Therefore the switching 
powers are significant compared with other latches. Our aim is to design error 
detection and correction for dual rail latch with less power dissipation and low 
propagation delay.  
 
Figure 6.1: Proposed EDD Latch 
 
The proposed error detection for dual rail implementation (EDD) is 
shown in Figure 6.1. Suppose dual rail,DATA= ‘1’ 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =’0’ propagates from 
previous combinational logic. When CLK is high, DATA = ‘1’ propagates to 
node 1 and node 2 and a ‘0’ appears at node 3.  When the CLK is low, a ‘0’ at 
node 3 is inverted to ‘1’ and propagates to node 1 to reinforce a ‘1’ at node 1. 
Similarly, when CLK is high, 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = ‘0’ propagates to node 5 and node 6 
and a ‘1’ appears at node 6.  When CLK is low, a ‘1’ at node 6 is inverted to 
‘0’ and propagates to node 5 to reinforce a ‘0’ at node 5.  The dual rail data 
propagate to the main latches are compared with the shadow latches. Any 
discrepancy of data between the main latches and shadow latches, cause the 
ERROR is set to high. 
In order to demonstrate the functionality of EDD latch, the fault-free 
and error detection at the middle of the functional signal is shown by using 
waveform in Figure 6.2.  At Time T1 shows the waveform for the fault-free 
condition with dual rail data are succesfully propagate through the latch. No 
error is detected.  
For dual rail, there are three types of of possible error that can occur as 
described in Chapter 2. 
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(a) Data generation: Error on Spacer that can cause 01 or 10 error. 
(b) Data generation: 1-1 error on valid data. 
(c) Data vanishing: 0-0 error on valid data. 
At time T2, the current pulse is injected at node 3 and results in the 
output of C-element 1 changing from 1 to 0 temporarily as shown in (a).  Node 
6 remains undisturbed. As a result,  this causes a 0-0 error. Similarly, at time 
T3 the current pulse is injected at node 6 and results in the output of C-
element 2 changing from 0 to 1 temporarily. This causes a spacer error and 
this data is considered invalid as shown in (b). At time T4 current pulse is 
injected at node 6 and results in the output of C-element 2 changing from 0 to 
1 temporarily. Node 3 remains undisturbed. As a result,  this causes a 1-1 error  
and this data is considered  invalid as shown in (c). For all the casses, error are 
detected as shown by ERROR. 
The simulation is repeated for the case of error detected operation at 
the edge of the functional signal as shown in Figure 6.3. At time T2 illustrate 
node 3 is injecting with current pulse at the edge of the functional signal 
causing the output of C-element 1 changing from 1 to 0 temporarily and thus 
creating 0-0 error as shown in (a).Similarly node 6 is injecting with current 
pulse at the edge of the functional signal causing the output of C-element 2 
changes temporarily from 0 to 1 at time T3 and thus creating 1-1 error as 
shown in (b). For 0-0 error and 1-1 error, the ERROR is high to indicate that 
SEU error taking place at node 3 and node 6 of C-elements respectively. 
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Figure 6.2: Fault-free and Error Detected at the middle of the functional signal 
for EDD Latch 
 
Figure 6.3: Fault-free and Error Detected at the edge of the functional signal 
for EDD Latch 
 
The experiment is repeated for EDD in order to observe the impact of 
voltage variation by +/-20% of its nominal value (0.8 V to 1.2 V). Figure 6.4 
shows the simulation of the statistical variation of injecting current pulse 
induce 0-0, spacer and 1-1errors as shown in (a),(b) and (c) respectively. All 
other electrical parameters are held constant. 
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Figure 6.4: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault Free 
and Error Detected at the middle of the functional signal for EDD Latch 
 
Figure 6.5: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault Free 
and Error Detected at the edge of the functional signal for EDD Latch 
 
At time T2 and T3, as voltage is varied, these errors are detected when current 
pulse is injected at the middle of the functional signal. Similarly as shown in 
Figure 6.5, at time T2 and T3, a 0-0 and 1-1 errors are detected as shown in (a) 
and (b) respectively when current pulse is injected at the edge of the functional 
signal. 
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In order to investigate the propagation delay of EDD latch with respect 
to the temperature variation and different process variation the experiment is 
conducted and the result is shown in Figure 6.6. As before, three different 
temperatures are under consideration in our analysis. For EDD, the delay 
increases by 14.8% as temperature is increased from −400𝐶  to 270𝐶  and 
increases by 11.6% as temperature is increased from 270𝐶  to 1000𝐶 . 
However, by changing process variation from SS to TT decreases delay by 
24.5% and from TT to FF decreases delay by 20.4 %. For a comparison 
purpose, with the same process (TT) and room temperature, the propagation 
delay for ED latch is 4X longer compared with EDD latch. This huge 
difference is mainly due to the delay in the converters in ED latch. However, 
one problem exist in EDD latch is that the DATA propagate faster than the 
error signal due to the logic gate needed to detect the presence of the signal. 
This could cause problem as the error due to SEU propagate to the output 
before it is corrected as the error signal propagate slower. In order to solve this 
problem, the appropriate delays are inserted to allow the error signal propagate 
faster than the output so the correction mechanism of SEU works. This is 
discussed in Section 6.3.   
 
Figure 6.6: Propagation delay of EDD latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Temperature 
 
The propagation delay of EDD latch with respect to process variation 
and voltage supply are also measured. Figure 6.7 reports the result. At supply 
voltage about 0.8 V, the propagation delay is 1.9X between the worst 
propagation delay (SS) and the best propagation delay (FF). However, at 
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supply voltage about 1.2 V, the worst propagation delay (SS) and the best 
propagation delay (FF) is only 1.5X. The standard deviation of propagation 
delay at 1.2 V is only 4.3 p and at 0.8 V is 14.7 p with respect to the process 
variation.  It is shown that the propagation delay is increased by 2.1X by 
scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V at TT process corner. 
 
Figure 6.7: Propagation delay of EDD latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Voltage 
 
Figure 6.8: Power Dissipation of EDD latch with respect to Process Variation 
and Temperature 
 
Figure 6.8 shows the average dynamic power of EDD latch whenever 
error is detected at three different temperatures. The voltage is set to 1 V. The 
highest switching power is FF process corner and SS has the lowest switching 
power. The factor variation of power dissipation between extreme process 
corner (SS and FF) is 1.4X at −400𝐶 and 1.6X at 1000𝐶. At 27 C and TT 
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process corner, the average dynamic power is 76 µW whenever error is 
detected. 
The switching energy of the EDD latch for 0-1 change and for 1-0 
change are shown in Figure 6.9 and 6.10 respectively. It is observed that the 
process corner of SS, TT and FF have identical critical charge with ED latch 
for 0-1 change and 1-0 change. For 0-1 change, SS has the lowest maximum 
switching energy (102 fJ) compared with TT (112 fJ) and FF (129 fJ). The 
switching energy for FF is 1.26X compared with SS. As a comparison with 
ED latch, in the event of  SEU is detected and caused the state to change, at 
TT process corner, EDD latch is 3% higher of switching energy compared 
with ED latch for 0-1 change Similarly, for 1-0 change SS has the lowest 
maximum switching energy (69 fJ) compared with TT (72 fJ) and FF (83 fJ).  
The above experiments are repeated at three different temperatures as 
shown in Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12. The corresponding switching energy 
values are 105 fJ, 112 fJ and 120 fJ for at temperature of −400𝐶, 270𝐶 and 
1000𝐶 respectively for 0-1 change. The switching energy at 1000𝐶 is 15.2% 
higher compared with switching energy at −400𝐶 . Similarly, the 
corresponding switching energy values are 67 fJ, 72 fJ and 78 fJ at 
temperature of −400𝐶 , 270𝐶  and 1000𝐶  respectively for 1-0 change. The 
switching energy at 1000𝐶 is 16.4% higher compared with switching energy 
at −400𝐶 . As for ED and EDC latch, the percentage change of switching 
energy for 1-0 change between temperature at −400𝐶  and 1000𝐶  is higher 
compared with 0-1 change with the same temperature. 
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Figure 6.9: Switching Energy for EDD Latch (0-1 Change) with different 
Process 
 
Figure 6.10: Switching Energy for EDD Latch (1-0 Change) with Different 
Process 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Switching Energy for EDD Latch (0-1 Change) with Different 
Temperature 
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Figure 6.12: Switching Energy for EDD Latch (1-0 Change) with Different 
Temperature 
 
The vulnerable nodes on EDD latch are shown in Figure 6.13. Error on nodes 
1,2,3,4,5 and 6 and nodes (a),(b),(c) and (d) are detectable if there is error on 
the nodes due to SEU. However if there SEU error on node (e),(f) and (g), it 
only generate error without changing the output. Results are summarized in 
Table 6.1. 
Component Vulnerable nodes Detected error on the 
nodes 
EDD Latch 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 
(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f) and 
(g) 
(a),(b),(c) and (d)  
Table 6.1: Vulnerable nodes on EDD Latch 
 
 
Figure 6.13: Vulnerable nodes on EDD Latch 
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6.3 Proposed Error Detection and Correction for Dual Rail Data 
The EDD latch as proposed in 6.2 can be modified to include error 
correction capabilities for dual-rail. Two shadow latches and two MUXs are 
used to provide correction mechanism for error detection and correction for 
dual rail data (EDCD) latch as shown in Figure 6.14. The functionality of 
EDCD can be explained as follows. When the clock is high, and no error 
signal is present, the dual rail data propagate to C-elements. At this time, the 
outputs of the MUXs are generated from the C-elements. Even though the 
outputs of the shadow latches are produced, they are not selected by MUXs as 
no error is detected. In the event of error is detected, the error signal selects 
the value of shadow latch from the affected MUX. The non-error data from C-
element propagates to MUX .  
 
 
Figure 6.14: Proposed EDCD Latch 
 
The delays need to be included at the output of C-element to ensure 
that in the event of errror, the error signal reached selection (S) before 
erronoues value propagates to one of the MUXs. This preventing the 
erroneous value from propagating to the rest of combinational logics. Figure 
6.15, 6.16 and 6.17 shows three possible scenario about the delay at the output 
of the C-element. 
(a) If no delay is subjected at the output of C-element, the erronous value 
propagates as shown in (a) and (b) to one of the MUXs before the 
signal error reach the selection of MUX. Therefore, the erronoues 
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values propagates to the output of MUX and hence to the rest of the 
combinational logic as depicted by Figure 6.15. Part of the erroneous 
value that arrives to the input of MUX before the signal arrives at the 
input selection is not protected againts error and therefore it propagates 
to the output without being corrected by shadow latch as shown in (c) 
and (d).  
(b) If the right delay (by placing 2 inverters from standard Faraday library 
of UMC 90 nm technology) is subjected at the output of C-element, the 
error signal reach at the selection of the MUXs before the erroneous 
value as shown in (a) and (b) reached at the one of MUX input. This 
causes the erroneous value is not selected instead the value from the 
shadow latches are selected and propagates to the output of MUX. As a 
result, the erronoues value is prevented from propagating to the rest of 
combinational logic as depicted by Figure 6.16. The corrected output 
values are shown in (c) and (d). 
 
Figure 6.15: No delay inserted at the output of C-element 
 
T1 T2 T3 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
(d) NOT OUT 
OUT 
NOT OUTC 
OUTC 
ERROR NOT OUTC 
ERROR OUTC 
 168 
 
 
Figure 6.16: Correct delay inserted at the output of C-element 
 
(c) If the delay is subjected at the output of C-element and the delay is 
longer than the error signal (by placing 4 inverters from standard 
Faraday library of UMC 90 nm technology) causing error signal 
propagates to the output before the erroneous value reached to one of 
the MUXs input.  
 
Figure 6.17: Delay is longer than error signal pulse 
 
This results in the erroneous value as shown in (a) and (b) propagates to the 
output of MUX as depicted by Figure 6.17. The corrected outputs due to the 
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longer delay are shown in (c) and (d). The magnitude of error of the corrected 
output as shown by Figure 6.17(d) is higher compared with Figure 6.16(d). 
       As before, the functionality of the proposed EDCD is best demonstrated 
by using simulation for the case of fault-free and error detected and corrected 
at the middle of the functional signal as shown by Figure 6.18 and 6.19. When 
CLK=1, the data is latched and propagates to the output. At time T1, no error 
is injected and the dual rail data is propagating to the output of the latch. At 
time T2, current pulse is injecting at node 3 and results in the output of C-
element 1 changing from 1 to 0 temporarily causing 0-0 error as shown in (a). 
This results in invalid data is produced.  Node 6 remains undisturbed. At time 
T3, current pulse is injecting at node 6 and results in the output of C-element 2 
changing from 0 to 1 temporarily causing 0-1 error on the spacer as shown in 
(b).  Node 3 remains undisturbed. As a result, this causes a spacer error and 
this data is considered invalid and is marked as erroneous. Similarly at time 
T4, current pulse is injecting at node 6 and results in the output of C-element 2 
changing from 0 to 1 temporarily causing 1-1 error as shown in (c). Hence, 
this data is considered invalid and is marked as erroneous. For all error cases, 
these cause  
 
Figure 6.18: Fault Free and Error Injected for EDCD Latch 
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Figure 6.19: Fault Free and Error Detected and Corrected at the middle of the 
functional signal 
 
error signal, ERROR OUTC  and ERROR NOT OUTC  to go high as shown in 
(d),(e) and (f) of Figure 6.19 respectively. As a result, the shadow latches, 
OUTSL and NOT OUTSL, are activated. The MUXs choose the values from 
shadow latches to propagate to the output and the corrected output are as 
shown by OUT and NOT OUT. 
The simulation is repeated for the case of error detected and corrected 
operation at the edge of the functional signal as shown in Figure 6.20. At time 
T2 illustrate node 3 is injecting with current pulse at the edge of the functional 
signal causing the output of C-element 1 changing from 1 to 0 temporarily and 
thus creating 0-0 error as shown in (a). The ERROR is high to indicate that 
SEU error taking place at node 3 as shown by (d). The corrected output, OUT 
due to 0-0 error is shown by OUT.Similarly node 6 is injecting with current 
pulse at the edge of the functional signal causing the output of C-element 2 
changes temporarily from 0 to 1 at time T3 and thus creating 1-1 error as 
shown in (b). The ERROR is high to indicate that SEU error taking place at 
node 6 as shown by (c). The corrected output, OUT due to 1-1 error is  shown 
by NOT OUT.  
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OUTC 
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NOT OUT 
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Figure 6.20: Fault Free and Error Detected and Corrected at the edge of the 
functional signal 
 
In order to observe the impact of voltage variation by +/-20% of its 
nominal value (0.8 V to 1.2 V), the simulation of the statistical variation of 
injecting current pulse to induce 0-0 error, space error and 1-1 error is shown 
in Figure 6.21 and Figure 6.22.  
 
Figure 6.21: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault 
Free, Error Injected at the middle of the functional signal for EDCD Latch 
 
All other electrical parameters are held constant. As shown in Figure 
6.21, at time T2, T3 and T4, as voltage is varied, a 0-0, spacer error and 1-1 
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errors are detected when current pulse is injected at the middle of the 
functional signal at node 3 and node 6 as shown in (a),(b) and (c) respectively. 
Errors are detected as shown (d),(e) and (f) respectively. The corrective output 
due to 0-0 and 1-1 errors are shown OUT and NOT OUT.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.22: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault 
Free, Error Detected and Corrected at the middle of the functional signal for 
EDCD Latch 
 
Similarly in Figure 6.23 , at time T2 and T3, as voltage is varied, error 
is injected causing 0-0 and 1-1 errors are detected as shown by (a) and (b) 
respectively when current pulse is injected at the edge of the functional signal 
at node 3 and node 6. Errors are detected as shown in (d) and (c) respectively. 
The corrective output due to 0-0 and 1-1 errors are shown in OUT and NOT 
OUT. 
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Figure 6.23: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Fault 
Free, Error Detected and Corrected at the edge of the functional signal for 
EDCD Latch 
 
For EDCD, the delay increases by 14% as temperature is increased 
from −400𝐶 to 270𝐶 and increases by 10.8% as temperature is increased from 
270𝐶  to 1000𝐶  as shown in Figure 6.24. However, by changing process 
variation from SS to TT decreases delay by 25.7% and from TT to FF 
decreases delay by 21.5 %. For comparison purpose, with the same process 
(TT) and the same temperature, the propagation delay of EDCD is 2.9X longer 
than the propagation delay of EDD latch. The extra delay is due to the extra 
delay that is inserted between the output of C-element and the input of MUX 
as it is part of the design to ensure that the error signal arrive before error is 
arrived as discussed before. The longer propagation delay is also due to the 
switching in MUX.  
At supply voltage about 0.8 V, the propagation delay is 2X between 
the worst propagation delay (SS) and the best propagation delay (FF) as shown 
by Figure 6.25. However, at supply voltage about 1.2 V, the worst propagation 
delay (SS) and the best propagation delay (FF) is only 1.5X. The standard 
deviation of propagation delay at 1.2 V is only 12.7 p and at 0.8 V is 45 p with 
respect to the process variation. The higher standard deviation at 0.8 V 
compared with the standard deviation at 1.2 V shows the delay is sensitive 
with process variation at lower voltage   It is shown that the propagation delay 
NOT OUTC 
OUTC 
ERROR NOT OUTC 
ERROR OUTC 
NOT OUT 
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is increased by 2X by scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V at TT process 
corner.  
 
Figure 6.24: Propagation delay of EDCD latch with respect to Process 
Variation and Temperature 
 
Figure 6.25: Propagation delay of EDCD latch with respect to Process 
Variation and Voltage Supply 
 
The highest switching power is FF process corner and SS has the 
lowest switching power as shown in Figure 6.26. The factor variation of power 
dissipation between extreme process corner (SS and FF) is 1.22X at −400𝐶 
and 1.3X at 1000𝐶.   For a comparison purpose, with the same process (TT) 
and the same temperature, the average power of EDCD latch is 1.24X higher 
compare with EDD latch. The extra power is due the correction mechanism 
whenever SEU error is corrected and power consumed by extra delay inserted. 
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Figure 6.26: Power Dissipation of EDCD latch with respect to Process 
Variation and Temperature 
 
The switching energy of the EDCD latch for 0-1 and for 1-0 change at 
different process corner variations are illustrated in Figure 6.27 and 6.28. It is 
observed that the process corner of SS, TT and FF have identical critical 
charge with ED latch for 0-1 change and 1-0 change. For 0-1 change, SS has 
the lowest maximum switching energy (129 fJ) compared with TT (139 fJ) 
and FF (154 fJ). The switching energy for FF is 1.2X compared with SS. As a 
comparison with EDD latch, in the event of  SEU is detected and caused the 
state to change, at TT process corner, EDCD latch is 1.25X higher of 
switching energy compared with EDD latch for 0-1 change. Similarly, for 1-0 
change SS has the lowest maximum switching energy (72 fJ) compared with 
TT (84 fJ) and FF (95 fJ). If SEU is detected and caused the state to change, at 
TT process corner, the switching energy for EDCD latch is 1.2X higher 
compared with EDD latch for 1-0 change. 
Similarly, the switching energy at three different temperatures are 
shown by Figure 6.29 and 6.30. The critical charges of EDCD latch at −400𝐶, 
270𝐶 and 1000𝐶  are equal with the ED latch for both 0-1 change and 1-0 
change at the same temperature. The corresponding switching energy values 
are 127 fJ, 139 fJ and 146 fJ for the temperature at −400𝐶, 270𝐶 and 1000𝐶 
respectively for 0-1 change. The switching energy at 1000𝐶  is 14% higher 
compared with switching energy at −400𝐶 . Similarly, the corresponding 
switching energy values are 70 fJ, 84 fJ and 90 fJ for the temperature at 
−400𝐶, 270𝐶 and 1000𝐶 respectively for 1-0 change. The switching energy 
at 1000𝐶 is 30% higher compared with switching energy at −400𝐶. 
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Figure 6.27: Switching Energy for EDCD Latch (0-1 Change) with different 
Process 
 
Figure 6.28: Switching Energy for EDCD Latch (1-0 Change) with different 
Process 
 
Figure 6.29: Switching Energy for EDCD Latch (0-1 Change) with Different 
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Temperature 
 
Figure 6.30: Switching Energy for EDCD Latch (1-0 Change) with Different 
Temperature 
 
The vulnerable nodes on EDCD latch are shown in Figure 6.31. Error 
due to SEU on nodes 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 and nodes (a),(b),(e),(f),(g) and (h) are 
detected and corrected. Only error due to SEU on nodes (c) and (d) are not 
detected and corrected. Results are summarized in Table 6.2. 
Component Vulnerable nodes Detected and corrected 
error on the nodes 
EDCD Latch 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 
(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f),(g) 
and (h) 
(a),(b),(e),(f),(g) and (h) 
Table 6.2: Vulnerable nodes on EDCD Latch 
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Figure 6.31: Vulnerable nodes on EDCD latch 
Table 6.3 shows the comparison of ED, EDC,EDD and EDCD latches 
at supply voltage of 1 V in terms of propagation delay with a temperature is 
fixed at 270𝐶 and the process corner is set to TT. The worst propagation delay 
is EDC latch with the delay is 216 ps and followed by ED latch, which is 171 
ps. The percentage difference of EDC latch and ED latch is about 26.3%. For 
dual rail latch, ED latch has the lowest delay which is about 42 ps compared 
with EDCD latch which is about 117 ps. EDCD latch is about 1.8X more 
delay compared with EDD latch. As a comparison, delay propagation in EDC 
latch is 1.8X longer compared with delay propagation in EDCD latch. The 
extra propagation time in EDC latches is mainly due to the single rail and dual 
rail converter in EDC latch.    
Latch Propagation Delay (ps) Percentage Differences 
ED 171 26.3% 
EDC 216 
EDD 42 178% 
EDCD 117 
Table 6.3: Propagation Delay Comparison 
   
Table 6.4 shows the comparison of ED, EDC, EDD and EDCD latches 
in terms of switching power with a temperature and process corner are set to 
270𝐶 and TT respectively. EDCD latch consumes the highest power compared 
with other latches. It consumes 23.7% more power compared with EDD latch 
and 16% compared with EDC latch. The big difference between EDD and 
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EDCD latch is due to the inverter acting as delay components and two MUXs 
used. EDC consume 15.7% more power compared with ED latch. The small 
percentage difference between EDC and ED latch is due to the switching in 
MUX 
Latch Switching power (uW) Percentage Differences 
ED 70 15.7% 
EDC 81 
EDD 76 23.7% 
EDCD 94 
Table 6.4: Switching Power Comparison 
 
6.4 Proposed Error Detection and Correction for Dual Rail Data with 
Transient Correction Latch 
EDCD latch is only corrected error due to SEU hitting any internal 
node in C-element. Suppose, there is a single event transient (SET) error at the 
input of the latch from previous combinational logic and the erroneous input 
propagates to the output without being detected and corrected by EDCD. 
Figure 6.32 shows the proposed error detection and correction for dual rail 
data with transient correction latch (EDCDT). This is the modified version of 
latch proposed in [36] as the previous does not include the detection and 
correction due to SEU. Under fault free condition, the reset signal is active 
high and in the event of errorneous value propagates to the latch, the reset 
signal is low. This force DATA and 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   to reset. The CLK is replaced with 
en for the case of asynchronous communication system.The transient error (1-
1) is detected by using AND gate and spacer is detected by using NOR gate. 
The dual rail data is detected by using XOR gate. The error, spacer and data 
are connected to the controller which produces reset and en as the outputs.  
 180 
 
 
 
Figure 6.32: Proposed EDCDT Latch 
 
The logic controllers are derived by using signal transition graph 
(STG) generated from Petrify as shown in Figure 6.33. Under fault-free 
condition, initially en is high and the latch holds spacer.  Once data is 
detected, the en is low to latch the data and followed by spacer. The latch is 
now ready to hold the spacer and the process continues.  In the event of error 
is detected, no data is detected and the reset is set low to reset the system.  
After the reset, the latch is now ready to hold the spacer and the input is re-
sampled. The system is then follows the normal operation as previously 
discussed. The resulting logic gates for the controller are as shown in Figure 
6.34. 
 
 
Figure 6.33: Signal transition graph (STG) 
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Figure 6.34: Logic gates for the controller 
 
The functionality of EDCDT is best described by using waveform. 
Figure 6.35 shows the simulation of fault-free error, SEU error and transient 
error. Figure 6.36 shows the simulation of control signal of the system. Under 
fault-free condition as shown by time T1, dual rail data are detected and 
propagate to the output. No SEU error and SET error are detected. The en goes 
high to latch the data and the reset signal remains high. At time T2, a particle 
hitting at node of EDCDT latch causing it to temporarily goes from 0-1, as 
shown in Figure 6.35(a). This causes spacer error. At this instance, the output 
of shadow latch propagates to the MUX to correct the corrupted output due to 
SEU as shown by the output, NOT OUT. The error signal (ERROR NOT 
OUTC) due to SEU (spacer error) is indicated by Figure 6.36(a). At time T3, a 
particle hitting at node of EDCDT latch causing it to temporarily goes from 0-
1, as shown in Figure 6.35(b). This causes 1-1 error. Similarly, at this instance, 
the output of shadow latch propagates to the MUX to correct the corrupted 
output due to SEU as shown by the output, NOT OUT. The error signal 
(ERROR NOT OUTC) due to SEU (1-1 error) is indicated in Figure 6.36(b). 
At time T4, a transient error propagates to the latch. The error due to SET 
(error) goes to 1 to indicate the presence of transient error as shown in Figure 
6.35(c) and error is indicated in Figure 6.36(c). At this instances, no data and 
spacer are detected as a result of SET error as shown in Figure 6.36(d) The 
error detect the transient error causing the reset to go low as shown in Figure 
6.36(e). Consequently, the erroneous data does not propagate to the output.  
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The simulation of the statistical variation are shown in Figure 6.37-
6.38. The injected SEU current causing spacer error and 1-1 error as well as 
transient error as shown in Figure 6.37 (a), (b) and (c) respectively. The 
control signal for detecting transient error, spacer and data under voltage 
variation are as shown in Figure 6.38 (c), (d) and (e). The error detection due 
to SEU under the same voltage variation are shown in Figure 6.38 (a) and (b). 
 
Figure 6.35: Fault Free, Error Detected and Error Corrected for EDCDT Latch 
 
 
Figure 6.36: Control Signal for EDCDT Latch 
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Figure 6.37: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Output 
of EDCDT Latch 
 
Figure 6.38: Statistical Variation of 𝑉𝐷𝐷+-20% of Nominal Value for Control 
Signal of EDCDT Latch 
 
For EDCDT, the delay increases by 12.3% as temperature is increased 
from −400𝐶 to 270𝐶 and increases by 11.5% as temperature is increased from 
270𝐶  to 1000𝐶  as shown in Figure 6.39. However, by changing process 
variation from SS to TT decreases delay by 28.5% and from TT to FF 
decreases delay by 20.9 %. For a comparison purpose, with the same process 
(TT) and the same temperature, the propagation delay of EDCDT is 2.6X 
longer than the propagation delay of EDCD latch. The extra delay is due to the 
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logic needed to detect transient error and produce reset and enable signal. 
However, with the same conditions apply, the propagation delay of EDCDT is 
only 1.4X longer than the propagation delay of EDC latch.  
At supply voltage about 0.8 V, the propagation delay is 2.2X between 
the worst propagation delay (SS) and the best propagation delay (FF) as shown 
in Figure 6.40. However, at supply voltage about 1.2 V, the worst propagation 
delay (SS) and the best propagation delay (FF) is only 1.6X. The standard 
deviation of propagation delay at 1.2 V is only 61 p and at 0.8 V is 203 p with 
respect to the process variation.  It is shown that the propagation delay is 
increased by 1.8X by scaling voltage from 1.2 V to 0.8 V at TT process 
corner. 
The factor variation of power dissipation between extreme process 
corner (SS and FF) is 1.3X at −400𝐶 and 1.24X at 1000𝐶 as shown by Figure 
6.41.  For a comparison purpose, with the same process (TT) and the same 
temperature (270𝐶 ), the average power of EDCDT latch is 2.7X higher 
compare with EDCD latch. The extra power is due to the switching power by 
the logic needed to detect transient error and produce reset and enable signal. 
 
Figure 6.39: Propagation delay of EDCDT latch with respect to Process 
Variation and Temperature 
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Figure 6.40: Propagation delay of EDCDT latch with respect to Process 
Variation and Voltage Scaling 
 
Figure 6.41: Power Dissipation of EDCDT latch with respect to Process 
Variation and Temperature 
 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 compares 10 latches in terms of area overhead 
(by counting number of transistors) with respect to ED latch and error 
correction capability. The proposed ED latch and EDC latch have higher area 
overhead compared with previous proposed latches due to the logic gates 
needed to convert the single-rail signals into dual-rail signals. However, for 
EDD and EDCD latches, the overhead areas are comparable with the previous 
proposed latches, especially FERST latch. The EDCDT latch and the proposed 
latch [36] have almost the same overhead area, but EDCDT latch has the SEU 
Error Detected and Corrected Capability in which the latch proposed by [36] 
do not have the capability. 
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Scheme Overhead Area Percentage  Number of undetected and 
uncorrected vulnerable 
nodes 
ED Latch - 1 
EDC Latch +18.5% 2 
FERST[32] -25.9% 3 
SIN-LC[33] -81.5% 3 
SIN-HR[33] 77.8% 3 
SDT[34] -70.4% 6 
EDD Latch +14.8% 3 
EDCD Latch +48.1% 2 
Table 6.5: Comparison of Different Latches 
 
Scheme SEU Error Detected and 
Corrected Capability  
Transient Error Detected 
and Corrected Capability 
EDCDT Latch Yes Yes 
Latch proposed  
by [36] 
No Yes 
Table 6.6: Comparison of Different Latches 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented fault tolerant latches that include error 
detection and correction capabilities due to SEU error as well as SET error. 
The first proposed latch (EDD) detects errors for dual rail data. Two C-
elements are used to accommodate the dual-rail data. Any invalid data on 
dual-rail line due to SEU hitting on the sensitive nodes is detected by an 
XNOR gate. The second proposed latch (EDCD) uses two Razor flip-flops to 
correct error by employing shadow latches that are controlled by the same 
clock in order to restore correct values. The third latch (EDCDT) uses 
controller to correct SET error apart from correcting SEU error. The 
simulation graphs are included to demonstrate the functionality of the latches 
in the event of fault-free condition and in the event  particle hitting the 
sensitive nodes.  
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Chapter 7. The design of Asynchronous  Communication by 
using the Proposed EDCD Latches 
 
This chapter presents the systems that utilise the proposed EDCD latches. 
Using Quartus II, the functionality EDCD latches are demonstrated by using 
waveforms under fault free conditions and in the event of SEU hitting the 
vulnerable nodes. An asynchronous communication is used to demonstrate the 
functionality of EDCD latches. The effect of the system using latches that has 
no capablity of detecting and correcting errors is also demonstrated in this 
chapter.   
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the functionality of error detection and correction for 
dual rail (EDCD) latches are verified by using Quartus II from Altera.  The 
functionality of error detection and correction for single rail (EDC) on 
complex logic is shown in Appendix B. Previously, Cadence UMC 90nm 
technology is used to construct the latches at transistor-level design.  In order 
to design the proposed latches in Quartus II, some modifications have to be 
made on the design. While there is a standard gates and logic available in 
library of Quartus II, some non-standard logic are not available such as C-
element. VHDL is used to describe the behaviour of non-standard logic as 
shown by Algorithm 7.1 and 7.2. Previously, the C-element and shadow latch 
are constructed at transistors level by using UMC90 nm technology. The result 
of synthesize C-element and shadow latch are shown in Figure 7.1 and Figure 
7.2 respectively. 
7.2 Asynchronous communication by using EDCD Latch 
The injection method by using XOR gate is used to simulate the state 
change in EDCD latch. Two XOR gates are inserted at the output of C-
element 1 and C-element 2 as shown by the dashed-box in Figure 7.3. The first 
port of XOR gate is fed with the output of C-element and the second port of 
XOR gate is fed with errors as denoted by e1 and e2. 
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Algorithm 7.1. VHDL for C-element. 
library ieee; 
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;  
 
entity C_element is  
 port( A :  in  std_logic; 
          B :  in  std_logic; 
          C :  out  std_logic ); 
end C_element; 
 
architecture behaviour of 
C_element is  
 
Signal  out :  std_logic; 
Signal  out1 :  std_logic; 
Signal  out2 :  std_logic; 
Signal  out3 :  std_logic; 
 
 
BEGIN  
C <= out; 
Out1 <= A and B; 
Out2 <= B and out; 
Out3 <= A and out; 
out<=out1 or out2 or out3; 
 
   end behaviour;  
 
Algorithm 7.2. VHDL for Shadow Latch . 
library ieee; 
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all; 
 
entity SL is 
port( d_in: in std_logic; 
 en:  in std_logic; 
 d_out: out std_logic); 
     
end SL; 
 
architecture behavior of SL is 
begin 
 
  process(d_in, en) 
  begin 
 if en=’1’ then 
   d_out <= d_in; 
 end if; 
  end process; 
 
end behavior; 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Synthesis of C-element Figure 7.2: Synthesis of Transmission 
Gate 
Fig 7.4 illustrates the fault free and error injected simulation by using 
Quartus II. At time T1, no error is injected and the data propagates correctly to 
the output of the latch. The output of C-element 1, OUTC, and output of C-
element 2, 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is “10” indicates that the correct operation of EDCD latch.  
At time T2 an error is injected and causes OUTC and 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  to have ‘11’ 
value as shown in (a) and (e) respectively. Error signal goes to high at time T2 
to indicate that an error is detected in the latch as shown in (g). At this time, 
the MUXs are activated and the correct values are restored as shown in (c). At 
T3, an error is injected and causes OUTC and 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  to have ‘00’ value, 
causing 0-0 error as shown in (b) and (f) respectively. Error is detected as 
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shown in (h). As before at this time, the MUXs are activated and the correct 
values are restored as shown in (d).  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Error injection on EDCD latch 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Waveform simulation for fault free condition and error injection on 
EDCD Latch 
 
In order to demonstrate the functionality of the latch in the complex 
system, an asynchronous communication system is used. The purpose of the 
communication system is converting single rail to dual rail and back to single 
rail data as shown in Figure 7.5. Dual rail encoding is necessary for long on-
chip interconnect since it is delay insensitive which refers to the data is 
transmitted correctly regardless of the delay in the interconnecting wires. It 
uses two wires to represent 1 bit of information. 
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Figure 7.5: Asynchronous on-chip communication 
 
The intermediate code in the communication is 3-6 code. Even though 
the dual rail encoding is suitable for long on-chip interconnect 
communication, it suffers the lowest capacity (bits/wire) compared with other 
codes. Hence, this makes it more costly. Table 7.1 compares some of the 
codes with information regarding the number of wires, transitions, capacities 
and the complexities. 
Codes Wires Transitions (Data + 
Ack) 
Capacities 
(bit/wire) 
Complexities 
Dual 
rail 
12 4x4=16 4/12=0.3 4+3C 
1-4  10 4x2=8 4/10=0.4 6+1C 
2-7 8 6x1=6 4/8=0.5 6+3C 
3-6 7 8x1=8 4/7=0.6 10+3C 
Table 7.1: Code comparison in terms of wires, transition and capacity [63] 
From Table 7.1, it is obvious that the 3-6 code has the highest capacity 
compared with other codes. Besides, the 3-6 code has double wire capacity 
compared with dual rail.  The same goes with the number of transitions. The 
numbers of transitions are related to the dynamic power dissipated by circuit.  
Compared with 3-6 codes, the numbers of transitions for dual rail is twice and 
2-7 code has the lowest numbers of transitions. However, the disadvantage of 
3-6 code is the complexity. The complexity refers to the number of standard 
gates and C-elements (C) to build completion detector (CD). Obviously, the 
CD for 3-6 code requires the most number of gates and C-elements. 
Due to the number of wires, numbers of transitions and the capacities, 
it is desirable to convert dual rail encoding to 3-6 codes for long on-chip 
communication as discussed above. Figure 7.6(a) and (b) show the dual rail to 
3-6 converter and 3-6 to dual rail converter respectively.  
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 (a) : Dual rail to 3-6 converter  (b) : 3-6 to dual rail converter 
Figure 7.6 
 
The conversion of the dual rail to 3-6 code back to dual rail code is 
shown in Figure 7.7.  Each of the pipelines is enabled from subsequent 
pipeline stage. The enable signal is obtained from the (CD) of the subsequent 
pipeline stage before it is inverted into second port of C-element of the 
previous pipeline.  The on-chip communication consists of three pipelines. 
The first register pipeline buffers the input of dual rail data and the CD detects 
the presence of dual rail data at the output of the first pipelines. This provides 
acknowledge signal to the preceding pipeline. The second pipeline outputs the 
3-6 code from dual rail to 3-6 converter and the CD detects the presence of 3-6 
acknowledge signal. The acknowledge signal is used to enable and disable the 
first pipeline. The third pipeline outputs the dual rail data from 3-6 to dual rail 
converter and allowing the acknowledge signal from CD that detects the 
presence of dual rail data. The CD signal is used to enable and disable the 
second pipeline. It is desired to build the latch from pipeline by using EDCD 
latch and the effect of using EDCD latch in the event of current pulse hit to 
one of latches in the pipeline is discussed below. 
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Figure 7.7: Dual rail to 3-6 and back to dual rail conversion 
 
Table 7.2 provides the interface of the circuit as provided in Figure 7.7. 
Name Direction Description 
ACK1 
ACK2 
ACK3 
I Acknowledge signal for the input data 
Data[7:0] I Input of dual rail data 
e1 
e2 
I Input of injected error 
OUTC1 
OUTC2 
OUTC3 
O Output of C-element for Pipeline 
OUTPL1 
OUTPL2 
PUTPL3 
O Output of the Pipeline 
ERRORPL1 
ERRORPL2 
ERRORPL3 
O Error detection for Pipeline  
3-6 CD O 3-6 code completion detector 
DR CD O Dual rail code completion detector 
EN I Enable port for pipeline 
Table 7.2: Interface of dual rail to 3-6 and back to dual rail conversion 
Table 7.3 provides the 3-6 code and the corresponding dual rail code. It 
consists of 16 symbols according to the equation  
Encoding capacity = 
6!
(6−3)!∗3!
=20 [63] 
The remaining 4 symbols can be reserved for future use. 
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3-6 code Dual Rail Code 
111000 10101010 
101100 01101010 
110100 10011010 
011100 01011010 
101010 10100110 
001110 01100110 
110010 10010110 
010110 01010110 
110001 10101001 
101001 01101001 
010101 10011001 
001101 01011001 
100011 10100101 
001011 01100101 
010011 10010101 
000111 01010101 
Table 7.3: 3-6 and dual rail code 
 
7.3 Result and Simulation Employing EDCD Latch 
For comparison purpose, the latches that do not have the capability to 
detect or correct error due to SEU are used in communication. The waveform 
simulation is shown in Figure 7.8.  Error is injected to Pipeline1. The four-bit 
dual rail input starts as ‘A9’ (10101001) and alternate with spacer. At time T1, 
no error is injected and the dual rail CD detects the presence of the first valid 
symbol. An acknowledge signal (ACK1) is sent to the preceding pipeline. The 
symbol is converted to 3-6 code by converter and a symbol ‘31’ appears at 
pipeline2. The 3-6 code is detected by CD and send an acknowledge signal 
(ACK2) to Pipeline1 causing Pipeline1 to reset. A valid 3-6 code is converted 
to dual rail symbol and a symbol “A9” appears at the output of pipeline3. A 
valid dual rail symbol is detected at the output of pipeline3 and send an 
acknowledge signal (ACK3) causing Pipeline2 to reset. At time T2, an error is 
injected at the Pipeline1 and causing the MSB of data to change from 1-0. A 
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new symbol appears at Pipeline1 as “29” (0010 1001) instead of “A9” (1010 
1001).  This data is not recognised by CD as a valid data and causing no 
acknowledge signal (ACK1) is sent as shown in (a). The corrupted signal 
propagates to the 3-6 converter and invalid signal “39” (0101 1001) appears at 
the output of Pipeline2. No acknowledge signal (ACK2) is sent by 3-6 CD. 
The signal propagates to Pipeline3 and a corrupted symbol “29” (0010 1001) 
appears at the output of Pipeline3 as shown in (b) with no acknowledge signal 
(ACK3) is sent as for the previous case. 
 
Figure 7.8: Waveform simulation for fault free condition and error injection on 
dual rail latch that does not have error correction capability 
 
The EDCD latches are used to demonstrate functionality of the latches 
in the event of current pulse hit on the pipeline causing the data to be 
corrupted. The waveform simulation is shown in Figure 7.9. The four-bit dual 
rail input starts as ‘A9’ (10101001) and alternate with spacer as in the 
previous case. At time T1, no error is injected and the dual rail CD detects the 
presence of the first valid symbol. An acknowledge signal (ACK1) is sent to 
the preceding pipeline.  Error signal at Pipeline1 (ERRORPL1) is ‘0’ indicates 
no error is detected at Pipeline1.  The symbol is converted to 3-6 code by 
converter and a symbol ‘31’ (0011 0001) appears at pipeline2. Error signal at 
Pipeline2 (ERRORPL2) is ‘0’ indicates no error is detected at Pipeline2. The 
3-6 code is detected by CD and send an acknowledge signal (ACK2) to 
Pipeline1 causing Pipeline1 to reset. A valid 3-6 code is converted to dual rail 
symbol and a symbol “A9” (1010 1001) appear at the output of Pipeline3. 
Error signal at Pipeline3 (ERRORPL3) is ‘0’ indicates no error is detected at 
Pipeline3. A valid dual rail symbol is detected at the output of Pipeline3 and 
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send an acknowledge (ACK3) signal causing Pipeline2 to reset. At time T2, an 
error is injected as shown in (a) at the Pipeline1 and causing the second MSB 
of data to change from 0-1. A new symbol appears at output of C-element 
(OUTC1) as “E9” (1110 1001) instead of “A9” (1010 1001) as shown in (e). 
This is an example of 1-1 error. At this instance, error signal at Pipeline1 is 
produced (ERRORPL1) to indicate that error is detected on Pipeline1 as shown 
in (c). As a result of error is detected, the MUXs are activated to replace the 
corrupted values with the true value. The true value of “A9” (1010 1001) 
appears at OUTPL1 as shown in (g). With the correction mechanism in place, 
the dual rail CD is able to detect the presence of valid dual rail and 
acknowledge signal (ACK1) is sent to the preceding pipeline. The corrected 
dual rail values are converted to 3-6 code and a symbol of “31” (0011 0001) 
appears the output of pipeline2 as shown in (g). The 3-6 CD recognise it as a 
valid data and sent an acknowledge signal (ACK2) to Pipeline1 and causing it 
to reset. No error signal is produced (ERRORPL2) at Pipeline2 to indicate that 
no error is detected on Pipeline2. The data is converted back to dual rail and a 
symbol of “A9” (1010 1001) appears at the output of Pipeline3 as shown in 
(g). Similarly no error is produced (ERRORPL3) at Pipeline3 to indicate that 
no error is detected on Pipeline3. 
At time T3 an error is injected as shown in (b) at the Pipeline1 and 
causing the MSB of data to change from 1-0. A new symbol appears at output 
of C-element (OUTC1) as “29” (0010 1001) instead of “A9” (1010 1001) as 
shown in  (f). This is an example of 0-0 error. At this instance, error signal at 
pipeline1 is produced (ERRORPL1) to indicate that error is detected on 
Pipeline1 as shown in (d). As a result of error is detected, the MUXs are 
activated to replace the corrupted values with the true value. The data proceed 
to converters, and Pipeline2 and Ppipeline3 with the same protocols as 
described above as shown in (h). 
With the 0-0 and 1-1 errors occur at pipeline, the proposed EDCD 
latches are able to detect and correct error as shown by the waveform in Figure 
7.9. 
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Figure 7.9: Waveform simulation for fault free condition and error injection on 
EDCD latch 
 
7.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the application of EDCD latch. The EDC 
latch is used as a pipeline in the adder system and the EDCD latch is used as a 
pipeline in the asynchronous communication.  For this purpose, Quartus II 
software is used to obtain the waveform of the simulation. To emulate the 
SEU hitting on the sensitive node, the XOR is placed at the output of the latch. 
One port is connected to the output of C-element and the other port is used to 
the error.  Two simulations are performed to demonstrate the functionality of 
EDCD latch. The first simulation is the data transfer by using latches that do 
not have the capability of detecting and correcting errors. The second 
simulation is by using EDCD latches. It is proven that simulation by using 
EDCD latches are able to counter SEU error for the case of dual rail 
asynchronous communication.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusions and Further Work 
 
Chapter 8 presents conclusions and future work related to the project. 
8.1 Conclusions 
Single event upset (SEU) can cause system failures or produce 
incorrect values in a digital system. Such problems become extremely severe 
in emerging submicron technologies due to the transistors and voltage supply 
scaling. This scaling causes physical features of transistors, drain current and 
threshold voltage to reduce, making them more vulnerable to SEU. The 
increasing demand for low power consumption and system complexities has 
necessitated the analysis of SEU and mitigation of the effect of SEU in digital 
systems. Apart from voltage and size scaling of transistors, other factors that 
can affect the vulnerability of the circuits towards SEU include process 
variation and temperature. Process variation refers to inaccuracies in the 
manufacturing process and can lead to deterioration of circuit performance and 
an increase in power consumption. As for temperature, it degrades the 
threshold voltage, carrier mobility and saturation velocity of transistors. As a 
result of degrading carrier mobility, the drain current becomes lower and the 
sensitivity of the node towards SEU is increased. 
The first step in this research was to analyse the occurrence of soft 
error on four different configurations of C-elements: SIL, SC, SS and DIL. 
The sensitive nodes on different C-elements were identified and injected with 
current pulse. The current pulse causing SEU was modelled with fast rising 
time and slow falling time. The amplitude of current was varied until the state 
was changed at the output of the C-elements. The charge corresponding to the 
state change is known as the critical charge. The experiments were repeated 
with respect to the change of the process corner, temperature, voltage and size 
scaling. The standard deviations of all nodes in all C-elements were compared. 
The SIL configuration had the highest standard deviation for all changes, 
which implies that SIL is the most sensitive C-element compared with other 
configurations. 
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Next, a new method was developed to calculate the error rate of the 
four C-element circuits with respect to process corner, temperature, voltage 
and size scaling. The method took into consideration the probability of being 
hit by current pulse. The error rates and the standard deviation of error rates 
were calculated and compared between C-elements. Results show that SS and 
DIL have the highest error rates and highest standard deviations compared 
with SIL and SC. It is concluded, therefore, that SIL and SC are the most 
stable C-elements compared with the SS and DIL configurations. 
The focus of the third stage was to mitigate the effect of SEU by 
designing error detection and correction latches in response to SEU. Two 
types of latches were proposed, EDC and EDCD latches for single and dual 
rail respectively. By using Cadence UMC 90nm, the functionality of both 
types of latches can be demonstrated by using waveforms under fault free 
conditions and in the event of a current pulse striking the vulnerable nodes. 
The performances of both latches were studied in terms of propagation delay 
versus process corner, temperature and voltage supply. The switching energy 
of both latches can be obtained in the event of the current charge being less 
than, equal to or more than the critical charge with different process corners 
and temperatures. The error detection and correction as well as transient error 
correction latch (EDCDT) were also proposed to correct transient error in 
addition to correcting SEU error. 
The focus of the fourth stage was to design asynchronous 
communication. The main purpose of designing the system was to test the 
functionality of the EDCD latch by injecting an error into one of the latches. 
This was demonstrated by using waveforms under fault free conditions and in 
the event of SEU hitting the vulnerable nodes. Quartus II software was used to 
design the systems. The effect of the system using latches in terms of it having 
no capablity of detecting and correcting errors was also demonstrated in order 
to compare the correction capability of the latch 
8.2 Further Work 
This section discusses possible extensions to this research. Future work could 
include the following: 
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(a) Designing an error correction latch due to charge sharing. As transistors 
continue to shrink, distances between the hit devices and the adjacent 
devices have become very close and this results in the diffusion of the 
charge to the adjacent node. The proposed error correction latches 
(EDC and EDCD latches) have addressed SEU for charge collecting at 
single nodes. The work can be extended to include error collection due 
to the charge sharing (charge collection at several nodes induced by a 
single event transient (SET)).  
(b) Silicon implementation can be used to measure error rate of the EDC 
and EDCD latches instead of using a Field Programmable Gates Array 
(FPGA). This is due to the delay in each of the blocks in FPGA. It is 
expected that the error rate measurements in silicon implementation 
would be less than in FPGA due to the propagation delay in FPGA, 
especially at lower voltages, where timing error is more significant than 
injected error. 
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Appendix A 
Standard deviation (σ) refers to the dispersion of data with respect to its mean. 
A large σ refers to the data that are spread out from the mean and a small  σ 
refers to the data that are close to the mean. The standard deviation for discrete 
random variable is given by equation (1). 
σ = √
1
N
[(x1 − μ)2 + (x2 − μ)2 +⋯+ (xN − μ)2]
2
 (1) 
where 
μ =
1
N
(x1 +⋯+ xN) 
The standard deviation can be written by using summation notation as given 
by equation (2) 
σ = √
1
N
∑(xi − μ)2
N
i=1
2
(2) 
where 
μ =
1
N
∑xi
N
i=1
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Appendix B 
 Adder System Employing EDC Latch 
Error injection in the EDC latch by using  XOR gate on Quartus II 
software as shown by Figure B1  
 
Figure B1: Error injection on EDC latch 
 
Figure B2 illustrates the simulation of error detection and correction 
(EDC) latch for single rail. At time T1, no error is injected and the data 
propagates correctly to the output of the latch. The output of C-element 1, 
OUTC1, and output of C-element 2, OUTC2 is ’10’ indicates that the correct 
operation of EDC latch.  At time T2 an error is injected (a) and cause OUTC1 
and OUTC2 to have ‘11’ value (e). Error signal goes to high at time T2 (g) to 
indicate that an error is detected in the latch. At this time, the MUX is 
activated and the correct value is restored (c). At T3, an error is injected (b) 
and cause OUTC1 and OUTC2 to have ‘00’ value (f), causing 0-0 error. Error 
is detected (h). As before, at this time, the MUX is activated and the correct 
value is restored (d). 
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Figure B2: Waveform simulation for fault free condition and error injection on 
EDC Latch 
 
Adder system employing EDC latch as shown by Figure B3.  
 
 
Figure B3: Adder system employing EDC latches 
 
In the adder system, Brent Kung adder is used as it is a high speed and 
less complex compared with other adder [64]. Another advantage is that this 
type of adder is suitable for high-bit input adder [65].  
Figure B4 shows the gate level view view for 8-bit Brent-Kung adder 
after synthesizing the full VHDL code for 8 bit Brent Kung Adder. Details of 
the Brent Kung adder can be found in Appendix C. 
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Figure B4: The gate level view for 8-bit Brent-Kung adder 
 
Table 1B: Interface of Adder System 
Name Direction Description 
CLK I Clock signal for the system 
CLKd I Delayed clock for the system 
Data1[7:0] 
Data2[7:0] 
I Input of set data1 and data 2 
e1 
e2 
I Input of injected error 
OUTC1 
OUTC2 
O Output of C-element for Pipeline1 
OUTC11 
OUTC22 
O Output of C-element for Pipeline2 
Pipeline1 
Pipeline2 
O Output of the pipeline 
Error1 
Error2 
O Error detection for Pipeline 1 and 
Pipeline2 
A[7:0] 
B[7:0] 
I Input of adder 
SUM[7:0] O Sum of adder 
CARRY O Carry of Adder 
 
As illustrated in the previous adder system, the sum can be corrupted if 
current hits on any of the sensitive nodes in the pipelines. The use of EDC 
latches to form pipeline can avoid the adder system from transmitting a false 
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value. The adder system is demonstrated by using pipeline that consists of 
EDC latches. Figure B5 shows simulation waveform. Two errors are injected 
into the latch to simulate the effect of SEU on EDC pipeline. At T1, no error is 
injected and the first batch of data are successfully transmitted and added to 
the subsequent pipeline stage. For example a symbol of ‘02’ from DATA1 and 
‘20’ from DATA2 are added and a symbol of ‘22’ appears at the SUM. This 
example demonstrates that the two data are correctly added. At time T2, a 
SEU error occurs at pipeline1 on data wire din[0] (a) causing a false symbol of 
‘03’ appears on output of C-element 1 (OUTC1) (e) instead of a symbol ‘02’ . 
At this instance the output of C-element 2 (OUTC2) contains a symbol of 
‘FD’. This correspond to 1-1 error as the equivalent binary value of OUTC1 is 
‘0000 0011” and the equivalent binary value of OUTC2 is ‘1111 1101’and 
therefore the LSB of OUTC1 and OUTC2 are both 1 which are not allowed. 
Error is detected (c). With the proposed error detection and correction single 
latch, the MUX is activated and 1-1 error is corrected by replacing the 
corrupted value with the input value. Hence, the symbol of ‘02’ appears at 
output of pipeline1 (g). This data is correctly added and propagated to the 
pipeline3 (i). Similarly at time T3, error is injected on C-element 2 on data 
wire din[0] as shown by (b)  causing a false symbol of ‘FA’ appears on output 
of C-element 2 (OUTC2) (f) instead of a symbol ‘FB’. This corresponds to 0-0 
error as the equivalent binary value of OUTC1 is ‘0000 0100” and the 
equivalent binary value of OUTC2 is ‘1111 1010’and therefore the LSB of 
OUTC1 and OUTC2 are both 0 which is not allowed. At this instance, the 
error is detected (d). With the proposed error detection and correction single 
latch, the MUX is activated and 0-0 error is corrected by replacing the 
corrupted value with the input value. Hence, the symbol of ‘04’ appears at 
output of pipeline1 (h). This data is correctly added and propagated to the 
pipeline3 (j). 
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Figure B5: Waveform simulation for fault free condition and error injection on 
EDC Latch 
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Appendix C 
 
Pre-processing design of Brent-Kung adder utilise equations known as 
propagate (p) and generate (g) as given by equations (1) and (2). 
(a) 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖+𝑏𝑖 (1) 
(b) 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖⊗𝑏𝑖 (2) 
 
Figure C1 shows the basic component of Brent-Kung Adder. It is 
basically the sum of p and g. It has latency of O(log N ) and is widely used in 
fast adders. The associative operator (∙) is defined as in equation (3)[63,67]. 
(gi, pi) ∙ (gj, pj) = (gi + (pigj), pigj) (3) 
 
 Figure C1: Block diagram for basic Brent-Kung Adder 
The corresponding eight-bit Brent Kung adder prefix graph is shown by 
Figure C2 [66]. 
 
Figure C2: Brent Kung Prefix Adder Graph  
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The Brent-Kung prefix adder equations are are according to stage 1-stage 5 
[66]. 
Stage 
1 
𝑐1 = 𝑔0 
 𝑐2 𝑔1:0 = 𝑔1 + 𝑝1𝑔0 
𝑝1:0 = 𝑝1𝑝0 
𝑔3:2 = 𝑔3 + 𝑝3𝑔2 
𝑝3:2 = 𝑝3𝑝2 
𝑔5:4 = 𝑔5 + 𝑝5𝑔4 
𝑝5:4 = 𝑝5𝑝4 
𝑔7:6 = 𝑔7 + 𝑝7𝑔6 
𝑝7:6 = 𝑝7𝑝6 
Stage 
2 
𝑐4 𝑔3:0 = 𝑔3:2 + 𝑝3:2𝑐2 
         = 𝑔3 + 𝑝3𝑔2 + 𝑝3𝑝2𝑐2 
𝑔7:4 = 𝑔7:6 + 𝑝7:6𝑔5:4 
         = 𝑔7 + 𝑝7𝑔6 + 𝑝7𝑝6(𝑔2 + 𝑝5𝑔4) 
𝑔7:4 = 𝑝7𝑝6𝑝5𝑝4 
Stage 
3 
𝑐8 𝑔7:0 = 𝑔7:4 + 𝑝7:4𝑐4 
Stage 
4 
𝑐6 𝑔5:0 = 𝑔5:4 + 𝑝5:4𝑐4 
Stage 
5 
𝑐3 
𝑐5 
𝑐7 
𝑔2:0 = 𝑔2 + 𝑝2𝑐2 
𝑔4:0 = 𝑔4 + 𝑝4𝑐4 
𝑔6:0 = 𝑔6 + 𝑝6𝑐6 
 
The VHDL programming used to derive eight-bit Brent Kung adder is given 
Algorithm C1. 
Algorithm C1: Brent Kung 8-Bit Adder 
   library IEEE; 
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.All; 
 
entity BrentKung8Bits is 
port ( A, B : in Std_Logic_Vector ( 7 downto 0 ) ;  -- A,B: addends 
       S : out Std_Logic_Vector ( 7 downto 0 ) ;    -- S: Sum; 
       Cout : out Std_Logic ) ;                      -- carry out 
end BrentKung8Bits ; 
 
architecture structural of BrentKung8Bits is 
-- G(ii)(jj), P(ii)(jj) : "group Generate", "group Propagate". ii = group left position, jj = 
group right position 
type Tr is array (15 downto 0) of Std_Logic_Vector (7 downto 0) ; 
signal G, P : Tr ; 
 
procedure HA 
(signal G, P : out Std_Logic; signal A, B : in Std_Logic) is 
begin G <= A and B; P <= A xor B; end HA; 
 
procedure BK 
(signal GO, PO : out Std_Logic; signal GI1, PI1, GI2, PI2 : in Std_Logic) is 
begin GO <= GI1 or ( PI1 and GI2 ); PO <= PI1 and PI2; end BK; 
 
begin 
 208 
 
 -- "HA" cells row 
HA ( G(07)(07) , P(07)(07) ,   A(07) , B(07) ) ; 
HA ( G(06)(06) , P(06)(06) ,   A(06) , B(06) ) ; 
HA ( G(05)(05) , P(05)(05) ,   A(05) , B(05) ) ; 
HA ( G(04)(04) , P(04)(04) ,   A(04) , B(04) ) ; 
HA ( G(03)(03) , P(03)(03) ,   A(03) , B(03) ) ; 
HA ( G(02)(02) , P(02)(02) ,   A(02) , B(02) ) ; 
HA ( G(01)(01) , P(01)(01) ,   A(01) , B(01) ) ; 
HA ( G(00)(00) , P(00)(00) ,   A(00) , B(00) ) ; 
 
 -- "BK" cells row 1 
BK ( G(07)(06) , P(07)(06) , G(07)(07) , P(07)(07) , G(06)(06) , P(06)(06) ) ; 
BK ( G(05)(04) , P(05)(04) , G(05)(05) , P(05)(05) , G(04)(04) , P(04)(04) ) ; 
BK ( G(03)(02) , P(03)(02) , G(03)(03) , P(03)(03) , G(02)(02) , P(02)(02) ) ; 
BK ( G(01)(00) , P(01)(00) , G(01)(01) , P(01)(01) , G(00)(00) , P(00)(00) ) ; 
 
 -- "BK" cells row 2 
BK ( G(07)(04) , P(07)(04) , G(07)(06) , P(07)(06) , G(05)(04) , P(05)(04) ) ; 
BK ( G(03)(00) , P(03)(00) , G(03)(02) , P(03)(02) , G(01)(00) , P(01)(00) ) ; 
 
 -- "BK" cells row 3 
BK ( G(07)(00) , P(07)(00) , G(07)(04) , P(07)(04) , G(03)(00) , P(03)(00) ) ; 
 
 -- "BK" cells row 4 
BK ( G(05)(00) , P(05)(00) , G(05)(04) , P(05)(04) , G(03)(00) , P(03)(00) ) ; 
 
 -- "BK" cells row 5 
BK ( G(02)(00) , P(02)(00) , G(02)(02) , P(02)(02) , G(01)(00) , P(01)(00) ) ; 
BK ( G(04)(00) , P(04)(00) , G(04)(04) , P(04)(04) , G(03)(00) , P(03)(00) ) ; 
BK ( G(06)(00) , P(06)(00) , G(06)(06) , P(06)(06) , G(05)(00) , P(05)(00) ) ; 
 
 -- "XOR" gates row 
Cout <= G(07)(00) ; 
S(07) <= P(07)(07) xor G(06)(00) ; 
S(06) <= P(06)(06) xor G(05)(00) ; 
S(05) <= P(05)(05) xor G(04)(00) ; 
S(04) <= P(04)(04) xor G(03)(00) ; 
S(03) <= P(03)(03) xor G(02)(00) ; 
S(02) <= P(02)(02) xor G(01)(00) ; 
S(01) <= P(01)(01) xor G(00)(00) ; 
S(00) <= P(00)(00) ; 
 
end structural ;                                                                     
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